Talk:Peano axioms/Archive 1

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I deleted this:

This was a proof using logic alone, but of course infinite. It gives an algorithm for simplifying a :possible proof of contradiction by a series of simple transformations, until it becomes very short. :To see that it becomes very short we need transfinite induction. Gentzen's proof has been :humorously called "assuming the dubious to prove the obvious".

since (a) it was not a proof using 'infinite logic' but a straightforward mathematical proof; (b) the procedure makes the proofs longer, not shorter; (c) whoever called the proof that doesn't understand it.

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Someone was getting confused about Peano's axioms vs. first order Peano Arithmetic. I(different I than the above: this I's a PhD student who's area is models of PA) changed

Although natural numbers satisfy these axioms, there are other, nonstandard models of arbitrary large cardinality - by Compactness theorem the existence of infinite natural numbers cannot be excluded in any axiomatization.

to

Dedekind proved, in his 1888 book Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen, that any model of the second order Peano axioms is isomorphic to the natural numbers. On the other hand, the last axiom listed above, the mathematical induction axiom, is not itself expressible in the first order language of arithmetic.

If one replaces the last axiom with the schema:

1. If P(0) is true and for all n P(x) implies P(x+1)

for each first order property P(x) (an infinite number of axioms) then although natural numbers satisfy these axioms, there are other, nonstandard models of arbitrary large cardinality - by the Compactness theorem the existence of infinite natural numbers cannot be excluded in any axiomatization; by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem there exist models of all cardinalities.

Thanks for the clear-up and help! Revolver 07:04, 30 Sep 2004 (UTC)

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Presumably "For all n, P(x) implies P(x+1)" really means:

"For all x, P(x) implies P(x + 1)."

Michael Hardy 00:07, 25 Oct 2003 (UTC)

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Peano fails on 0 (zero) not being a natural number and zero (the absolute absence of anything) exists only in mathematics. Zero is a natural number by definition alone and not by any construct that is derived from the science; it is an add-on and leads to "axiomatic" for that construct alone, and nowhere else. Like all attempts to by-pass absolutes, short-cuts are always based on some form of assumption that is passed off as knowledge by some one exercising status or authority. For every natural number, Peano is correct, but for the unnatural numbers of zero and infinite, he also has no way of inclusion. Both are outside the science, at all times. From nowhere to somewhere but not at either end. jparranto@yahoo.com Oct 29, 2005

Peano system

Why is the name Peano system used in the article? The criteria are due to Dedekind. ---- Charles Stewart 11:30, 29 Sep 2004 (UTC)

This is the term that I seem to remember hearing/reading most often. You can certainly check the literature and see if you find Dedekind system to be more standard. Whether the criteria are due to Dedekind is worth noting for historical reasons but not really related to current standard usage — we all know how many things in math aren't named after the proper person. Revolver 07:04, 30 Sep 2004 (UTC)

No doubt you are right, I think that the structure is normally given an ad hoc name such as "numerical structure"; I don't think there is a standard name for it, but I think the name Peano system is doubly unfortunate, because, besides the historical point, one usually uses the term "structure" to talk about these things and not system.

FWIW, Google tells me that "Peano system" is not much used, 180 hits, the most common being for a Perl ORB on freshmeat, and most of the relevant links referrring to Peano'x axioms and not the number structure. ---- Charles Stewart 12:14, 30 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I can do a check of several set theory books over the next week or so, just as an initial look. I'm not sure how to interpret the google quote you give (180 hits) without comparison to an alternative (how many hits does "___" get?) Revolver 08:25, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)

"Numerical structure" got about 1600 hits, but the very FIRST hit is some religious numerology babble, so I take these google hit-numbers with a few grains of salt. Revolver 08:31, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)

`Meaning' of 180 hits: the structure is obviously very fundamental, so 180 hits is low, especially since Wikipedia has quite a few syndicates. By comparison "Hopf algebra" gets 12700 hits, despite being an obviously less fundamental concept. I think there is no standard way of talking about this structure; given this, it looks to me that we should call the structure something non-misleading. Dedekind structure, gets only one relevant hit, but it is for exactly this item, and it is what I would call it. ---- Charles Stewart 12:09, 1 Oct 2004 (UTC)

