Tor (network): Difference between revisions
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Because location-hidden services do not use exit nodes, they are not subject to exit node eavesdropping. There are, however, a number of security issues involving Tor hidden services. For example, services that are reachable through Tor hidden services ''and'' the public Internet are susceptible to correlation attacks, and consequently are not necessarily hidden. Other pitfalls include "letting your web server reveal identifying information about you, your computer, or your location"<ref>{{cite web | title=Tor: Hidden Service Configuration Instructions | url=http://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service | date=2008-02-27 | accessdate=2008-06-08}}</ref>, [[uptime]] and [[downtime]] statistics, intersection attacks and user error. |
Because location-hidden services do not use exit nodes, they are not subject to exit node eavesdropping. There are, however, a number of security issues involving Tor hidden services. For example, services that are reachable through Tor hidden services ''and'' the public Internet are susceptible to correlation attacks, and consequently are not necessarily hidden. Other pitfalls include "letting your web server reveal identifying information about you, your computer, or your location"<ref>{{cite web | title=Tor: Hidden Service Configuration Instructions | url=http://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service | date=2008-02-27 | accessdate=2008-06-08}}</ref>, [[uptime]] and [[downtime]] statistics, intersection attacks and user error. |
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*[http://oldd6th4cr5spio4. |
*[http://oldd6th4cr5spio4.onion/index.php?title=Main_Page Main Page - The Hidden Wiki], a wiki focusing on Tor hidden services |
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*[http://l6nvqsqivhrunqvs. |
*[http://l6nvqsqivhrunqvs.onion/ onionforum], a popular forum |
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*[http://l73fuoioj5hzznxc. |
*[http://l73fuoioj5hzznxc.onion/ Toogle], a search engine and service index |
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*[http://anegvjpd77xuxo45. |
*[http://anegvjpd77xuxo45.onion/services/ Services index], list of tor services and uptimes |
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*[http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo. |
*[http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/ Freedom Hosting], Free hidden web hosting with PHP and MySQL |
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== Weaknesses ==<!-- This section is linked from [[Internet censorship]] --> |
== Weaknesses ==<!-- This section is linked from [[Internet censorship]] --> |
Revision as of 09:35, 5 December 2008
This article's use of external links may not follow Wikipedia's policies or guidelines. |
File:Eff tor.png | |
Developer(s) | The Tor Project[1] |
---|---|
Initial release | September 20, 2003[2] |
Stable release | 0.4.8.13[3] (24 October 2024 ) |
Repository | |
Written in | C |
Operating system | Cross-platform |
Type | Onion routing / Anonymity |
License | BSD license |
Website | www.torproject.org |
Tor (The Onion Router) is a free software implementation of second-generation onion routing – a system enabling its users to communicate anonymously on the Internet. Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson presented "Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router" at the 13th USENIX Security Symposium.[4]
Originally sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory, Tor became an Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) project in late 2004, and the EFF supported Tor financially until November 2005.[5] The Tor software is now developed by the Tor Project, which since December 2006 is a 501(c)(3) research/education non-profit organization based in the United States of America[1][6] that receives a diverse base of financial support.[5]
Description
Aiming to protect its users against traffic analysis attacks, volunteers operate an overlay network of onion routers that enable anonymous outgoing connections and anonymous "hidden" services.
Outgoing connections
Users of the Tor network run an onion proxy on their machine. This software connects out to Tor, periodically negotiating a virtual circuit through the Tor network. Tor employs cryptography in a layered manner (hence the onion analogy), ensuring perfect forward secrecy between routers. At the same time, the onion proxy software presents a SOCKS interface to its clients. SOCKS-aware applications may be pointed at Tor, which then multiplexes the traffic through a Tor virtual circuit.
Once inside the Tor network, the traffic is sent from router to router, ultimately reaching an exit node at which point the cleartext packet is available and is forwarded on to its original destination. Viewed from the destination, the traffic appears to originate at the Tor exit node.
Tor's application independence sets it apart from most other anonymity networks: it works at the TCP stream level. Applications commonly anonymised using Tor include IRC, instant messaging and Web browsing. When browsing the Web, Tor is often coupled with Privoxy – a filtering proxy server – that aims to add privacy at the application layer.
Hidden services
Tor can also provide anonymity to servers in the form of location-hidden services, which are Tor clients or relays running specially configured server software. Rather than revealing the server's IP address (and therefore its location), hidden services are accessed through the Tor-specific .onion
pseudo top-level domain. The Tor network understands this TLD and routes data anonymously both to and from the hidden service. Due to this lack of a public address, hidden services may be hosted behind firewalls or NAT. A Tor client is necessary in order to access a hidden service.[7]
Hidden services have been deployed on the Tor network beginning in 2004.[8] Besides the database that stores the hidden-service descriptors[9], Tor is decentralized by design; there is no direct readable list of hidden services. There are a number of independent hidden services that serve this purpose.
