default search action
Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 69
Volume 69, Number 1, May 2010
- Pradeep Dubey, Eric Maskin, Yair Tauman:
A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday. 1 - Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg:
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents. 2-23 - James J. Anton, Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo:
Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data. 24-41 - Bernard De Meyer:
Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information. 42-71 - Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos:
Grading exams: 100, 99, 98, ... or A, B, C? 72-94 - Olivier Gossner:
Ability and knowledge. 95-106 - Sergiu Hart, Yishay Mansour:
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures. 107-126 - Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet:
A commitment folk theorem. 127-137 - Gil Kivetz, Yair Tauman:
Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions. 138-149 - Jinpeng Ma:
The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). 150-164 - Abraham Neyman, Joel Spencer:
Complexity and effective prediction. 165-168 - Dov Samet:
Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case. 169-174
- Adam Brandenburger:
The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games. 175-183 - Yuval Heller:
All-stage strong correlated equilibrium. 184-188 - Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray, Roberto Serrano:
A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions. 189-193 - Yi-You Yang:
On the accessibility of the core. 194-199
Volume 69, Number 2, July 2010
- Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Andrew Schotter:
Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and fixed costs. 205-223 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Anirban Kar:
On obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. 224-237 - Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin:
Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: Beyond the Folk solution. 238-248 - Pablo Brañas-Garza, Ramón Cobo-Reyes, María Paz Espinosa, Natalia Jiménez, Jaromír Kovárík, Giovanni Ponti:
Altruism and social integration. 249-257 - Xiaoyong Cao, Guoqiang Tian:
Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs. 258-273 - Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero, Martin Sefton:
Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence. 274-292 - Robert Dur, Joeri Sol:
Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives. 293-301 - Lars Ehlers:
Manipulation via capacities revisited. 302-311 - Florian Englmaier, Achim Wambach:
Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. 312-328 - Theresa C. Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach:
Minority voting and long-term decisions. 329-345 - David Gill, Rebecca Stone:
Fairness and desert in tournaments. 346-364 - Hanna Halaburda:
Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences. 365-393 - Yuval Heller:
Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol. 394-400 - Pietro Ortoleva:
Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion. 411-424 - Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver:
House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization. 425-445 - Bernhard von Stengel, Shmuel Zamir:
Leadership games with convex strategy sets. 446-457 - David H. Wolpert:
Why income comparison is rational. 458-474 - Özgür Yilmaz:
The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments. 475-491
- Francesco De Sinopoli, Carlos Pimienta:
Costly network formation and regular equilibria. 492-497 - Fuhito Kojima, Yuki Takagi:
A theory of hung juries and informative voting. 498-502 - David de Meza, Ben Lockwood:
Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options. 503-511 - Bernhard von Stengel:
Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. 512-516
- William S. Zwicker:
Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano, , Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power (2008) Cambridge University Press 184 pages. 517-522
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.