A process-algebraic approach for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference¹

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Aldini, Alessandro^{a; *} | Bravetti, Mario^b | Gorrieri, Roberto^b

Affiliations: [a] Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie dell'Informazione, Università di Urbino, Piazza della Repubblica 13, 61029 Urbino, Italy | [b] Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Informazione, Università di Bologna, Italy

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. Tel./Fax: +3907224475; E-mail: [email protected].

Note: [1] Preliminary results of this paper appeared in: A. Aldini, Probabilistic information flow in a process algebra, in: Proc. of 12th Int. Conf. on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2001), Springer LNCS, Vol. 2154, pp. 152–168 and A. Aldini, On the extension of non-interference with probabilities, in: 2nd ACM SIGPLAN and IFIP WG 1.7 Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS 2002).

Abstract: We define several security properties for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference as a conservative extension of a classical, nondeterministic, process-algebraic approach to information flow theory. We show that probabilistic covert channels (that are not observable in the nondeterministic setting) may be revealed through our approach and that probabilistic information can be exploited to give an estimate of the amount of confidential information flowing to unauthorized users. Finally, we present a case study showing that the expressiveness of the calculus we adopt makes it possible to model and analyze real concurrent systems.

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2004-12202

Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 191-245, 2004