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{{Short description|
[[File:Number of countries experiencing autocratization and democratization, 1900–2000.jpg|thumb|upright=1.
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2021}}
{{Democracy sidebar}}
'''Democratic backsliding{{efn|Other names include autocratization, democratic decline,<ref name=Mietzner>{{cite journal |last1=Mietzner |first1=Marcus |title=Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials |journal=Democratization |date=2021 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=161–178 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1796649|s2cid=225475139 }}</ref> de-democratization,<ref>[[Cas Mudde|Mudde, Cas]] and
Proposed causes of democratic backsliding include [[economic inequality]], [[culturally conservative]] reactions to societal changes, [[populist]] or [[Cult of personality|personalist]] politics, and external influence from [[great power politics]]. During crises, backsliding can occur when leaders impose autocratic rules during [[states of emergency]] that are either disproportionate to the severity of the crisis or remain in place after the situation has improved.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Pandemic Backsliding|publisher=V-Dem|url=https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/|access-date=23 January 2021|website=www.v-dem.net|archive-date=21 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201221152151/https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/|url-status=dead}}</ref>
==Manifestations==
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* An over-emphasis on [[national security]] as response to acts of terrorism or perceived antagonists.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox" />
==
{{further|Hybrid regime}}
Democratic backsliding can occur in several common ways. Backsliding is often led by democratically elected leaders, who use "incremental rather than revolutionary" tactics.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-Empirical-Assessment.pdf|title=The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment|last1=Kyle|first1=Jordan|last2=Mounk|first2=Yascha|date=December 2018|publisher=Tony Blair Institute for Global Change|access-date=17 May 2019|archive-date=30 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210130094058/https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-Empirical-Assessment.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> As emphasized by [[Steven Levitsky]] and [[Daniel Ziblatt]], it is difficult to pinpoint a single specific moment at which a government is no longer democratic, given that this process of decline manifests "slowly, in barely visible steps".<ref name=":1" /> [[Ozan Varol]] uses the phrase ''stealth [[authoritarianism]]'' to describe the practice of an authoritarian leader (or a potential authoritarian leader) using "seemingly legitimate legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends ... concealing anti-democratic practices under the mask of law."<ref name="Varol">{{Cite encyclopedia|author=[[Ozan Varol|Ozan O.Varol]]|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e5WRDwAAQBAJ|title=Stealth Authoritarianism in Turkey|
===Promissory coups===
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===Executive aggrandizement===
In political science, executive aggrandizement refers to the expansion of the leader's power beyond the "[[checks and balances]]" provided by the legislature and the judiciary, or by interfering with the independence of the public service. Even a legitimately elected leader can undermine democracy or cause a democratic backlash by using government resources to weaken his political opposition.<ref>Williamson, Vanessa (2023). [https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/ Understanding democratic decline in the United States] ''brookings.edu''.</ref>
This process contains a series of institutional changes by the elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government and hold it to account.<ref name=":6" /> The most important feature of executive aggrandizement is that the institutional changes are made through legal channels, making it seem as if the elected official has a democratic mandate.<ref name=":02" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=How Democracies Die|last1=Levitsky|first1=Steven|last2=Ziblatt|first2=Daniel|publisher=Crown|year=2018|location=United States|pages=76–78}}</ref> Some examples of executive aggrandizement are the decline of media freedom and the weakening of the [[rule of law]] (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government), such as when judicial autonomy is threatened.<ref name=":02" />▼
▲This process contains a series of institutional changes by
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-14439, Rede Adolf Hitlers zum Ermächtigungsgesetz.jpg|thumb|315x315px|[[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] gives a speech to the [[Reichstag (Weimar Republic)|Reichstag]] in support of the [[Enabling Act of 1933|Enabling Act]]. The collapse of the [[Weimar Republic]] into [[Nazi Germany]] is perhaps the most infamous example of democratic backsliding.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Levitsky|first1=Steven|title=[[How Democracies Die]]|last2=Ziblatt|first2=Daniel|publisher=Crown|year=2018|isbn=978-1-5247-6293-3|location=New York|pages=95}}</ref> ]]▼
▲[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-14439, Rede Adolf Hitlers zum Ermächtigungsgesetz.jpg|thumb|
