Paper 2024/1026
MaSTer: Maliciously Secure Truncation for Replicated Secret Sharing without Pre-Processing
Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) in a three-party, honest majority scenario is currently the state-of-the-art for running machine learning algorithms in a privacy-preserving manner. For efficiency reasons, fixed-point arithmetic is widely used to approximate computation over decimal numbers. After multiplication in fixed-point arithmetic, truncation is required to keep the result's precision. In this paper, we present an efficient three-party truncation protocol secure in the presence of an active adversary without pre-processing and improve on the current state-of-the-art in MPC over rings using replicated secret sharing (RSS). By adding an efficient consistency check, we lift the efficient but only passively secure three-party truncation protocol from the ABY3 framework by Mohassel and Rindal into the malicious setting without pre-processed data. Our benchmark indicates performance improvements of an order of magnitude in the offline phase for a single batch training. Finally, we apply our protocol to a real-world application for diagnostic prediction based on publicly available ECG heartbeat data. We achieve an improvement by a factor of two in the total throughput for both LAN and WAN settings.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. CANS 2024
- Keywords
- Secure Multi-party ComputationTruncationReplicated Secret SharingPrivacy-Preserving Machine Learning
- Contact author(s)
-
martin zbudila @ esat kuleuven be
erik pohle @ esat kuleuven be
aysajan abidin @ esat kuleuven be
bart preneel @ esat kuleuven be - History
- 2024-06-28: approved
- 2024-06-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1026
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1026, author = {Martin Zbudila and Erik Pohle and Aysajan Abidin and Bart Preneel}, title = {{MaSTer}: Maliciously Secure Truncation for Replicated Secret Sharing without Pre-Processing}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1026}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1026} }