It may be more "fundamental" in the foundational sense, but my guess is that more people study Hopf algebras than Dedekind structures. There does seem to be no standard terminology. I googled "Peano structure" and found at least half a dozen relevant hits. I admit I have no real knowledge on the history of the situation. Since both "Dedekind" and "Peano" seem to be in use, why not use "Dedekind-Peano structure" (which I have seen), and make some comments about other terminology? Note: I have also seen "Dedekind-Peano axioms" for "Peano axioms". Revolver 01:30, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I'd guess the structure of positive integers sees as much study and more application than Hopf Algebras; however everytime you see a Hopf algebra applied you will see the fact advertised using the standard name. I have no objection to Dedekind-Peano structure. I think the name Dedekind-Peano axioms is generally used for second-order Peano arithmetic, but saying "second-order Peano axioms" I think is more suggestive. Should we add a terminology section? ---- Charles Stewart 09:27, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

first order?

The article claims that "Peano axioms (or Peano postulates) are a set of first-order axioms" can someone please tell how is it possible to postulate: "if a property is possessed by 0 and also by the successor of every natural number which possesses it, then it is possessed by all natural numbers." in a first order logic? i think you will have two use second order for that claim.(it seems to quantify over properties(definition of second order logic))

(post moved to bottom of page)

As an axiom, induction is second-order. However it can be formulated in a first-order manner by adding not a single axiom, but an axiom schema with infinitely many instances. Since the schema defines a(primitive) recursive set, from the point of view of proof theory, it is acceptable. ---- Charles Stewart 07:46, 26 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I see, for example we can get around induction by using no-cycles claim, (no size 1 cycle, no size 2 cycle..etc up to infinity).Still, In this case the text of the artcile should be changed to this particular(infinitary) axiomatization, because as it stands it is confusing as to why is it first-order.--Hq3473 08:02, 26 Jan 2005 (UTC)

If I'm not mistakened, forbidding cycles is both too weak and can't be captured by a first-order axiomatisation. I agree the text needs (much) improvement, but I guess the issue won't be clear until we give an actual axiomatisation in a Hilbert-style proof theory - then we can talk about this point properly. I'll put it on my overburdened to do list ---- Charles Stewart 10:22, 26 Jan 2005 (UTC)

i see, cycles will not rule out higher orders. Any way, can you maybe give me link or a refernce to riogorous first order peano axiomatization? i want to see how is the deduction overcome.--Hq3473 21:44, 26 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I agree with the original objection that the induction axiom is second order. The fact that it can be replaced by an infinite number of first order formulae does not change this statement. Having arbitrarily large sets of formulae is not usually meant when speaking of a "first order theory" and it is commonly said that the natural numbers are not first order axiomatizable (meaning "by a single formula (or a finite set of formulae)"). Allowing for infinite sets of first-order axioms gives you quite a lot of expressive power, e.g. you can describe the natural numbers and any subset thereof. I think it is misleading to speak of first-order in the intro, especially since the section on Peano arithmetic also speaks of "the restriction of Peano axioms to a first-order theory". --Markus Krötzsch 20:19, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

Peano arithmetic is definitely a first-order theory; this is completely standard usage. The fact that it's not finitely axiomatizable makes no difference. (Actually, "true arithmetic", the set of all true first-order statements about the natural numbers, is also a first-order theory; the difference is that it doesn't have a computable or even computably enumerable set of axioms.). The full Peano axioms are second order because you quantify over properties, not just over individual natural numbers. --Trovatore 20:28, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

Discardng induction?

I asked a vague question at Talk:Preintuitionism ... are there any examples of systems in which the first four axioms are kept, the fifth (induction) is intentionally broken or discarded, and yet are not finite, and somehow manage to achieve some sort of "infinity"? (By "intentionally broken", I mean, are there different set of axioms, in which induction is a theorem that may be proven false?) (By requiring "infinity", I want to exclude "obvious" systems like finite groups and fields (and finite state machines?) which seem like they might not need induction as an axiom). linas 05:50, 7 September 2005 (UTC)