Over time, there has been a decline in [[Coup d'état|active coups]] (in which a power-seeking individual, or small group, seizes power through forcibly, violently removing an existing government) and [[self-coup]]s (involving "a freely elected chief executive suspending the constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep") and an increase in ''executive aggrandizement''.<ref name=":02" /> Political scientist [[Nancy Bermeo]] notes that executive aggrandizement occurs over time, through institutional changes legitimized through legal means, such as new [[constituent assembly|constituent assemblies]], [[referendum]]s, or "existing courts or legislatures ... in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies."<ref name=":02" /> Bermeo notes that these methods mean that the aggrandizement of the executive "can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate."<ref name=":02" /> Executive aggrandizement is characterized by the presence of distress in axes of democracy, including institutional or horizontal accountability;<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/legitimacy-9780198825265?cc=nl&lang=en&|title=Legitimacy: The State and Beyond|date=1 April 2019|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-882526-5|editor-last=Sadurski|editor-first=Wojciech|editor-link=Wojciech Sadurski|location=Oxford, New York|editor-last2=Sevel|editor-first2=Michael|editor-last3=Walton|editor-first3=Kevin}}</ref> and executive or discursive accountability.<ref>{{Cite book|chapter=III Factors, 25 Populism versus Democratic Governance|title=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?|url=https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001/law-9780190888985-chapter-25|isbn=9780190888985|last=Issacharoff|first=Samuel|editor3-first=Tushnet|editor3-last=Mark|editor2-first=Levinson|editor2-last=Sanford|editor1-first=Graber|editor1-last=Mark a|website=Oxford Constitutions|year=2018|language=en|doi=10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001|access-date=15 May 2020|archive-date=16 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116125232/https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001/law-9780190888985-chapter-25|url-status=live}}</ref>▼
▲Over time, there has been a decline in [[Coup d'état|active coups]] (in which a power-seeking individual, or small group, seizes power through forcibly, violently removing an existing government) and [[self-coup]]s (involving "a freely elected chief executive suspending the constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep") and an increase in ''executive aggrandizement''.<ref name=":02" /> Political scientist [[Nancy Bermeo]] notes that executive aggrandizement occurs over time, through institutional changes legitimized through legal means, such as new [[constituent assembly|constituent assemblies]], [[referendum]]s, or "existing courts or legislatures ... in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies."<ref name=":02" /> Bermeo notes that these methods mean that the aggrandizement of the executive "can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate."<ref name=":02" /> Executive aggrandizement is characterized by the presence of distress in axes of democracy, including institutional or horizontal accountability;<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/legitimacy-9780198825265?cc=nl&lang=en&|title=Legitimacy: The State and Beyond|date=1 April 2019|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-882526-5|editor-last=Sadurski|editor-first=Wojciech|editor-link=Wojciech Sadurski|location=Oxford, New York|editor-last2=Sevel|editor-first2=Michael|editor-last3=Walton|editor-first3=Kevin}}</ref> and executive or discursive accountability.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Issacharoff |first=Samuel |year=2018 |chapter=III Factors, 25 Populism versus Democratic Governance|title=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? |
===Incremental election subversion===
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==Causes and characteristics==
The [[V-Dem Institute#V-Party Dataset|V-Party Dataset]] demonstrates a
▲The [[V-Dem Institute#V-Party Dataset|V-Party Dataset]] demonstrates a statistically significantly greater probability of autocratization for victorious parties with very high populism, high anti-pluralism, lack of commitment to the democratic process, acceptance of political violence, far-right culturally or far-left economic characteristics.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Medzihorsky, Juraj |author2=Lindberg, Staffan I |title=Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties |journal=Party Politics |date=2023 |doi=10.1177/13540688231153092 |hdl=2077/68137 |s2cid=265727508 |url=https://v-dem.net/media/publications/working_paper_116_final.pdf}}</ref>
===Populism===
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Some, but not all, populists are authoritarian, emphasizing "the importance of protecting [[Traditionalist conservatism|traditional]] lifestyles against perceived threats from 'outsiders', even at the expense of civil liberties and [[minority rights]]."<ref name="Norris"/> According to Norris, the reinforcement of the insecurities from the "twin forces" has led to more support for populist-authoritarian leaders, and this latter risk was especially pronounced in the United States during the [[presidency of Donald Trump]]. For example, Norris argues that Trump benefited from the mistrust of "[[the establishment]]" and that he continuously sought to undermine faith in the legitimacy of the media and the [[Judicial independence|independence of the court]]s.<ref name="Norris"/>
In 2017, [[Cas Mudde]] and
