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978-1-107-11582-8 — How Dictatorships Work
Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz
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How Dictatorships Work

This accessible volume shines a light on how autocracy really works by providing basic facts about how post–World War II dictatorships achieve, retain, and lose power. The authors present an evidence-based portrait of key features of the authoritarian landscape with newly collected data on about 200 dictatorial regimes. They examine the central political processes that shape the policy choices of dictatorships and how they compel reaction from policy makers in the rest of the world. Importantly, this book explains how some dictators concentrate great power in their own hands at the expense of other members of the dictatorial elite. Dictators who can monopolize decision-making in their countries cause much of the erratic, warlike behavior that disturbs the rest of the world. By providing a picture of the central processes common to dictatorships, this book puts the experience of specific countries in perspective, leading to an informed understanding of events and the likely outcome of foreign responses to autocracies.

BARBARA GEDDES teaches at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Her 1999 article in the *Annual Review of Political Science* is credited with changing the way social scientists think about dictatorships. She has written extensively on regime transition, dictatorial politics, and research design. She has won awards for data creation and graduate student mentoring.

JOSEPH WRIGHT'S research examines how international factors – such as foreign aid, sanctions, human rights regimes, and migration – influence politics in dictatorships. He is the author of multiple articles published in top-ranked political science journals, as well as the award-winning book (with Abel Escribà-Folch) *Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival*.

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How Dictatorships Work

Power, Personalization, and Collapse

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To our (ten) children:

Dylan

Danielle

Darcy

Demetria

Lee

Luca

Enzo

Rania

Luciana

Felix

who help us keep it all in perspective

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Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	page xi
<i>List of Tables</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv
I Introduction	I
<i>Implementing Our Definition of Regime</i>	5
<i>The Groups That Initiate Dictatorships</i>	7
<i>Conflict and Bargaining within the Seizure Group</i>	10
<i>Plan of the Book</i>	13
<i>Appendix: Coding Rules for Authoritarian Regimes</i>	18
PART I INITIATION	
2 Autocratic Seizures of Power	25
<i>Who Do Dictatorial Seizure Groups Oust?</i>	26
<i>How Dictatorships Begin</i>	26
<i>Before the Seizure of Power</i>	33
<i>The Morning after a Seizure of Power</i>	36
<i>Post-Seizure Organization</i>	38
<i>Conclusion</i>	42
3 What Do We Know about Coups?	44
<i>Coups for Various Purposes</i>	46
<i>Preconditions Associated with Regime-Change Coups</i>	47
<i>Inequality and Coups</i>	54
<i>Conclusion</i>	56

PART II ELITE CONSOLIDATION

- | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 4 | Power Concentration: The Effect of Elite Factionalism on Personalization | 61 |
| | <i>Elite Bargaining in Dictatorships</i> | 65 |
| | <i>Handing Power to a Leader</i> | 68 |
| | <i>Bargaining over the Distribution of Resources and Power</i> | 74 |
| | <i>Characteristics That Influence the Credibility of Threats to Oust the Dictator</i> | 76 |
| | <i>Measuring Personalism</i> | 79 |
| | <i>Patterns of Personalism</i> | 85 |
| | <i>The Effect of Factionalism on the Personalization of Power</i> | 89 |
| | <i>Conclusion</i> | 92 |
| 5 | Dictatorial Survival Strategies in Challenging Conditions: Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party Creation | 95 |
| | <i>The Strategic Context</i> | 97 |
| | <i>The Interaction of Dispersed Arms and Factionalism</i> | 99 |
| | <i>The Strategic Creation of New Political Actors</i> | 101 |
| | <i>Evidence That Post-Seizure Party Creation Aims to Counterbalance Factionalized Armed Supporters</i> | 105 |
| | <i>Post-Seizure Party Creation and Dictatorial Survival</i> | 115 |
| | <i>The Effect of Post-Seizure Party Creation on the Likelihood of Coups</i> | 118 |
| | <i>Conclusion</i> | 123 |