Yes, this is an active area of study. If you limit the induction schema to formulas all of whose quantifiers are bounded, you get a theory called IΔ₀, which is insufficient to prove that the exponential function (the function that sends n to 2ⁿ) is total. (No warranties on the exact definition of IΔ₀). There's a whole hierarchy of theories weaker than PA. --Trovatore 20:49, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Looks like I didn't read your question carefully enough; this isn't what you were after. But it still might be of interest to you.... --Trovatore 23:24, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

definition of PA

The most glaring deficiency of this article in its current form is that it does not give any explicit definition of first-order PA, which makes the introduction to the article seem almost a misrepresentation. PA is alluded to in the third paragraph of the "Metamathematical discussion" section (a section which has serious POV flaws as well), but an actual precise characterization of PA is never given. It should be mentioned that the language needs to include multiplication--this isn't necessary for the second-order Peano axioms, but it is for first-order PA; otherwise you get something much weaker, and I believe actually decidable. --Trovatore 20:56, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

We could borrow the treatment from PlanetMath. Presburger arithmetic is sort of PA without multiplication, and is indeed decidable. --- Charles Stewart 01:37, 17 October 2005 (UTC)

Hmmm... I think the Peano Induction axiom is necessarily a second order axiom, and there is a similar first order axiom schema, but which is slightly weaker. Perhaps the claim in the opening sentence that Peano's axioms are first order should be removed? -Lethe | [[User talk:Lethe|Talk]] 19:26, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

User:Jeekc has copied the PlanetMath material, which I've touched up a little bit. I think it's OK now. It's important that we get this right, because the initialism PA refers to the first-order theory and we probably talk about it all over the place in Wikipedia. --Trovatore 19:32, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

I suppose there should be an article Peano arithmetic and that article should use the first-order schema. -Lethe | [[User talk:Lethe|Talk]] 19:41, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

I want to look it up in a book, but I think the term "Peano's axioms" should and does normally include the stronger second order axiom. If that's the case, the recent changes here are not correct. -Lethe | [[User talk:Lethe|Talk]] 19:43, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

What do you mean? The recent changes are about "Peano arithmetic", not "Peano's axioms". --Trovatore 19:49, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

The article now claims that "Peano axioms are a set of first order axioms". I suggest that this is wrong: Peano axioms are a set of second order axioms. Peano arithmetic uses first order axioms, and therefore Peano arithmetic is not defined by the Peano axioms but rather by some other set of weaker axioms. I'm not positive about this, so I'd like to go check perhaps in EDM2. -Lethe | [[User talk:Lethe|Talk]] 20:26, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

PS what is going on with my signature?

Ah, right you are, that's bad. The article certainly shouldn't say that the Peano axioms are first order, and then list them as a second-order axiomatization. However it's not a recent change. It's been that way for at least a year. What we now have, that we didn't have before, is at least a list of the first-order axioms. --Trovatore 20:34, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

Oh, I see. JeekC added a new section on PA, and you were talking about that. Right then, I guess we're in agreement. -Lethe | [[User talk:Lethe|Talk]] 20:38, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

I've fixed the claims in the preamble, and added refs for Peano and Dedekind. --- Charles Stewart 17:24, 16 November 2005 (UTC)

there seems to be much confusion here about first order PA and second order peano axioms. The second order induction axiom allows for ARBITRARY properties, and thus it is NOT equivalent to a set of first order formulas. There are properties of natural numbers which are not expressable in terms of first order formulas, and there are nonstandard models of Peano arithmetics, while there are no nonstandard models for the second order axioms. Please do not mess up in the article and obscure this distinction. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 137.205.132.172 (talk • contribs) 01:46, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

No one has been "messing up the article". It used to be much worse. Take a glance through the history. --Trovatore 01:57, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Consistency

The following part of the article badly needs to be reworded and cleared up:

But in 1931, Kurt Gödel in his celebrated second incompleteness theorem showed such a proof cannot exist. It is even impossible to prove consistency of Peano arithmetic while assuming the axioms themselves. Furthermore, we can never prove that any axiom system is consistent within the system itself, if it is at least as strong as Peano's axioms. In 1936, Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of Peano's axioms, using transfinite induction.

Most mathematicians assume that Peano arithmetic is consistent, although this relies on intuition only.