<blockquote>Populism does not have the same effect in each stage of the democratization process. In fact, we suggest that populism tends to play a positive role in the promotion of electoral or minimal democracy, but a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a full-fledged liberal democratic regime. Consequently, while populism tends to favor the democratization of authoritarian regimes, it is prone to diminish the quality of liberal democracies. Populism supports popular sovereignty, but it is inclined to oppose any limitations on majority rule, such as judicial independence and minority rights. Populism-in-power has led to processes of de-democratization (e.g., [[Viktor Orban|[Viktor] Orbán]] in Hungary or [[Hugo Chavez|[Hugo] Chávez]] in Venezuela) and, in some extreme cases, even to the breakdown of the democratic regime (e.g., [[Alberto Fujimori|[Alberto] Fujimori]] in Peru).<ref>[[Cas Mudde|Mudde, Cas]] and
A 2018 analysis by political scientists [[Yascha Mounk]] and Jordan Kyle links populism to democratic backsliding, showing that since 1990, "13 right-wing populist governments have been elected; of these, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Over the same time period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number, five, brought about significant democratic backsliding."<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Mounk |first1=Yascha |last2=Kyle |first2=Jordan |date=26 December 2018 |title=What Populists Do to Democracies |website=The Atlantic |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/
A December 2018 report by the [[Tony Blair Institute for Global Change]] concluded that populist rule, whether left- or right-wing, leads to a significant risk of democratic backsliding. The authors examine the effect of populism on three major aspects of democracy: the quality of democracy in general, [[Checks and Balances]] on executive power and citizens' right to politically participate in a meaningful way. They conclude that populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. Also, more than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten the countries' constitution, frequently in a way that eroded checks and balances on executive power. Lastly, populists attack individual rights such as freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights.<ref name=":3" />
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Many [[political economy]] scholars, such as [[Daron Acemoglu]] and [[James A. Robinson (economist)|James A. Robinson]], have investigated the effect of income inequality on the democratic breakdown.<ref name=":2" /> Studies of democratic collapse show that [[economic inequality]] is significantly higher in countries that eventually move towards a more authoritarian model.<ref name=":4" /> Hungary is an example of a country where a large group of unemployed, low-educated people were dissatisfied with the high levels of inequality, especially after the [[financial crisis of 2007–2008]]. [[Viktor Orbán]] used this dissatisfaction of a relatively large segment of the population to his advantage, winning popular support by using national-populist rhetoric.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Greskovitz|first=Béla|date=2015|title=The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East-Central Europe|journal=Global Policy|volume=6|issue=1|pages=28–37|doi=10.1111/1758-5899.12225}}</ref>
===
{{See also|Business-firm party}}
A 2019 study found that personalism had an adverse impact on democracy in Latin America: "presidents who dominate their own weakly organized parties are more likely to seek to concentrate power, undermine horizontal accountability, and trample the rule of law than presidents who preside over parties that have an independent leadership and an institutionalized bureaucracy."<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Rhodes-Purdy |first1=Matthew |last2=Madrid |first2=Raúl L. |date=27 November 2019 |title=The perils of personalism |journal=Democratization |volume=27 |issue=2 |pages=321–339 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2019.1696310 |s2cid=212974380 |issn=1351-0347}}</ref>
===
{{Main article|Political impact of the COVID-19 pandemic|Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on journalism}}
Many national governments worldwide delayed, postponed or canceled a variety of democratic elections at both national and subnational governmental levels resulting in the [[COVID-19 pandemic]] opening gaps in the action of democracy.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections |title=Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections |website=www.idea.int |access-date=28 January 2021 |archive-date=13 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210313030648/https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lewkowicz |first1=Jacek |last2=Woźniak |first2=Michał |last3=Wrzesiński |first3=Michał |date=January 2022 |title=COVID-19 and erosion of democracy
According to the V-Dem Institute, only 39% of all countries have committed no or only minor violations of democratic standards in response to COVID-19.<ref>B. Edgell, A., Grahn, S., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A. and F. Maerz, S. (2021). [https://web.archive.org/web/20210131170154/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b9/2e/b92e59da-2a06-4d2e-82a1-b0a8dece4af7/v-dem_policybrief-24_update-pandemic-backsliding_200702.pdf "An Update on Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy Four Months After the Beginning of the Covid-19 Pandemic".] V-dem.net. Accessed 31 January 2021.</ref> According to Ingo Keilitz, both authoritarian leaders and [[surveillance capitalism|surveillance capitalists]] used the pandemic to "make massive shifts and reprogramming of our sensibilities about privacy and civil liberties that may not be reversible". Keilitz saw this as a threat to judicial independence.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Keilitz |first1=Ingo |title=Illiberalism Enabled by the Coronavirus Pandemic: An Existential Threat to Judicial Independence |journal=International Journal for Court Administration |date=10 August 2020 |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=2 |doi=10.36745/ijca.339 |s2cid=225514092 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