Because location-hidden services do not use exit nodes, they are not subject to exit node eavesdropping. There are, however, a number of security issues involving Tor hidden services. For example, services that are reachable through Tor hidden services and the public Internet are susceptible to correlation attacks, and consequently are not necessarily hidden. Other pitfalls include "letting your web server reveal identifying information about you, your computer, or your location"[10], uptime and downtime statistics, intersection attacks and user error.
- Main Page - The Hidden Wiki, a wiki focusing on Tor hidden services
- onionforum, a popular forum
- Toogle, a search engine and service index
- Services index, list of tor services and uptimes
- Freedom Hosting, Free hidden web hosting with PHP and MySQL
Weaknesses
DNS leaks
As with many anonymous web surfing systems, direct DNS requests are usually still performed by many applications, without using the Tor proxy. Using Privoxy or the command "torify" included with the Tor distribution is a possible solution to this problem.[11] Additionally, applications using SOCKS5 – which supports name-based proxy requests – can route DNS requests through Tor, having lookups performed at the exit node and thus receiving the same anonymity as other Tor traffic.[12]
As of Tor release 0.2.0.1-alpha, Tor includes its own DNS resolver which will dispatch queries over the mix network. This should close the DNS leak and can interact with Tor's address mapping facilities to provide Tor hidden service (.onion
) access to non-SOCKS aware applications.[13]
Traffic analysis
Like all current low latency anonymity networks, Tor is vulnerable to traffic analysis from observers who can watch both ends of a user's connection.[14]
Steven J. Murdoch and George Danezis from University of Cambridge presented an article[15] at the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. They presented traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor. They have also shown that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator. The identity of the original user remains undiscovered by this attack, however.[15] Murdoch has been working with and funded by Tor since 2006.
Eavesdropping by exit nodes
In September 2007, Dan Egerstad, a Swedish security consultant, revealed that by operating and monitoring Tor exit nodes he had intercepted usernames and passwords for a large number of email accounts.[16] As Tor does not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the target server, any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic passing through it which does not use end-to-end encryption, e.g. SSL. While this does not inherently violate the anonymity of the source, it affords added opportunities for data interception by self-selected third parties, greatly increasing the risk of exposure of sensitive data by users who are careless or who mistake Tor's anonymity for security.[17]
Etiquette and abuse
Because of its inherent anonymity, Tor is subject to abuse. Routers each maintain an exit policy of what traffic is and is not permitted to leave the Tor network through that node. It is possible to combat most major abuses of the Tor network using a combination of addresses and ports. Potential abuses include:
- Bandwidth hogging
- It is considered impolite to transfer massive amounts of data across the Tor network – the onion routers are run by volunteers using their own bandwidth at their own cost.
- BitTorrent
- Due to the high bandwidth usage caused by the use of this protocol, it is considered impolite and inappropriate to use the Tor network for BitTorrent transfers.
Illegal uses
Among the large numbers of people who use the Tor network are some who have used it for illegal purposes, ranging from P2P sharing of copyrighted files to communicating child pornography.[18][19][20] In September 2006, German authorities seized data center equipment running Tor software during a child pornography crackdown.[19][21][22]
The Tor project's response to accusations that it is helping to facilitate illegal activity has been to emphasize that (1) many law-abiding individuals who use Tor for "good" purposes (privacy, freedom of communication) do not have readily available and practical alternatives to Tor, while (2) those who are willing to break laws already have other more effective ways to remain anonymous (such as breaking into computers, renting botnets, or stealing cell phones).[23] The argument is that the benefit to those in group (1) is much larger than the assistance to those in group (2), who have realistic alternatives to Tor by virtue of the fact that they are willing to break the law.
Implementation
- The main implementation of Tor is written in C and is roughly 49,000 lines of code long. The rationale for using C is that Tor requires routers to run fast.
- It is known that Vuze (formerly known as Azureus) includes built-in Tor support. Vuze is Java software but it is not known if the Vuze Tor implementation is a full implementation of the Tor protocol in Java.