For a layman without a mathematical background, this basically reads "It's impossible to prove the consistency of PA. Gentzen proved the consistency of PA in 1936. It's impossible to prove the consistency of PA, but we assume it anyway", which of course is highly problematic. -- Schnee (cheeks clone) 21:55, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

0 and 1 do not need to be posited separately

To the anonymous user who tried to put this in, it is not needed. You can write to me about why this is true, but don't try to edit it this way again. The form of Peano's axioms is a matter of history and mathematical practice.

1 is defined as S(0) (S is a primitive notion; it is not defined as "adding 1".) Your counterexample is not a counterexample: the structure 0, pi, 2*pi, etc (non-negative integer multiples of pi in the usual real number system) is a perfectly good Peano-Dedekind structure: the "1" of this structure is the usual pi, and "adding 1" in this structure is adding pi in the subset of the real numbers which is its domain.

Randall Holmes 23:01, 25 December 2005 (UTC)

historical question about 0 vs. 1, quite distinct from the previous issue

Did Peano actually have 0 as the first natural number? The axioms are also sometimes presented with 1 as first, and I suspect this may be historically the original form. Of course, both are fine mathematically -- but one defines addition and multiplication differently in each case. I'm not going to edit the article on this point without historical sources. Randall Holmes 05:58, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

I suggest the article on Zermelo set theory as a model: someone has taken the trouble there to go back to the original text, and what he finds is rather interesting. I'm pretty sure that here the original text will bear out Lethe's claim that the original axiom set was second-order, but who knows what else we might find? Randall Holmes 06:00, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

undid incorrect changes to PA axiom set.

I reversed the changes to the PA axiom set, which were incoherent, and took the opportunity to eliminate the (older) references to <, which is not a primitive notion of PA (it is definable). Randall Holmes 06:29, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

You say the changes were inconsitent, however, the five axiom system descibed is the original one, from which other theorems can be derived. Also note that the layout of the theorems IS important in Peano arithmatic, despite many peoples' objections to it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Evildictaitor (talk • contribs) 18:00, January 16, 2006 (UTC)

The list of axioms you give is not the original one. Moreover, I'm a professional mathematical logician; you aren't going to get anywhere lecturing me on what is correct and what isn't, because I know... Hofstadter is not an Authority, merely a popularizer. Randall Holmes 17:30, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Forall a and b, it must be written seperately, $\forall a:\forall b:$ and cannot be combined. Forall cannot be moved within the string, and parenthesis are not transmutable, and are implicitly required.

$a+b+c$ is a badly formed string, whereas $(a+(b+c))$ is a valid one.

Also note that some "axioms" have been removed because they are not axioms at all, but theorems. The "axiom" $\forall a:\forall b:(a+b)=(b+a)$ is proovable within the system, and therefore can be used as one would use an axiom, but because it is a theorem of the system, not because it is an axiom. The five axioms are as follows:

Let us firstly state that all numbers are positive integers, such that

1.$\forall a:Sa\not =0$

Let us next state that addition of zero to a number is equal to that first number, such that

2.$\forall a:(a+0)=a$

Let us also say that succession of one number is tranmutable between elements being suceeded, such that,

3.$\forall a:\forall b:(a+Sb)=S(a+b)$

Let us now also say any number multiplied by zero (including itself) is equal to zero.

4.$\forall a:(a\cdot 0)=0$

Let us also say that multiplication is cummulative addition, such that

5.$\forall a:\forall b:(a\cdot Sb)=((a\cdot b)+a)$

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Evildictaitor (talk • contribs) 18:00, January 16, 2006 (UTC)

The typographical details do not matter (many different conventions on notation are possible). This said, I have no particular objections to your notational changes. The axiom $\forall x:\forall y:S(x)=S(y)\rightarrow x=y$ is essential: you cannot prove it from the other axioms. The notation $\forall xy:S(x)=S(y)\rightarrow x=y$ is generally understood and perfectly correct, by the way. Randall Holmes 17:30, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

I think the colons are a bit strange; I don't recall seeing those in any standard text. Usually one uses parentheses, either around each quantifier or around the matrix (or both, but I think that's usually excessive). I seem to recall that Hofstatder uses the colons. --Trovatore 19:33, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Right, something like $(x)$ for $\forall x$ is common. The notation changes suggested are useless and confusing. Gew75 03:19, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

No, I didn't mean the (x) notation, which looks more like Russell-Frege era stuff; it's not used much these days, at least in mathematics (I think some philosophers may still use it). I meant you can write either

