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Philosophy of Mind
The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim's Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students, Philosophy of Mind focuses on the mind/body problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The second edition features a new chapter on Cartesian substance dualism-a perspective that has been little discussed in the mainstream philosophy of mind and almost entirely ignored in most introductory books in philosophy of mind. In addition, all the chapters have been revised and updated to reflect the trends and developments of the last decade. Throughout the text, Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, the author's own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair, Philosophy of Mind is a model of philosophical exposition. It is a major contribution to the study and teaching of the philosophy of mind.
352 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
About the author
Jaegwon Kim
22 books50 followersJaegwon Kim (born 1934 in Daegu, Korea (now in South Korea)) is a Korean-born American philosopher currently working at Brown University. He is best known for his work on mental causation and the mind-body problem. Key themes in his work include: a rejection of Cartesian metaphysics, the limitations of strict psychophysical identity, supervenience, and the individuation of events. Kim's work on these and other contemporary metaphysical and epistemological issues is well-represented by the papers collected in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (1993).
Kim's philosophical work focuses on the areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science.
Kim's philosophical work focuses on the areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 37 reviews
August 30, 2019
A comprehensive, balanced, lucid and clear review of the main philosophical themes and trends associated with what is generally described as "philosophy of mind".
Designed for the upper-undergraduate and graduate student, it is probably not recommended as a beginner's introduction, however it does manage to accomplish a remarkably successful compromise between clarity of exposition, breath of analysis and level of detail.
Not perfect, a bit rushed in some parts and also with some questionable argumentation in some areas, but a very, very good overview providing an excellent and highly informative survey of the discipline.
4 stars.
Designed for the upper-undergraduate and graduate student, it is probably not recommended as a beginner's introduction, however it does manage to accomplish a remarkably successful compromise between clarity of exposition, breath of analysis and level of detail.
Not perfect, a bit rushed in some parts and also with some questionable argumentation in some areas, but a very, very good overview providing an excellent and highly informative survey of the discipline.
4 stars.
January 10, 2014
A decent, if at times dry and technical introduction to the field of the philosophy of mind.
As other reviewers have already pointed out, the author takes a broadly physicalist approach to the topic, although he does present alternative solutions relatively fairly. The work is predominantly focussed on the "hard problem" of consciousness; that is, how it is that physical brain states can give rise to the phenomenal sensation of consciousness, or - more properly - what link may be said to exist between the two, or whether the latter can propery be said to exist as a distinct phenomenon at all. As a consequence, much of the book (particularly the latter chapters) is involved with in depth discussions about qualia and mind / brain supervenience. Such discussions are of course essential to the topic, but it seems like other potentially interesting areas of inquiry relating to consciousness (e.g. theory of mind, phenomenology, sociability, language etc.) are largely ignored or skipped over in favour of these rather more technical questions.
As a result, it's probably best to judge the work as an extended introduction to cognitive physicalism - including the consequences and questions it raises - rather than as a broad introduction to the philosophy of consciousness.
As other reviewers have already pointed out, the author takes a broadly physicalist approach to the topic, although he does present alternative solutions relatively fairly. The work is predominantly focussed on the "hard problem" of consciousness; that is, how it is that physical brain states can give rise to the phenomenal sensation of consciousness, or - more properly - what link may be said to exist between the two, or whether the latter can propery be said to exist as a distinct phenomenon at all. As a consequence, much of the book (particularly the latter chapters) is involved with in depth discussions about qualia and mind / brain supervenience. Such discussions are of course essential to the topic, but it seems like other potentially interesting areas of inquiry relating to consciousness (e.g. theory of mind, phenomenology, sociability, language etc.) are largely ignored or skipped over in favour of these rather more technical questions.
As a result, it's probably best to judge the work as an extended introduction to cognitive physicalism - including the consequences and questions it raises - rather than as a broad introduction to the philosophy of consciousness.
July 28, 2012
This is an excellent survey of the contemporary problems and positions in the philosophy of mind. This text is not meant for people with absolutely no background in the relevant philosophy; so, prior reading may be a necessary precondition for getting the most out of this book. Kim does a fantastic job of presenting contemporary disagreements as evenhandedly as possible (even though he has his own positions to defend within the field). The book gives a particularly fair treatment to substance dualism (which is something you won't find in most philosophy of mind texts today).