See also
This article's use of external links may not follow Wikipedia's policies or guidelines. |
- Tools to use with Tor:
- Vidalia – a cross-platform GUI controller for Tor
- TorButton Firefox Plug-in for Tor proxy management
- Polipo – a caching web proxy
- Privoxy – a filtering proxy
- SOcat Multipurpose relay (SOcket CAT): includes socks4, and socks4a functionality (Linux / Mac)
- Portable Tor – Repackaged version of Tor + Vidalia + Privoxy for use on a USB flash drive
- TorK a KDE GUI controller for Tor
- Torcap allows any network application to connect through Tor, even if the overlying application doesn't support SOCKS.
- Web browsers bundled with Tor
- Tor Browser Bundle lets you use Tor on Windows without needing to install any software.
- OperaTor – Preconfigured bundle with Opera (web browser) + Tor + Privoxy
- xB Browser – Firefox derivative with integrated Tor; can run from a USB flash drive (crippleware)
- Anonymous chat
- Tor IM Browser Bundle allows instant messaging and chat via Tor on Windows without needing to install any software.
- TorChat – a serverless instant messaging application based on Tor's hidden services
- Preinstalled environments with Tor enabled:
- Incognito – A sandboxed, Gentoo based Linux distribution, available as a Live CD or Live USB
- xB Machine – A virtual OS for anonymous communication, ISO bootable and Live CD (crippleware)
- JanusVM – A VMware Virtual Machine that among other things can provide anonymity though Tor
- Tor-ramdisk – an i686 uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose sole purpose is to securely host a Tor server purely in RAM.
- List of anonymous P2P networks and clients
- Anonymous remailers
- Issues and Ideas related to online anonymity
Footnotes
- ^ a b "Tor: People". 2008-07-17. Retrieved 2008-07-17.
- ^ Dingledine, Roger (2002-09-20). "pre-alpha: run an onion proxy now!". or-dev (Mailing list). Retrieved 2008-07-17.
{{cite mailing list}}
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suggested) (help) - ^ "dgoulet" (24 October 2024). "New Tor Stable Release: 0.4.8.13". Retrieved 25 October 2024.
- ^ Dingledine, Roger (2004-08-13). "Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router". Proc. 13th USENIX Security Symposium. San Diego, California. Retrieved 2008-11-17.
{{cite conference}}
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suggested) (help) - ^ a b "Tor: Sponsors". 2008-07-16. Retrieved 2008-07-17.
- ^ "Tor: Donate!". 2008-06-27. Retrieved 2008-07-17.
- ^ "Tor: Hidden Service Configuration Instructions". 2008-02-27. Retrieved 2008-06-08.
- ^ Øverlier, Lasse (2006-06-21). "Locating Hidden Servers" (PDF). Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Oakland, CA: IEEE CS Press. p. 1. doi:10.1109/SP.2006.24. ISBN: 0-7695-2574-1. Retrieved 2008-06-08.
{{cite conference}}
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ignored (|conference-url=
suggested) (help) - ^ Tor: Hidden Service Protocol, Hidden services
- ^ "Tor: Hidden Service Configuration Instructions". 2008-02-27. Retrieved 2008-06-08.
- ^ "TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO – Noreply Wiki". Retrieved 2007-04-19.
- ^ "RFC 1928 - SOCKS Proxy Protocol, Version 5". Retrieved 2008-08-04.
- ^ "Tor Changelog". Retrieved 2007-09-11.
- ^ "TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ". Retrieved 2007-09-18.
Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel
- ^ a b "Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor" (PDF). 2006-01-19. Retrieved 2007-05-21.
- ^ "Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise". Retrieved 2007-09-16.
- ^ "Tor hack proposed to catch criminals". Retrieved 2008-02-01.
- ^ Cleaning up Tor on broadband.com
- ^ a b Anders Bylund (September 11, 2006). "TOR anonymizing proxy servers seized during German child porn investigation".
{{cite web}}
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- ^ Ed Oswald,. "Tor Servers Target of Porn Crackdown". BetaNews.
{{cite web}}
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References
- Anonymity Bibliography Retrieved: 21 May 2007
- Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography. ISBN 0-471-11709-9.
- Schneier, Bruce. Email Security. ISBN 0-471-05318-X.
- Bacard, Andre. Computer Privacy Handbook. ISBN 1-56609-171-3.
Further reading
- AnonWatch, Tor in Depth Security Analysis of the Tor Network
- Goodin, Dan "Tor at heart of embassy passwords leak", 2007-09-10 article on The Register news website. (Accessed 2007-09-20).
- Krebs, Brian, Attacks Prompt Update for 'Tor' Anonymity Network 2007-08-08 (Accessed 2007-10-27)
- "The Hack of the Year". The Syndey Morning Herald. 2007-11-13. Retrieved 2007-11-16.
- Zhelatin.IR (= Storm Worm) 2007-09-07 (Accessed 2007-10-27) Template:Fr icon