$\forall x(x\cdot 2=2\cdot x)$

or

$(\forall x)\ x\cdot 2=2\cdot x$

--Trovatore 03:25, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Reverted all changes by Evildictaitor; will continue to do this as necessary

It's all in the title, really. Randall Holmes 17:45, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Hofstadter is not the source for Peano arithmetic, and his choices of notation are somewhat unusual. Your modifications to the informal description of the axioms were entirely inappropriate. You do not understand what the usual sets of axioms are (hint: Hofstadter is a popular writer, not an authority). I will revert your edits as necessary. I always watch this page. Randall Holmes 17:45, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

I'm perfectly happy to talk here about the reasons for all this, but don't make ill-informed changes to the main article (or at least, don't expect them to stay there). Randall Holmes 17:52, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Circular Reasoning?

These axioms seem (to me) to have a chicken-and-egg problem, so to speak. You can't tick off how many times you applied recursion [ f(f(f(..))) ] until you have integers to do it with. Seems to me you have to go back to pebbles or the like and construct examples first. 24.8.160.40 21:40, 6 February 2006 (UTC) sorry I was logged out - the foregoing on circular reasoning was from Carrionluggage 21:45, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

So it might help if you tried to elucidate just what proposition it is that you think is being demonstrated circularly. If you simply mean that the presentation of the Peano axioms is more about showing you how your intuitive idea of natural numbers is formalized than it is about telling you what natural numbers "really are", well, of course you're right. Hope this isn't bad news, but you understood what a natural number is as well when you were ten years old, as you're ever going to. Answering that question for you is not the job of a formalization.

Still, the section you're referring to is undoubtedly written in a confusing fashion at best; unless someone wants to sepcify a little better what's meant by saying that the Peano axioms are "summed up" in the diagram with the f's, then that passage should be deleted. --Trovatore 22:20, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for the reply. What I meant, in more detal is illustrated by two examples: It is written : "where each of the iterates f(x), f(f(x)), f(f(f(x))), ... of x under f are distinct. "

Now, that looks clever, but if you do not have a way to count up the nesting that was just presented, you have accomplished nothing (as I see it). I suggest you might tell the reader just to put little pebbles or beans in a container instead. Of course you can't get to infinity, but people can get the idea that if they could sit there forever with an unlimited supply of beans, their container could eventually exceed any "target" weight. In other words, what is the value added of that expression above with all the parentheses, and how does it compete with counting beans?

Next case:

It is written: "so that

• 0 := {}
• 1 := S(0) = {0}
• 2 := S(1) = {0,1} = {0, {0}}
• 3 := S(2) = {0,1,2} = {0, {0}, {0, {0}}}

and so on. This construction is due to John von Neumann."

Once again, it seems to me that the question is begged (chicken-egg problem), because you can't count up the lines displayed (or, again, the curly brackets) unless you know what the integers are. Is this a nutty complaint? I always had a similar problem with group isomorphisms - so it is well that I did not continue in math past a course using van der Waerden and some real and complex variables. In the latter case, when you have a group with a lot of isomorphic subgroups (as I recall) you can (usually?) indice a permutation among them - say a cyclic permutation. But after this permutation, the subgroups look the same as before, so how does anyone know you permuted them amongst each other? Well, not to bother if this is not interesting. Thanks Carrionluggage 19:08, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

It's not a nutty complaint at all, just an insoluble one. What it indicates is that you want more from formal theories than they're able to deliver. The point of the von Neumann construction is not to tell you what the naturals are, just how to code them into set theory, so that the methods of set theory can then be applied to them. As I said, you already know what the naturals are, as well as you're ever going to (for that matter, as well as anyone else is ever going to). --Trovatore 19:17, 7 February 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for explaining. Carrionluggage 05:33, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

Dead Link to Gentzen's Proof

This link in the bottom group on the article page: [1] would not work for me at this time - perhaps a bad omen :-) Carrionluggage 21:38, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

Results?

Perhaps commutativity, associativity and distributivity should be proved here? This would show the axioms in action as it were.