PART III RULING SOCIETY: IMPLEMENTATION AND INFORMATION GATHERING

- | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 6 | Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships? | 129 |
| | <i>Implementation, Monitoring, and Information Gathering</i> | 129 |
| | <i>Elite Competition and Institutions That Engage Citizens</i> | 131 |
| | <i>Parties</i> | 131 |
| | <i>Dictatorial Legislatures</i> | 136 |
| | <i>Elections</i> | 137 |
| | <i>Conclusion</i> | 150 |
| 7 | Double-Edged Swords: Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and Coercion | 154 |
| | <i>Internal Security Agencies</i> | 156 |
| | <i>The Army: Bulwark of the Regime or Incubator of Plots?</i> | 162 |
| | <i>The Relationship between Counterbalancing and Interference</i> | 167 |
| | <i>Conclusion</i> | 173 |

PART IV DICTATORIAL SURVIVAL AND BREAKDOWN

- | | | |
|---|------------------------------------------|-----|
| 8 | Why Dictatorships Fall | 177 |
| | <i>How Dictatorships End</i> | 178 |
| | <i>Individual Support and Opposition</i> | 181 |

<i>Contents</i>	ix
<i>The Effect of Crisis on Decisions to Oppose the Dictatorship</i>	186
<i>Economic Crisis and Breakdown</i>	187
<i>Power Concentration and Regime Survival</i>	190
<i>Leadership Changes and Regime Breakdown</i>	201
<i>The Dictator's Future and the Likelihood of Democratization</i>	206
<i>The Effect of Personalization on Prospects for Democracy</i>	211
<i>Conclusion</i>	214
9 <i>Conclusion and Policy Implications</i>	218
<i>References</i>	237
<i>Index</i>	253

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-11582-8 — How Dictatorships Work
Barbara Geddes , Joseph Wright , Erica Frantz
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

Figures

3.1	Regime-initiating coups against incumbent dictatorships	<i>page</i> 49
3.2	Coups against incumbent democracies	53
3.3	Causes of coups in dictatorships, by coup type	55
4.1	Frequency of events that end dictatorships	72
4.2	Illustration of personalism scores	83
4.3	The first dictator's advantage in personalizing power	87
4.4	Personalizing power after the first three years	88
4.5	United versus factionalized seizure groups	91
5.1	Post-seizure party creation and the rotation of dictatorial leadership	109
5.2	Post-seizure party creation and military marginalization	110
5.3	Post-seizure party creation before the leader's election	111
5.4	Post-seizure party creation, age, and rank of first dictator	112
5.5	Effect of age, rank, and previous regime on post-seizure party creation	113
5.6	Post-seizure party creation over time	114
5.7	Parties and regime survival	118
5.8	Coups in dictatorships with post-seizure parties or no parties	119
5.9	Post-seizure party creation and coup risk	121
5.10	Post-seizure party creation and reshuffling versus regime-change coups	123
6.1	Foreign aid and the election of dictators	139
6.2	The electoral spending cycle in dictatorships	146
6.3	Dictatorial elections and health outcomes	148
7.1	Paramilitary forces and interference in the army	171
7.2	Loyalist paramilitary forces and interference	172
8.1	How autocratic regimes end	179
8.2	Semi-competitive elections and coup attempts in dictatorships	180

8.3	Economic crisis, party networks, and authoritarian breakdown	189
8.4	The effect of personalism on authoritarian breakdown	196
8.5	The effects of personalism in dictatorships with different leadership configurations	200
8.6	Probability that dictator exit coincides with regime collapse	203
8.7	Effect of personalism on capacity to handle succession	204
8.8	Personalism and post-death regime survival	205
8.9	Personalism and democratization	212
8.10	Personalism, military rule, and democratization	214

Tables

2.1 Proportion of dictatorships begun by different kinds of seizures of power	<i>page 28</i>
2.2 Proportion of dictatorships begun by different kinds of seizure groups	31
3.1 Area under the ROC for models of regime-change coups in dictatorships	52

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-11582-8 — How Dictatorships Work
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Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

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