January 27, 2021
O livro de Kim é uma decente introdução à Filosofia da Mente. O autor praticamente cobre os principais debates e abordagens contemporâneos da filosofia analítica mais ortodoxa. Kim faz uma apresentação muito caridosa, no segundo capítulo, do Dualismo Cartesiano. Isso é algo muito interessante já que, na filosofia contemporânea, o fisicalismo (ou alguma forma variada de materialismo), é a posição compartilhada por todas as abordagens. Porém, o linguajar cartesiano, como é mostrado na obra, ainda está muito presente nas nossas expressões, bem como no senso comum. E nem preciso comentar do dualismo presente na cultura pop, no cinema etc.
As outras abordagens da mente trabalhadas são o behaviorismo, teoria da identidade psiconeural e funcionalismo.
O encerramento do livro, falando sobre consciência (dois últimos cap.) são muito bons. Na minha opinião, os mais vivos e empolgantes. Ele me convenceu a ler muito mais sobre o problema mente-corpo, bem como o problema duro da consciência.
A obra também tem seus pontos fracos. O meio do livro, a começar pelo capítulo sobre funcionalismo, é uma apresentação muito enfadonha e pouco didática dessa importantíssima base filosófica para as ciências cognitivas. Kim falha, na minha opinião, em apresentar adequadamente o que o possivelmente capítulo mais importante do livro. Terei que procurar outro livro para entender adequadamente essa abordagem.
Outro ponto que considero negativo é a preferência por argumentos e discussões filosóficas mais "puras", em detrimento de algum input relevante das ciências cognitivas, neurociências e afins. Kim é um filósofo analítico bastante ortodoxo (ao menos nesse livro). Isso o leva a dar espaço demais para grandes nomes da filosofia analítica, como Quine e Davidson, mas pouquíssimo espaço para o que sabemos (empiricamente) sobre a mente. Acho um grande demérito tentar investigar esse complexo fenômeno focando mais em argumentos dedutivos e afins do que se baseando em estudos empíricos.
Por fim, o autor dá pouquíssimo espaço para as abordagens epifenomenalista, emergentista, cognição corporificada (que ele nem menciona) e cognição social. Acredito que livros de filosofia da mente do século XXI necessitam incorporar esses novos debates.
É um boa introdução, mas pretendo ler outras mais cientificamente informadas.
As outras abordagens da mente trabalhadas são o behaviorismo, teoria da identidade psiconeural e funcionalismo.
O encerramento do livro, falando sobre consciência (dois últimos cap.) são muito bons. Na minha opinião, os mais vivos e empolgantes. Ele me convenceu a ler muito mais sobre o problema mente-corpo, bem como o problema duro da consciência.
A obra também tem seus pontos fracos. O meio do livro, a começar pelo capítulo sobre funcionalismo, é uma apresentação muito enfadonha e pouco didática dessa importantíssima base filosófica para as ciências cognitivas. Kim falha, na minha opinião, em apresentar adequadamente o que o possivelmente capítulo mais importante do livro. Terei que procurar outro livro para entender adequadamente essa abordagem.
Outro ponto que considero negativo é a preferência por argumentos e discussões filosóficas mais "puras", em detrimento de algum input relevante das ciências cognitivas, neurociências e afins. Kim é um filósofo analítico bastante ortodoxo (ao menos nesse livro). Isso o leva a dar espaço demais para grandes nomes da filosofia analítica, como Quine e Davidson, mas pouquíssimo espaço para o que sabemos (empiricamente) sobre a mente. Acho um grande demérito tentar investigar esse complexo fenômeno focando mais em argumentos dedutivos e afins do que se baseando em estudos empíricos.
Por fim, o autor dá pouquíssimo espaço para as abordagens epifenomenalista, emergentista, cognição corporificada (que ele nem menciona) e cognição social. Acredito que livros de filosofia da mente do século XXI necessitam incorporar esses novos debates.
É um boa introdução, mas pretendo ler outras mais cientificamente informadas.
