Paper 2021/068

Banquet: Short and Fast Signatures from AES

Carsten Baum, Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem, Daniel Kales, Emmanuela Orsini, Peter Scholl, and Greg Zaverucha

Abstract

In this work we introduce Banquet, a digital signature scheme with post-quantum security, constructed using only symmetric-key primitives. The design is based on the MPC-in-head paradigm also used by Picnic (CCS 2017) and BBQ (SAC 2019). Like BBQ, Banquet uses only standardized primitives, namely AES and SHA-3, but signatures are more than 50% shorter, making them competitive with Picnic (which uses a non-standard block cipher to improve performance). The MPC protocol in Banquet uses a new technique to verify correctness of the AES S-box computations, which is efficient because the cost is amortized with a batch verification strategy. Our implementation and benchmarks also show that both signing and verification can be done in under 10ms on a current x64 CPU. We also explore the parameter space to show the range of trade-offs that are possible with the Banquet design, and show that Banquet can nearly match the signature sizes possible with Picnic (albeit with slower, but still practical run times) or have speed within a factor of two of Picnic (at the cost of larger signatures).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in PKC 2021
Keywords
Post-quantum signatureSecure Multiparty Computation
Contact author(s)
emmanuela orsini @ esat kuleuven be
cbaum @ cs au dk
cyprien delpechdesaintguilhem @ kuleuven be
daniel kales @ iaik tugraz at
peter scholl @ cs au dk
gregz @ microsoft com
History
2021-03-04: last of 4 revisions
2021-01-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/068
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/068,
      author = {Carsten Baum and Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem and Daniel Kales and Emmanuela Orsini and Peter Scholl and Greg Zaverucha},
      title = {Banquet: Short and Fast Signatures from {AES}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/068},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/068}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.