===
Great power transitions have contributed to democratic backsliding and the spread of authoritarianism in two ways: "First, the sudden rise of autocratic Great Powers led to waves of autocracy driven by conquest but also by self-interest and even admiration, as in the fascist wave of the 1930s or the post-1945 communist wave. Second, the sudden rise of democratic hegemons led to [[waves of democratization]], but these waves inevitably overextended and collapsed, leading to failed consolidation and rollback."<ref>{{Citation|last=Gunitsky|first=Seva|title=Great Powers and the Spread of Autocracy Since the Cold War|date=2021|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/before-and-after-the-fall/great-powers-and-the-spread-of-autocracy-since-the-cold-war/D7F3EC6F0C4B41F5742693AB13DE28AD|work=Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War|pages=225–243|editor-last=Bartel|editor-first=Fritz|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108910194.014|isbn=978-1-108-90677-7|s2cid=244851964|editor2-last=Monteiro|editor2-first=Nuno P.|access-date=17 December 2021|archive-date=11 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220111013819/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/before-and-after-the-fall/great-powers-and-the-spread-of-autocracy-since-the-cold-war/D7F3EC6F0C4B41F5742693AB13DE28AD|url-status=live}}</ref>
===
Global variation in democracy is primarily explained by variance between popular adherence to authoritarian values vs. emancipative values, which explains around 70 percent of the variation of democracy between countries every year since 1960. Emancipative values, as measured by the [[World Values Survey]], have been consistently rising over time in response to increasing economic prosperity.<ref name=Welzel/>
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Political scientist [[Christian Welzel]] argues that the third wave of democratization overshot the demand for democracy in some countries. Therefore, Welzel sees the current autocratization trend as [[regression to the mean]], but expects that it too will reverse in response to long-term changes in values.<ref name=Welzel>{{cite journal |last1=Welzel |first1=Christian |title=Why The Future Is Democratic |journal=Journal of Democracy |date=2021 |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=132–144 |doi=10.1353/jod.2021.0024 |s2cid=234920048 |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-the-future-is-democratic/ |issn=1086-3214 |access-date=28 February 2022 |archive-date=28 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220228041154/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-the-future-is-democratic/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
===
The 2019 Annual Democracy Report of the V-Dem Institute at the [[University of Gothenburg]] identified three challenges confronting global democracy: (1) "Government manipulation of media, civil society, rule of law, and elections"; (2) rising "toxic polarization", including "the division of society into distrustful, antagonistic camps"; diminishing "respect for opponents, factual reasoning, and engagement with society" among political elites; and increasing use of [[hate speech]] by political leaders; and (3) foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily digital, and mostly affecting Taiwan, the United States, and former [[Soviet bloc]] nations such as [[Latvia]].<ref name="2019VDem">{{Cite report|url=https://
According to [[Suzanne Mettler]] and [[Robert C. Lieberman]], four characteristics have typically provided the conditions for democratic backsliding (alone or in combination): [[Political polarization]], racism and nativism, economic inequality, and excessive executive power.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mettler|first=Suzanne|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1155487679|title=Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=2020|isbn=978-1-250-24442-0|location=New York|oclc=1155487679|access-date=14 August 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317155808/https://www.worldcat.org/title/four-threats-the-recurring-crises-of-american-democracy/oclc/1155487679|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=History tells us there are four key threats to U.S. democracy|author=Farrell, Henry|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|date=14 August 2020|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/14/history-tells-us-there-are-four-key-threats-us-democracy/|access-date=14 August 2020|archive-date=18 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210118163030/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/14/history-tells-us-there-are-four-key-threats-us-democracy/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Lieberman|first=By Suzanne Mettler and Robert C.|date=10 August 2020|title=The Fragile Republic|url=https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2020/08/10/the-fragile-republic/content.html|access-date=15 August 2020|website=Foreign Affairs|language=en-GB|archive-date=6 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201106005911/https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2020/08/10/the-fragile-republic/content.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman highlight three key causes of backsliding: "the pernicious effects of polarization; realignments of party systems that enable elected autocrats to gain legislative power; and the incremental nature of derogations, which divides oppositions and keeps them off balance."<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Haggard|first1=Stephan|last2=Kaufman|first2=Robert|date=2021|title=Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/backsliding/CCD2F28FB63A56409FF8911351F2E937|access-date=21 January 2021|publisher=Cambridge University Press|language=en|doi=10.1017/9781108957809|isbn=9781108957809|s2cid=242013001|archive-date=3 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303135223/https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/backsliding/CCD2F28FB63A56409FF8911351F2E937|url-status=live}}</ref> A 2022 study linked polarization to support for undemocratic politicians.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Orhan |first=Yunus Emre |date=2022 |title=The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence |url=