April 15, 2016
So long as one takes Kim's book to be an undergraduate textbook on the metaphysics of mind, it's quite competent. Kim writes well and there is a good sense of progression from one chapter to the next. Yet, why did I give this a 2/5 star rating? I'm going to express my own personal opinion, so feel free to disagree: contemporary philosophy of mind is mostly unintelligible. The metaphysics of mind takes for granted (fortunately, there are some notable exceptions) that the physical is an adequately defined term, one that is capable of sustaining a meaningful debate. Unfortunately, this assumption has disastrous consequences: mental causation, mental content, physicalism etc. are taken as serious fields/topics where the various philosophical positions are supposed to have immense metaphysical implications. Kim's book is no exception. He seems oblivious to the suggestion that the central notions of his reasoning are impressively ambiguous.
My view is this: I take the categories of the mental and the physical to be pretheoretical, and I find physicalism a vacuous and unreasonable doctrine whose prominence is paradoxical. Perhaps the doctrine made sense in the 17th century, where the concept of the physical was equated either with Euclidean extension, or the mechanical properties of corpuscles. To hold such an aprioristic position today is an absurdity. Many physicalists defend their doctrine by holding that the notion of the physical denotes a complete physical theory. This is only evident of the low quality of the discussion; many philosophers of mind nowadays openly claim to be able to predict the future. Of course, this sort of reasoning is not entirely unprecedented. Lord Kelvin famously proclaimed the end of physics, but unfortunately (for him) he made this statement before the discoveries of special/general relativity and quantum mechanics. Such false predictions do not seem to trouble many contemporary philosophers who believe that similar reasoning is unobjectionable. To me, such reasoning seems desperate. I should point out that without a coherent concept of the physical, there is no dualism. Consequently, there is almost no debate to be had!
If you disagree with me, I'm sure you'll enjoy this book; if you don't, then you should avoid it (and with it, much of contemporary philosophy of mind I'm afraid).
My view is this: I take the categories of the mental and the physical to be pretheoretical, and I find physicalism a vacuous and unreasonable doctrine whose prominence is paradoxical. Perhaps the doctrine made sense in the 17th century, where the concept of the physical was equated either with Euclidean extension, or the mechanical properties of corpuscles. To hold such an aprioristic position today is an absurdity. Many physicalists defend their doctrine by holding that the notion of the physical denotes a complete physical theory. This is only evident of the low quality of the discussion; many philosophers of mind nowadays openly claim to be able to predict the future. Of course, this sort of reasoning is not entirely unprecedented. Lord Kelvin famously proclaimed the end of physics, but unfortunately (for him) he made this statement before the discoveries of special/general relativity and quantum mechanics. Such false predictions do not seem to trouble many contemporary philosophers who believe that similar reasoning is unobjectionable. To me, such reasoning seems desperate. I should point out that without a coherent concept of the physical, there is no dualism. Consequently, there is almost no debate to be had!
If you disagree with me, I'm sure you'll enjoy this book; if you don't, then you should avoid it (and with it, much of contemporary philosophy of mind I'm afraid).
May 15, 2023
Dense as all hell. Intentionally confusing analogy structures that refuse to be understood.
April 1, 2024
This man wrote that the primary colors are red blue and green …
December 27, 2020
A vivid thorough walkthrough over major discussions and topics on philosophy of mind.
November 25, 2014
An accessible, expansive, quite contemporary textbook-like introduction to the philosophy of mind and the questions "what is mentality?", "what is the relation of mind and body?" and "what is consciousness?", suited for classes and discussion.
What I really like is the way the topics are presented - questions often outweigh statements, because in most questions there currently is no clear consensus (as always). But the most common and reasonable options and theories are presented, the viewer is invited to compare them, consider their (very clearly stated) consequences and implications, discuss them and perhaps choose which they prefer. Also, the essential problems and challenges to each theory are clearly stated, which one would need to solve to strengthen it.
I would criticize some details about the content though: Some (sub-)chapters were less convincing than others, and the author does seem to be more proficient in Philosophy of Mind than Cognitive Science, as he sometimes gives limited accounts of their theories and especially leaves out discussion of many contemporary Cognitive Science theories and models like Global Workspace Theory or Information Degradation Theory. The last chapter about Consciousness has the same flaw. This book is not quite in the light of contemporary Cognitive Science (though it includes many older concepts like machine functionalism or Computationalism).
