Collecting channel selection and information value of a closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility

The paper aims to explore how the participants in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) select collecting strategies under the scenarios of information symmetry and asymmetry, and to investigate the value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cost information for participants.

This paper constructs a two-echelon CLSC Stackelberg game consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer undertakes CSR and is responsible for the remanufacturing of used products. First, the authors establish two collecting models under information symmetry: manufacturer-collecting and retailer-collecting. Second, the authors construct two collecting models under information asymmetry and propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the participants’ profits. Finally, the authors make a numerical analysis to verify the results.

Under information symmetry, the profit of the participant who does not undertake collecting is positively related to the collecting rate, and the other participant may not benefit from the increase in the collecting rate. Under information asymmetry, the manufacturer will still select the retailer-collecting channel. Asymmetric information only affects the retailer’s selection. In addition, the manufacturer’s private CSR cost information is always valuable to the retailer.

This paper first explores the influence of the CSR cost information value on the selection of collecting channel under information asymmetry in the CLSC. The results can help company managers choose optimal collecting channel under information symmetry or under information asymmetry.