===Effects of judicial independence===
A 2011 study examined the effects of [[judicial independence]] in preventing democratic backsliding. The study, which analyzed 163 nations from 1960 to 2000, concluded that established independent judiciaries are successful at preventing democracies from drifting to authoritarianism, but that states with newly formed courts "are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies".<ref>{{cite journal |author=Douglas M. Gibler |author2=Kirk A. Randazzo |title=Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=55|issue=3|pages=696–709|date=2011|jstor=23024945|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x}}</ref>
==
{{see also|Democratic backsliding by country}}
[[File:Countries democratizing or autocratizing substantially and significantly 2010–2020.svg|thumb|upright=1.35|Countries autocratizing (red) or [[democratizing]] (blue) substantially and significantly (2010–2020), according to the [[V-Dem Democracy indices]]. Countries in grey are substantially unchanged.<ref>Nazifa Alizada, Rowan Cole, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Sebastian Hellmeier, Palina Kolvani, Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Shreeya Pillai, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2021. Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210914030243/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf |date=14 September 2021 }}</ref>]]
A study by the [[V-Dem Democracy indices]] by the V-Dem Institute at the [[University of Gothenburg]], which contains more than eighteen-million data points relevant to democracy, measuring 350 highly specific indicators across 174 countries as of the end of 2016, found that the number of democracies in the world modestly declined from 100 in 2011 to 97 in 2017; some countries moved toward democracy, while other countries moved away from democracy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mechkova|first1=Valeriya|last2=Lührmann|first2=Anna|last3=Lindberg|first3=Staffan I.|s2cid=158736288|date=2017|title=How Much Democratic Backsliding?|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=28|issue=4|pages=162–169|doi=10.1353/jod.2017.0075|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> V-Dem's 2019 Annual Democracy Report found that the trend of autocratization continued, while "24 countries are now severely affected by what is established as a 'third wave of autocratization{{'"}} including "populous countries such as Brazil, Bangladesh and the United States, as well as several Eastern European countries" (specifically Bulgaria and Serbia).<ref name=2019VDem/> The report found that an increasing proportion of the world population lived in countries undergoing autocratization (2.3 billion in 2018).<ref name=2019VDem/> The report found that while the majority of countries were democracies, the number of liberal democracies declined to 39 by 2018 (down from 44 a decade earlier).<ref name=2019VDem/> The research group [[Freedom House]], in reports in 2017 and 2019, identified democratic backsliding in a variety of regions across the world.<ref name=":5">{{Cite report|url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|title=Democracy in Retreat|date=2019|publisher=Freedom House|access-date=17 May 2019|archive-date=15 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190215005216/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Esther King|url=http://www.politico.eu/article/democratic-backsliding-threatens-international-order-report/|title=Democratic backsliding threatens international order|date=31 January 2017|work=Politico|access-date=23 June 2017|archive-date=29 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170729092311/http://www.politico.eu/article/democratic-backsliding-threatens-international-order-report/|url-status=live}}</ref> Freedom House's 2019 ''[[Freedom in the World]]'' report, titled ''Democracy in Retreat'', showed freedom of expression declining each year over the preceding 13 years, with sharper drops since 2012.<ref>{{Cite report|url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|title=Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019|year=2020|publisher=Freedom House|access-date=17 May 2019|archive-date=15 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190215005216/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|url-status=live}}</ref>
[[File:BTI 2022 DEM.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35| Global trend report [[Bertelsmann Transformation Index]] 2022<ref name="BTI 2022a">{{cite web | title=Global Dashboard | website=BTI 2022 | url=https://bti-project.org/en/reports/global-dashboard?&cb=00000 | access-date=Apr 17, 2023 | archive-date=17 April 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230417052038/https://bti-project.org/en/reports/global-dashboard?&cb=00000 | url-status=live }}</ref>]]