That said, it is very valuable and enriching for students of Cognitive Science as well, as there are quite some discussions of the Brain Sciences and conceptual frameworks for experimental studies (what they may achieve and how to interpret that).
I especially found the "Mental Content" chapter lacking: Interpretation theory doesn't make sense to me (what gives an interpretation authority over statements about the world? how to judge the correctness of an interpretation, which does not even seem to be a factor?), wide content seems implausible too (it seems to me there can only be narrow content, relations of beliefs and external content seem fuzzy and subject to interpretation), i don't like the Twin Earth thought experiment (water and twater are simply the same), and relatedly content realism, which seems very intuitive to me (beliefs do not depend on interpretation), is only given a very late and brief look.
In other chapters we were dissatisfied with other details and argumentations as well, but most of the book really is well written.
Somewhat strangely and funnily, we had problems putting many of the argumentations and theories in the book into the context of Dual-Aspect Monism, which some of our group liked to defend or discuss. Physical causal closure is not as necessary or strongly plausible in this theory, and there are other possible considerations under it. It would be interesting to know what the author would respond to that, what the stance on Dual-Aspect Monism from Cognitive Scientists and philosophers of mind is, and what implications it has to the field.
I discussed this book chapter by chapter in a group of advanced students of Cognitive Science, all with some background in philosophy, one in philosophy, two in AI/Computer Science, one in medicine.
We mostly enjoyed it, learned many concepts and ways to answer the basic questions, and had fruitful discussions.
What I really like is the way the topics are presented - questions often outweigh statements, because in most questions there currently is no clear consensus (as always). But the most common and reasonable options and theories are presented, the viewer is invited to compare them, consider their (very clearly stated) consequences and implications, discuss them and perhaps choose which they prefer. Also, the essential problems and challenges to each theory are clearly stated, which one would need to solve to strengthen it.
I would criticize some details about the content though: Some (sub-)chapters were less convincing than others, and the author does seem to be more proficient in Philosophy of Mind than Cognitive Science, as he sometimes gives limited accounts of their theories and especially leaves out discussion of many contemporary Cognitive Science theories and models like Global Workspace Theory or Information Degradation Theory. The last chapter about Consciousness has the same flaw. This book is not quite in the light of contemporary Cognitive Science (though it includes many older concepts like machine functionalism or Computationalism).
That said, it is very valuable and enriching for students of Cognitive Science as well, as there are quite some discussions of the Brain Sciences and conceptual frameworks for experimental studies (what they may achieve and how to interpret that).
I especially found the "Mental Content" chapter lacking: Interpretation theory doesn't make sense to me (what gives an interpretation authority over statements about the world? how to judge the correctness of an interpretation, which does not even seem to be a factor?), wide content seems implausible too (it seems to me there can only be narrow content, relations of beliefs and external content seem fuzzy and subject to interpretation), i don't like the Twin Earth thought experiment (water and twater are simply the same), and relatedly content realism, which seems very intuitive to me (beliefs do not depend on interpretation), is only given a very late and brief look.
In other chapters we were dissatisfied with other details and argumentations as well, but most of the book really is well written.
Somewhat strangely and funnily, we had problems putting many of the argumentations and theories in the book into the context of Dual-Aspect Monism, which some of our group liked to defend or discuss. Physical causal closure is not as necessary or strongly plausible in this theory, and there are other possible considerations under it. It would be interesting to know what the author would respond to that, what the stance on Dual-Aspect Monism from Cognitive Scientists and philosophers of mind is, and what implications it has to the field.
I discussed this book chapter by chapter in a group of advanced students of Cognitive Science, all with some background in philosophy, one in philosophy, two in AI/Computer Science, one in medicine.
We mostly enjoyed it, learned many concepts and ways to answer the basic questions, and had fruitful discussions.
May 6, 2016
This was my college text book for a forgotten class nearly twenty years ago. In reading it now, its apparent that the main unstated approach in Philosophy of Mind is formalism/functionalism.
The attempt to highlight causation as the main agent shows a confusion about the necessarily obscuration inherent with functionalism.
Nonreductive physicalism and Emergentism are possible because a functionalist approach necessarily loses information about its underlying system. If we adopt functionalism as the mainstay in describing how we are, physical agencies necessarily becomes an abstraction that cannot be grasped by functionalism because of the functional layer is less rich than its antecedent layer.