Formalization of induction

The article uses $\forall x[\varphi (0)\wedge (\varphi (x)\rightarrow \varphi (Sx))\rightarrow \varphi (x)]$, but this doesn't seem a correct formulation. For example, let $\varphi (x)$ denote the statement $x=0$. Then consider the case of $x=3$. $\varphi (0)\wedge (\varphi (3)\rightarrow \varphi (4))\rightarrow \varphi (3)=T\wedge (F\rightarrow F)\rightarrow F=T\wedge T\rightarrow F=T\rightarrow F=F$, so the statement is false.

I would formalize induction instead as $(\varphi (0)\wedge \forall x[\varphi (x)\rightarrow \varphi (Sx)])\rightarrow \forall x[\varphi (x)]$. 67.166.242.232 06:05, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

No history here? No zero?

I was hoping to find something about any relationship between Dedekind and Peano, and Peano's "use" of Dedekind's postulates/axioms, along this line:

"Peano acknowledges (1891b, p.93) that his axioms came from Dedekind (1888, art. 71, definition of a simply infinite system; see also below, pp. 100-101)" (van Heijenoort, p. 84)

(Page 100-101 contains Dedekind's expression of his axioms in a defense against the criticisms of Keferstein.) Maybe there's nothing more to be said ... was there any consequential rancor? Why are they called "the Peano axioms? rather than the "Dedekind axioms?"

Also for me it was an eye-opener when I read the axioms in van Heijenoort, that the "real", "true" Peano axioms do not define "zero" except as #8 which I read as "no number exists for which the unit is its successor". Am I reading this right? Someone else above raised this point. Thanks, wvbaileyWvbailey 14:40, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

By the way, I found this to be is a nicely-written, erudite article.wvbaileyWvbailey 14:43, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

I am not familiar with the history, except that many older works began the natural numbers with one rather than with zero. But zero is the standard starting point today. This makes sense logically because if a natural number is the number of elements which can be in a finite set (or pebbles in a basket), then zero is needed to describe an empty set (or empty basket). Back in the old days, an empty basket would not even be considered as having a number of pebbles. It just did not occur to them to ask the question. JRSpriggs 04:22, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

Anybody out there know how/when "zero" crept into the axioms? Was this von Neumann up to his tricks? (I'm familiar with his set-theoretic notion of "an empty box as 'the unit'", at least indirectly through Halmos, Naive Set Theory.) Lemme know, 'twould be interesting to add a small history section to this article. Thanks, wvbaileyWvbailey 13:48, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

I just peeked into van Heijenoort and discovered von Nemann (1923) there on p. 346 ff. He defines "the null set" (how on earth can something have a name "the null basket" -- the non-basket -- and at the same time truly represent/be nothingness?) as O and the unit as (O). As I thumb backwards I see in Lowenheim's The Calculus of Relatives what looks a bit like von Neumann's 0 (Lowenheim's ordered pair 1ij = (i, j), 0 = ~1. And he is fiddling around with Schröder and he prints out Müller's axioms that look suspiciously like here is where the 0 got into the game (cf page 240 in van Heijenoort). Anybody know any details? Thanks, wvbaileyWvbailey 14:05, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

The link to natural number was a good idea, but it looks like Ernst Schroder and his works that Eugen Muller codified (1909, 1910) precedes Whitehead and Russell's P.M. (cf commentary in van Heijenoort p. 231).wvbaileyWvbailey 14:29, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

The historical sources

We have a pretty good department library; it is cleary better than my understanding of Latin and Italian is. Within our library I found three volumes of Opere Scelte of Peano, in an edition from the 1950:s; and therin, in vol. II, pp. 20-55, the full Arithmetices principia nova methodo exposita (in Latin). This is not the 1889 printing; but I assume that there are no essential changes. From this text I deduce the following consequences:

1. In the second paragraph, where Peano's original paper and nine axioms are briefly discussed, we have to state that he starts from one (not, as it now is written, zero).
2. At the beginning of the 'informal' exposition of the five axioms, we should mention in so many words that there is some modernisation in notation and by starting from zero, but this in no way changes the essential properties of his approach.
3. It would be reasonable to insert a sentence somewhere, stating that his work both was influenced by and influenced his contemporaries, and that he especially mentions a book by Grassmann and the paper by Dedekind (vide infra).JoergenB

I'll try to give anyone with a deviating opinion an as fair chance as possible to decide it for h*rself, by quoting the Latin text and giving some of my interpretation of it. Real Latin experts are welcome to give better translations. If you want me to quote some other part, I'll gladly do so. Unhappily, while the original text from 1889 should be free now, I' don't think this holds for this Italian edition; otherwise, scanning it into Wikisource would be an option, if there were sufficient interest.