Scholarly work in the 2010s detailed democratic backsliding, in various forms and to various extents, in [[Hungary]] and [[Poland]],<ref name="Cianetti">{{Cite journal|title=Rethinking "democratic backsliding" in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland |author=Licia Cianetti |author2=James Dawson |author3=Seán Hanley |journal=East European Politics|volume=34|issue=3|date=2018|pages=243–256|quote=Over the past decade, a scholarly consensus has emerged that that democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is deteriorating, a trend often subsumed under the label 'backsliding'. ... the new dynamics of backsliding are best illustrated by the one-time democratic front-runners Hungary and Poland.|doi=10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401|doi-access=free}}</ref> the [[Czech Republic]],<ref name=Hanley>{{Cite journal|author=Seán Hanley & Milada Anna Vachudova|title=Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic|journal=East European Politics|volume=34|issue=3|pages=276–296|date=2018|doi=10.1080/21599165.2018.1493457|doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Turkey]],<ref name=Tansel>{{Cite journal|author=Cemal Burak Tansel|title=Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress|volume=23|issue=2|journal=South European Society and Politics|date=2018|pages=197–217|doi=10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=AkyuzHess>{{Cite journal|author=Kadir Akyuz & Steve Hess|s2cid=158084228|title=Turkey Looks East: International Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in a Hybrid Regime|journal=Mediterranean Quarterly|volume=29|issue=2|date=2018|pages=1–26|doi=10.1215/10474552-6898075}}</ref> [[Brazil]], [[Venezuela]],<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal|title=Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela|author=Laura Gamboa|s2cid=157426820|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=49|issue=4|date=2017|pages=457–477|doi = 10.5129/001041517821273044}}</ref><ref name="Sabatini">{{cite news|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2016-11-01/final-blow-venezuelas-democracy|title=The Final Blow to Venezuela's Democracy: What Latin America Can Do About It|last=Sabatini|first=Christopher|work=[[Foreign Affairs]]|date=1 November 2016|language=en-US|issn=0015-7120|access-date=27 May 2019|archive-date=25 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225184836/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2016-11-01/final-blow-venezuelas-democracy|url-status=live}}</ref> and [[India]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2021/02/05/democratic-erosion-in-india-a-case-study/|title=Democratic Erosion in India: A Case Study|website=www.democratic-erosion.com|date=5 February 2021 |access-date=14 March 2021|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317155809/https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2021/02/05/democratic-erosion-in-india-a-case-study/|url-status=live}}</ref> The scholarly recognition of the concept of democratic backsliding reflects a reversal from older views, which held "that democracy, once attained in a fairly wealthy state, would become a permanent fixture."<ref name="DemDigest"/> This older view came to be realized as erroneous beginning in the mid-2000s, as multiple scholars acknowledged that some seemingly-stable democracies have recently faced a decline in the quality of their democracy.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Huq|first1=Aziz|last2=Ginsburg|first2=Tom|date=2018|title=How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy|url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/uclalr65&div=5|journal=UCLA Law Review|volume=65|pages=78–169|access-date=15 May 2023|archive-date=15 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230515200309/https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/uclalr65&div=5|url-status=live}}</ref> Huq and Ginsburg identified in an academic paper "37 instances in 25 different countries in the postwar period in which democratic quality declined significantly (though a fully authoritarian regime didn't emerge)", including countries that were "seemingly stable, reasonably wealthy" democracies.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox"/> The [[V-Dem Institute#Democracy Report|V-Dem Democracy Report]] identified for the year 2023 23 cases of stand-alone autocratization and 19 cases of bell-turn autocratization.<ref name="report">[https://v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf Democracy Report 2024, Varieties of Democracy]</ref>
{|class="wikitable sortable" style="margin:1em auto;"
!width=200px|State
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!Ruling group or person
!Notes and references
|-
|{{flag|Georgia}}
|2019
|[[Georgian Dream]], especially under [[Irakli Kobakhidze]]
|<ref name="announcement">{{Cite web|url=https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80542|title=Georgia's Dangerous Slide Away From Democracy|website=Carnegie Europe|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205095701/https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80542|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://civil.ge/archives/611904 |title=BREAKING: US State Department Implements First Tranche of Sanctions against Georgian Individuals |publisher=Civil.ge |date=6 June 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2024-10-09 |title=EP adopts resolution on decline of democracy in Georgia with 495 votes |url=https://georgiatoday.ge/ep-adopts-resolution-on-decline-of-democracy-in-georgia-with-495-votes/ |access-date=2024-10-09 |website=Georgia Today |language=en-US}}</ref>
|-
|-
|{{flag|El Salvador}}
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|2014
|[[Bharatiya Janata Party]], under [[Narendra Modi]]
|<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ding |first1=Iza |last2=Slater |first2=Dan |date=2 January 2021 |title=Democratic decoupling |url=
|-
|{{flag|Israel}}
|2018
|[[Likud]], under [[Benjamin Netanyahu]]
