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Changing short description from "Philosophical view regarding reason and knowledge" to "Epistemological view centered on reason" |
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{{Short description|Epistemological view centered on reason}}
{{About|the philosophical concept}}
{{Distinguish|rationality|Rationalization (disambiguation){{!}}rationalization}}
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In [[philosophy]], '''rationalism''' is the [[Epistemology|epistemological]] view that "regards [[reason]] as the chief source and test of knowledge"<ref name="Encyclopædia Britannica: Rationalism">{{cite web|url=http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/492034/rationalism|title=Rationalism|date=28 May 2023|publisher=[[Encyclopædia Britannica|Britannica.com]]|access-date=22 May 2013|archive-date=18 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150518105808/https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/492034/rationalism|url-status=live}}</ref> or "any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification",<ref name="Lacey 286">Lacey, A.R. (1996), ''A Dictionary of Philosophy'', 1st edition, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976. 2nd edition, 1986. 3rd edition, Routledge, London, 1996. p. 286</ref> often in contrast to other possible sources of knowledge such as [[religious faith|faith]], tradition, or [[sensory experience]]. More formally, rationalism is defined as a [[methodology]] or a [[theory]] "in which the criterion of [[truth]] is not sensory but intellectual and [[Deductive reasoning|deductive]]".<ref name="Bourke 263">Bourke, Vernon J., "Rationalism," p. 263 in Runes (1962).</ref>
In a major philosophical debate during the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]],<ref name= essay >[[John Locke]] (1690), [[An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]]</ref> rationalism (sometimes here equated with [[innatism]]) was opposed to [[empiricism]]. On the one hand, the rationalists emphasized that knowledge is primarily innate and the intellect, the inner faculty of the human mind, can therefore directly grasp or derive [[Logical truth|logical truths]]; on the other hand, the empiricists emphasized that knowledge is not primarily innate and is best gained by careful observation of the physical world outside the mind, namely through sensory experiences. Rationalists asserted that certain principles exist in [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[ethics]], and [[metaphysics]] that are so fundamentally true that denying them causes one to fall into contradiction. The rationalists had such a high confidence in reason that empirical proof and physical evidence were regarded as unnecessary to ascertain certain truths{{snd}}in other words, "there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience".<ref name="Rationalism vs. Empiricism">''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ "Rationalism vs. Empiricism"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180929143915/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ |date=2018-09-29 }} First published August 19, 2004; substantive revision March 31, 2013 cited on May 20, 2013.</ref>
Different degrees of emphasis on this method or theory lead to a range of rationalist standpoints, from the moderate position "that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge" to the more extreme position that reason is "the unique path to knowledge".<ref name="Audi 771">Audi, Robert, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 2nd edition, 1999, p. 771.</ref> Given a [[pre-modern]] understanding of reason, rationalism is identical to [[philosophy]], the [[Socrates|Socratic]] life of inquiry, or the zetetic ([[Skepticism|skeptical]]) clear interpretation of authority (open to the underlying or essential cause of things as they appear to our sense of certainty)
==Background<!--'Continental rationalism' and 'Continental Rationalism' redirect here-->==
Rationalism{{snd}}as an appeal to human reason as a way of obtaining knowledge{{snd}}has a philosophical history dating from [[Ancient philosophy|antiquity]]. The [[analytic philosophy|analytical]] nature of much of philosophical enquiry, the awareness of apparently [[A priori knowledge|a priori]] domains of knowledge such as mathematics, combined with the emphasis of obtaining knowledge through the use of rational faculties (commonly rejecting, for example, direct [[revelation]]) have made rationalist themes very prevalent in the [[history of philosophy]].
Since the Enlightenment, rationalism is usually associated with the introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy as seen in the works of [[Descartes]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]], and [[Spinoza]].<ref name="Bourke 263"/> This is commonly called '''continental rationalism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, because it was predominant in the continental schools of Europe, whereas in Britain [[empiricism]] dominated.
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===Political usage===
In [[politics]], rationalism, since the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], historically emphasized a "politics of reason" centered upon [[
{{quote|In the past, particularly in the 17th and 18th centuries, the term 'rationalist' was often used to refer to free thinkers of an anti-clerical and anti-religious outlook, and for a time the word acquired a distinctly pejorative force (thus in 1670 Sanderson spoke disparagingly of 'a mere rationalist, that is to say in plain English an atheist of the late edition...'). The use of the label 'rationalist' to characterize a world outlook which has no place for the supernatural is becoming less popular today; terms like '[[secular humanist|humanist]]' or '[[materialism|materialist]]' seem largely to have taken its place. But the old usage still survives.}}
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}}</ref> and [[Thomas Hobbes]],<ref name=tws07dec114/> as well as theologians in the Jewish philosophical tradition such as [[Maimonides]].<ref name=tws07dec114/> But his work was in many respects a departure from the [[Judeo-Christian-Islamic]] tradition. Many of Spinoza's ideas continue to vex thinkers today and many of his principles, particularly regarding the [[emotions]], have implications for modern approaches to [[psychology]]. To this day, many important thinkers have found Spinoza's "geometrical method"<ref name=tws07dec211/> difficult to comprehend: [[Johann Wolfgang von Goethe|Goethe]] admitted that he found this concept confusing.{{Citation needed|date=June 2015}} His ''[[Masterpiece|magnum opus]]'', ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]'', contains unresolved obscurities and has a forbidding mathematical structure modeled on Euclid's geometry.<ref name=tws908/> Spinoza's philosophy attracted believers such as [[Albert Einstein]]<ref name=tws9903>{{cite news
| title = Einstein Believes in "Spinoza's God"; Scientist Defines His Faith in Reply, to Cablegram From Rabbi Here. Sees a Divine Order But Says Its Ruler Is Not Concerned "Wit Fates and Actions of Human Beings."
| newspaper = The New York Times
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====Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)====
{{Immanuel Kant}}
{{Main|Immanuel Kant}}
Kant is one of the central figures of modern [[philosophy]], and set the terms by which all subsequent thinkers have had to grapple. He argued that human perception structures natural laws, and that reason is the source of morality. His thought continues to hold a major influence in contemporary thought, especially in fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ |title=Immanuel Kant (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |publisher=Plato.stanford.edu |date=20 May 2010 |access-date=2011-10-22 |archive-date=2012-01-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112123355/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
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Rationalism has become a rarer label of philosophers today; rather many different kinds of specialised rationalisms are identified. For example, [[Robert Brandom]] has appropriated the terms "rationalist expressivism" and "rationalist pragmatism" as labels for aspects of his programme in ''Articulating Reasons'', and identified "linguistic rationalism", the claim that the contents of propositions "are essentially what can serve as both premises and conclusions of inferences", as a key thesis of [[Wilfred Sellars]].<ref>''Articulating reasons'', 2000. Harvard University Press.</ref>
Outside of academic philosophy, some participants in the internet communities surrounding [[
==Criticism==
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* [[Idealism]]
* [[Innatism]]
* [[
* [[Logical truth]]
* [[Natural philosophy]]
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* [[Philosophical realism]]
* [[Platonic realism]]
* [[Positivism]]
* [[Psychological nativism]]▼
* [[Rational choice theory]]
* [[Rational expectations]]
* [[Rational mysticism]]▼
* [[Rational realism]]
* [[Realistic rationalism]]▼
* [[The Circle of Reason|Pluralistic rationalism]]▼
▲* [[Psychological nativism]]
* [[Rationalist International]]
▲* [[Rational mysticism]]
* ''[[Rationality and Power]]''
▲* [[Realistic rationalism]]
* [[Theistic rationalism]]
}}
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