Functionalism reduces physical causes into a range of (non)experience so that physical causes become undecidable in terms of non-reductive approaches. Attempting to reduce consciousness and its attributed experiences to physical causes is essentially trying to reduce an already reduced field with its characteristically different nomological network to its antecedent causes. It's like trying to reduce an app on your smart phone into its binary code. It can be done, but there will inevitably be many undecidable ways of doing so because there are many ways to code the same thing. The multiplicity of coding shows that none of these ways of coding are necessary, thereby leading us to conclude that none of these physical (binary) relations can be said to "cause" any of the app's activities because it is entirely undecidable.
In that sense, Philosophy of Mind is an "unsolvable" field. I've read my share of Philosophy of Mind essays over the last few years. There are two main approaches, the content as agency approach (which is deterministic, stating that the environmental factors determine our activities) and the structure as agency approach (which is analogous to free-will since one's internal objects have agency.) But if you look at the functional layer and physical layer relations as a whole, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact, to give one layer agency over the other is really a sham since the two are irreducible to one another even if the functional layer relies on the physical antecedent layer... after all the middle layers of programs can be made to decide things that are inexpressible as a mere physical cause. It is the undecideability of their relationship between a quantizable physicality and a logical structure that gives rise to a Godel-like incompleteness. Philosophers who attempt to find "The Algorithm" will be embroiled in an endless unresolveable debate as long as they seek to only define their structure by necessary causes. Everything is possibly sufficient leading nothing to be necessary.
The failings of the field however, is not the failing of the textbook. Kim has written a fairly concise text that is well written and clarifies details while reflecting back to previous discussions.
The attempt to highlight causation as the main agent shows a confusion about the necessarily obscuration inherent with functionalism.
Nonreductive physicalism and Emergentism are possible because a functionalist approach necessarily loses information about its underlying system. If we adopt functionalism as the mainstay in describing how we are, physical agencies necessarily becomes an abstraction that cannot be grasped by functionalism because of the functional layer is less rich than its antecedent layer.
Functionalism reduces physical causes into a range of (non)experience so that physical causes become undecidable in terms of non-reductive approaches. Attempting to reduce consciousness and its attributed experiences to physical causes is essentially trying to reduce an already reduced field with its characteristically different nomological network to its antecedent causes. It's like trying to reduce an app on your smart phone into its binary code. It can be done, but there will inevitably be many undecidable ways of doing so because there are many ways to code the same thing. The multiplicity of coding shows that none of these ways of coding are necessary, thereby leading us to conclude that none of these physical (binary) relations can be said to "cause" any of the app's activities because it is entirely undecidable.
In that sense, Philosophy of Mind is an "unsolvable" field. I've read my share of Philosophy of Mind essays over the last few years. There are two main approaches, the content as agency approach (which is deterministic, stating that the environmental factors determine our activities) and the structure as agency approach (which is analogous to free-will since one's internal objects have agency.) But if you look at the functional layer and physical layer relations as a whole, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact, to give one layer agency over the other is really a sham since the two are irreducible to one another even if the functional layer relies on the physical antecedent layer... after all the middle layers of programs can be made to decide things that are inexpressible as a mere physical cause. It is the undecideability of their relationship between a quantizable physicality and a logical structure that gives rise to a Godel-like incompleteness. Philosophers who attempt to find "The Algorithm" will be embroiled in an endless unresolveable debate as long as they seek to only define their structure by necessary causes. Everything is possibly sufficient leading nothing to be necessary.
The failings of the field however, is not the failing of the textbook. Kim has written a fairly concise text that is well written and clarifies details while reflecting back to previous discussions.
December 20, 2020
My ratings here are more subjective than objective. In general, I think about three things:
1. Did the author accomplish their purpose?
2. Was it an engaging read?
3. Was it helpful to me? (Meaning, did I learn anything? Did it change or push my thinking in any way?)
For this book, Kim gets a 5/5 on the first point, a 3/5 on the second, and a 2/5 on the third. It is, I believe, an objectively good book, but I just didn’t like it. I thought that I would be super interested in neurophilosphy, but, after reading this and Churchland’s book back to back, I’ve realized that the philosophical element doesn’t grip me nearly as much as books about pure neuroscience. So in that case, I suppose this book was helpful in that it motivated me to give up on this line of inquiry...