|<ref>{{cite news|last1=Eshman|first1=Rob|title=When did Zionists become snowflakes?|url=https://forward.com/opinion/532939/anti-israel-protest-campus-zionists-palestine-snowflakes/|newspaper=[[The Forward]]|date=21 January 2023|access-date=7 July 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|author=Yaniv Roznai|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e5WRDwAAQBAJ|date=2018|title=Israel: A Crisis of Liberal Democracy?|
|-
|{{flag|Peru}}
|2022
|[[Popular Force]] and [[Dina Boluarte]]
|<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Banda |first1=Gonzalo |date=January 12, 2023 |title=At Peru Protests' Epicenter, Rage—And a Sense of Betrayal |url=https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/at-peru-protests-epicenter-rage-and-a-sense-of-betrayal/ |access-date=2023-01-15 |website=[[Americas Quarterly]] |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2023-01-04 |title=Perú Libre presentará moción de interpelación contra ministro del Interior |url=https://larepublica.pe/politica/2023/01/03/marcha-por-la-paz-peru-libre-presentara-mocion-de-interpelacion-contra-ministro-del-interior-victor-rojas-pnp-atmp/ |access-date=2023-01-12 |website=[[La República (Peru)|La Republica]] |language=es}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2023-01-02 |title=Daniel Encinas: "Dina Boluarte ha hecho una coalición con fuerzas que no ganaron la elección" |url=https://larepublica.pe/politica/actualidad/2023/01/02/pedro-castillo-daniel-encinas-dina-boluarte-ha-hecho-una-coalicion-con-fuerzas-que-no-ganaron-la-eleccion-golpe-de-estado-fuerzas-armadas-adelanto-de-elecciones/ |access-date=2023-01-12 |website=[[La República (Peru)|La Republica]] |language=es}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Noriega |first=Carlos |date=2023-05-17 |title=Perú: la Corte Suprema prohíbe el derecho a la protesta {{!}} Un paso más en la ofensiva autoritaria |url=https://www.pagina12.com.ar/550438-peru-la-corte-suprema-prohibe-el-derecho-a-la-protesta |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=[[Página 12]] |language=es}}</ref>
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|{{flag|Poland}}
|2015
|[[Law and Justice (Poland)|Law and Justice]]
|<ref name="democratization2019"/><ref name="Rohac"/><ref>[[Terry Gross|Gross, Terry]] (September 22, 2018) [https://www.npr.org/2018/09/27/652127648/journalist-polands-shift-toward-authoritarianism-is-a-red-flag-for-democracy "Poland's Shift Toward Authoritarianism Is A 'Red Flag' For Democracy"] [[NPR]]</ref><ref>The Washington Post editorial Board (December 21, 2018) [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/poland-is-sliding-into-authoritarianism-now-we-see-if-the-eu-can-stop-the-drift/2018/12/21/68fcebd6-02f9-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html "Poland is sliding into authoritarianism. Now we see if the E.U. can stop the drift"] ''[[The Washington Post]]''</ref><ref>Staff (May 15, 2019) [https://corporateeurope.org/en/2019/05/authoritarian-right-poland "Authoritarian right: Poland"] [[Corporate European Observatory]]</ref><ref>Easton, Adam (April 30, 2020) [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52489336 "Polish state becoming authoritarian, top judge Gersdorf says"] ''[[BBC]]''</ref><ref>Junes, Tom (May 19, 2020) [https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/19/in-poland-authoritarianism-may-turn-out-half-baked/ "In Poland, Authoritarianism May Turn Out Half-Baked"] ''[[Balkan Insight]]''</ref><ref>Przybylski, Wojciech (July 14, 2020) [https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-poland-authoritarian-government/ "How the EU can manage Poland's authoritarian government "] ''[[Politico]]''</ref>
|-
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|}
The 2020 report of the Varieties of Democracy Institute found that the global share of democracies declined from 54% in 2009 to 49% in 2019, and that a greater share of the global population lived in autocratizing countries (6% in 2009, 34% in 2019).<ref name=VDem2020>''[https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf Autocratization Surges–Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200330123413/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf |date=30 March 2020 }}'', V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg (March 2020).</ref> The 10 countries with the highest degree of democratizing from 2009 to 2019 were [[Tunisia]], [[Armenia]], [[The Gambia]], [[Sri Lanka]], [[Madagascar]], [[Myanmar]], [[Fiji]], [[Kyrgyzstan]], [[Ecuador]], and [[Niger]]; the 10 countries with the highest degree of autocratizing from 2009 to 2019 were [[Hungary]], [[Turkey]], [[Poland]], [[Serbia]], Brazil, [[Bangladesh]], [[Mali]], [[Thailand]], [[Nicaragua]], and [[Zambia]].<ref name=VDem2020/> However, the institute found that signs of hope in an "unprecedented degree of mobilization for democracy" as reflected in increases in pro-democracy mass mobilization; the proportion of countries with "substantial pro-democracy mass protests" increased to 44% in 2019 (from 27% in 2009).<ref name=VDem2020/> According to a 2020 study, "Democratic backsliding does not necessarily see all democratic institutions erode in parallel fashion... we establish that elections are improving and rights are retracting in the same time period, and in many of the same cases."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ding|first1=Iza|last2=Slater|first2=Dan|date=23 November 2020|title=Democratic decoupling|journal=Democratization|volume=28|pages=63–80|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1842361|issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free}}</ref>
Democracy indices with varying democracy concepts and measurement approaches show different
=== Central and Eastern Europe ===
{{See also|Democratic backsliding under Viktor Orbán|Polish constitutional crisis}}