From p. 22, at the end of the section titled PRAEFATIO, Peano mentions Cantor, Boole, H. Grassmann, and R. Dedekind. The third and second last paragraphs read:

In arithmetica demonstrationibus usus sum libro: H. Grassmann, Lehrbuch der Arithmetik, Berlin 1861.

Utilius quoque mihi fuit recens scriptum: R. Dedekind, Was sind und was sollen die Zahhlen, Braunschweig, 1888, in quo quaestiones, quae ad numerorum fundamenta pertinent, acute examinantur.

I suppose this means approximately (I really don't understand e.g. that form 'usus'):

In proofs of arithmetic I employ the book: H. Grassmann <title> . Also useful for me was the recent paper: R. Dedekind <title>, in which questions, which fundamentally concern numbers, are sharpely investigated.

On p. 23, under the heading SIGNORUM TABULA, Peano inter alia gives the 'Signum' – the 'Significatio' non, and writes

Signa 1 , 2 , ... , = , > , <, +, -, $\times$ vulgarent habent significationem.

i.e., 'The signs... have their common meanings'. Under the subheading 'Signa composita' he writes e.g.

– < non est minor ('is not less than')

On the next pages he (inter alia) explains that points are used for grouping, in a similar manner (?) as parentheses in algebra; and that a reverted capital C signifies deducitur, essentially 'implies'. Since I think I lack a more appropriate symbol, I represent it by ⊃.

On p. 34, under the main heading ARITHMETICES PRINCIPIA and subheading § 1. De numeris et de additione. he gives the 9 axioms, preceeded by:

Signo N significatur numerus (integer positivus).

Signo 1 significatur unitas.

Signo a + 1 significatur sequens a , sive a plus 1.

Signo = significatur est aequalis. Hoc ut novum signum considerandum est, etsi logicae signi figuram habeat.

As axiom 8 he states:

a $\epsilon$ N . ⊃ . a+1 – = 1 .

This really should mean: For any natural number, its successor is different from 1 (one). Moreover, axiom 9 is the axion of induction, starting the induction at 1. Actually, he continues by constructing positive rationals (which he denotes R) and positive reals (denoted Q; sic); the latter construction seems related to Dedekind's.--JoergenB 17:31, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

usus sum means "I have used" or "I used". (perfect tense of "utor". Remember utor fruor fungor potior vescor?).

I hope you don't mind that I have replaced your symbol Ə by ⊃ in your text, since this is the usual (old-fashioned) way of writing "implies".

quae ad numerorum fundamenta pertinent means "that concern (or pertain to) the fundaments/foundations/fundamentals of numbers".

acute is probably "precisely" rather than "sharply".

I am not sure about vulgarent, perhaps this should be vulgare? --Aleph4 18:27, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

Formalized atoms?

The subsection Formalized atoms appeared recently, with no prose and an unclear comment in the page source code. I don't think it belongs here at all, but if it does it ought to be expanded somehow (the induction axiom is particularly tricky to formalize...). The entire point of the "Peano axioms" is that they are informally stated; the formalized version is Peano arithmetic.

In fact, the entire section The axioms seems to repeat itself three times. And it is certainly false that Dedekind defined a "Dedekind-Peano structure" in 1888. Any objections to a rewrite of that section? CMummert 03:26, 3 January 2007 (UTC)

No objection here. I TeX'd it up, but anything you can do to improve it would be welcome. CRGreathouse (t | c) 05:01, 4 January 2007 (UTC)

References Question

Why are the references indented as they are. As a non-mathematician, not familiar with this topic, it appears to me that something is mixed up with this indentation. I believe that Wikipedia works best when it is clear to the non-specialist. Thanks. Nwbeeson 15:40, 3 January 2007 (UTC)

If you read the wording of the references, you'll see the reason for the indentation. However, the vertical spacing was inconsistent, which made the lay-out somewhat unclear. I've fixed it now. --Zundark 16:01, 3 January 2007 (UTC)