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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 76
Volume 76, Number 1, September 2012
- Yakov Babichenko:
Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria. 1-14 - Roberto Burguet
, Juan-José Ganuza, Esther Hauk:
Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement. 15-25 - Timothy N. Cason, Roman M. Sheremeta, Jingjing Zhang:
Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games. 26-43 - Thorsten Chmura, Sebastian J. Goerg, Reinhard Selten:
Learning in experimental 2×2 games. 44-73 - Songzi Du:
Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play. 74-87 - Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper:
Unbeatable imitation. 88-96 - John Duffy, Jack Ochs:
Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games. 97-116 - Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom, Sara Munkhammar:
Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs? 117-130 - Wedad Elmaghraby, Nathan Larson:
Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs. 131-159 - Arantza Estévez-Fernández:
New characterizations for largeness of the core. 160-180 - Emel Filiz-Ozbay:
Incorporating unawareness into contract theory. 181-194 - Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lünser, Jean-Robert Tyran:
Competition fosters trust. 195-209 - Ali Jadbabaie, Pooya Molavi, Alvaro Sandroni, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi:
Non-Bayesian social learning. 210-225 - René Kirkegaard:
Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps. 226-248 - Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn:
Political competition between differentiated candidates. 249-271 - Priscilla T. Y. Man:
Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games. 272-284 - Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy:
Strategy-proof partitioning. 285-300 - Philip R. Neary:
Competing conventions. 301-328 - Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium. 329-339 - Juha Tolvanen, Elefterios Soultanis:
A correction to "Large games and the law of large numbers" [Games Econom. Behav. 64(2008) 1-34]. 340-343 - René van den Brink:
Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks. 344-348
- Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong:
Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter. 349-353
Volume 76, Number 2, November 2012
- Hassan Benchekroun, Cees Withagen:
On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game. 355-374 - Yuval Heller:
Justifiable choice. 375-390 - T. Renee Bowen, Zaki Zahran:
On dynamic compromise. 391-419 - David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou:
Smooth multibidding mechanisms. 420-438 - Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren:
Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case. 439-456 - Thomas Buser:
Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences. 457-470 - Franz Dietrich:
Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework. 471-494 - Nejat Anbarci, Nick Feltovich:
Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study. 495-514 - Stefano Colombo:
A comment on "welfare reducing licensing". 515-518 - Prajit K. Dutta:
Coordination need not be a problem. 519-534 - Stefan Terstiege:
Endogenous information and stochastic contracts. 535-547 - Huan Xie, Yong-Ju Lee:
Social norms and trust among strangers. 548-555 - Andrea Collevecchio, Marco LiCalzi:
The probability of nontrivial common knowledge. 556-570 - Bo Chen, Satoru Takahashi:
A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting. 571-581 - Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique:
When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? 582-595 - Kang Rong:
Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration. 596-610 - Kirill Chernomaz, Dan Levin:
Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study. 611-635
- Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta:
Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact. 636-647
- Charles Zhoucheng Zheng:
Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions. 648-664 - Miguel A. Hinojosa, Eulalia Romero, José Manuel Zarzuelo:
Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value. 665-677 - Dirk Engelmann, Martin Strobel:
Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. 678-689 - Kirill Chernomaz:
On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study. 690-710 - Marie Laclau:
A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network. 711-737 - Penélope Hernández, Amparo Urbano, José Enrique Vila:
Pragmatic languages with universal grammars. 738-752 - David Martimort, Lars Stole:
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency. 753-772
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