In the 2010s, a scholarly consensus developed that the [[Central and Eastern Europe]] region was experiencing democratic backsliding, most prominently in [[Hungary]] and [[Poland]],<ref name="Cianetti" /> and the European Union (EU) failed to prevent democratic backsliding in some of its other [[European Union member states|member states]].<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last=Kelemen|first=R. Daniel|date=February 2020|title=The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium|language=en|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455?journalCode=rjpp20|volume=20|journal=Journal of European Public Policy|issue=3|pages=481–499|doi=10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455|s2cid=221055795
According to the [[Democracy Index]], backsliding in Europe is most advanced in Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania.{{when|date=July 2024}}{{Citation needed|date=July 2024}}
=== United States ===
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==See also==
* [[
==References==
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==Further reading==
{{Refbegin}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Andersen |first1=David |title=Comparative Democratization and Democratic Backsliding: The Case for a Historical-Institutional Approach |journal=Comparative Politics |date=July 2019 |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=645–663 |doi=10.5129/001041519X15647434970117 |doi-broken-date=25 March 2024 |jstor=26663952 |s2cid=201373568 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Bieber |first1=Florian|author-link=Florian Bieber |title=The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans |date=2019 |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-22149-2 |language=en}}
* {{cite book |last1=Cheeseman |first1=Nic |author-link1=Nic Cheeseman |first2=Brian |last2=Klaas |title=How to Rig an Election |location=New Haven |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-20443-8 |date=2018}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Daly |first1=Tom Gerald |title=Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field |journal=Hague Journal on the Rule of Law |date=April 2019 |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=9–36 |doi=10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2|s2cid=159354232 }}
* {{Cite book |last1=Geddes |first1=Barbara |title=How Dictatorships Work |last2=Wright |first2=Joseph |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2018 |isbn=9781107115828}}
* Grillo, Edoardo; Luo, Zhaotian; Nalepa, Monika; Prato, Carlo (2024). "Theories of Democratic Backsliding". ''Annual Review of Political Science''.
* {{cite book |last1=Haggard |first1=Stephan |last2=Kaufman |first2=Robert |title=Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World |date=2021 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-95840-0 |language=en}}
* {{cite journal |first1=Roberto Stefan |last1=Foa |first2=Yascha |last2=Mounk |author-link2=Yascha Mounk |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/danger-deconsolidation-democratic-disconnect |title=The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect |journal=[[Journal of Democracy]] |volume=27 |issue=3 |year=2016 |pages=5–17 |doi=10.1353/jod.2016.0049 |s2cid=156622248 |access-date=25 June 2018 |archive-date=11 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190311093027/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/danger-deconsolidation-democratic-disconnect |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |title=Liberalism and Its Discontents |author-link=Francis Fukuyama|first=Francis |last=Fukuyama |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |year=2022 |isbn=978-0374606718}}
* Jee, Haemin; Lueders, Hans; Myrick, Rachel (2021). "[[doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.2010709|Towards a unified approach to research on democratic backsliding]]". ''Democratization''
* {{cite book |last1=Klaas |first1=Brian |title=Despot's Accomplice: How the West is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy |date=2016 |publisher=Hurst Publishers |isbn=978-1-84904-930-6}}
* Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Marquardt, Kyle L.; Seim, Brigitte; Coppedge, Michael; Edgell, Amanda B.; Medzihorsky, Juraj; Pemstein, Daniel; Teorell, Jan; Gerring, John; Lindberg, Staffan I. (11 January 2024). "Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding". ''PS: Political Science & Politics''. doi:10.1017/S104909652300077X.
* {{cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Ziblatt |first2=Daniel |author1-link=Steven Levitsky |author2-link=Daniel Ziblatt |title=[[How Democracies Die]] |date=2018 |publisher=Crown |location=New York |isbn=978-1-5247-6293-3}}
* {{cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Way |first2=Lucan A. |title=Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War |date=2010 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511781353|isbn=9780511781353 }}
* Przeworski, Adam. 2019. ''Crises of Democracy''. Cambridge University Press.
* {{cite journal |last1=Waldner |first1=David |last2=Lust |first2=Ellen |title=Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |date=11 May 2018 |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=93–113 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628|doi-access=free }}
{{refend}}
==External links==
* {{Commonscatinline|Democratic backsliding}}
* ''[https://www.democratic-erosion.com Democratic Erosion Consortium],'' a
* [https://democracyparadox.com/the-democracy-paradox-podcast/ Podcast: Democracy Paradox], hundreds of interviews with democracy experts around the world, including exploring democratic breakdowns
[[Category:Democratic backsliding| ]]
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