1. Did the author accomplish their purpose?
2. Was it an engaging read?
3. Was it helpful to me? (Meaning, did I learn anything? Did it change or push my thinking in any way?)
For this book, Kim gets a 5/5 on the first point, a 3/5 on the second, and a 2/5 on the third. It is, I believe, an objectively good book, but I just didn’t like it. I thought that I would be super interested in neurophilosphy, but, after reading this and Churchland’s book back to back, I’ve realized that the philosophical element doesn’t grip me nearly as much as books about pure neuroscience. So in that case, I suppose this book was helpful in that it motivated me to give up on this line of inquiry...
June 6, 2013
Kim has written a truly excellent introduction to the philosophy of mind. It is a book that many other writers of philosophical introductions could learn from - it is deep enough but does not pretend or try to cover everything, it is sufficiently broad, and most of all it is well written. Kim has his own opinions and he makes them clear, but as is appropriate in an introductory text he explains both sides of the arguments. It provides an exceptionally clear explanation of a complex topic and is a very good stepping stone to further studies, although for many it will be sufficient in itself.
September 22, 2019
My favorite description of this book is from an unfortunate undergraduate that wrote “it's obviously not for students but for very educated humans or aliens”. But it's not. If it's difficult it's because of the subject matter (and demanding professors) and not from Kim's writing -quite the contrary. The problem with pure philosophy of mind is that the good old metaphysics kinda moved there so it stays quite abstract. Most good philosophers use evidence from the neurosciences but for a general introduction that also has a historical mindset (even if it is just the past 70 years or so), it's not possible to focus on them. And of course even with the help of the neurosciences there are still no answers in sight. All the theories that manage to solve some problems end up creating new ones.
I read two editions of this as at the time of reading them I was considering pursuing a postgraduate program in philosophy of mind, but now I decided against it. The philosophy part is too abstract and armchair-y and the neurosciences part too science-y and constricting. The newer edition is a welcomed improvement compared to the older. Although Kim tries his best to present all theories fairly, the book is structured in a way that points to reductive physicalism as the one having the last word. This is less obvious in the newer edition. Other than that, I found the section on machine functionalism too detailed for what it offers, while the one on the causal/correlational approach too rushed and confusing.
I read two editions of this as at the time of reading them I was considering pursuing a postgraduate program in philosophy of mind, but now I decided against it. The philosophy part is too abstract and armchair-y and the neurosciences part too science-y and constricting. The newer edition is a welcomed improvement compared to the older. Although Kim tries his best to present all theories fairly, the book is structured in a way that points to reductive physicalism as the one having the last word. This is less obvious in the newer edition. Other than that, I found the section on machine functionalism too detailed for what it offers, while the one on the causal/correlational approach too rushed and confusing.
January 21, 2017
I have previously read Sam Harris's Free Will that I consistently see derided as poor philosophy (even though it is not a philosophical study). Harris's book takes a decidedly reductive physicalist thus epiphenomenalist view on consciousness. Funnily enough if Jaegwon's assessment of contemporary philosopher's views are accurate they seem to align reasonably well with Harris's. I think the hate for Harris extends from 1) Joe Rogan philosophers 2) Harris's willingness to criticise Islam.
Anyway, as a propaedeutic - the third thorough and relatively undiluted propaedeutic in philosophy I have read in the last year, Philosophy of Mind was quite successful. It was not a fast read and became particularly wearing towards the end but I am becoming more accustomed to the structure of examining philosophical arguments & philosophical vernacular as a whole. The phrase "begging the question" I now don't have to look up every fucking time because an intuitive reading using common usage of the word "beg" massively misdirects. Really they should just use "presupposing a premise".
Anyway, as a propaedeutic - the third thorough and relatively undiluted propaedeutic in philosophy I have read in the last year, Philosophy of Mind was quite successful. It was not a fast read and became particularly wearing towards the end but I am becoming more accustomed to the structure of examining philosophical arguments & philosophical vernacular as a whole. The phrase "begging the question" I now don't have to look up every fucking time because an intuitive reading using common usage of the word "beg" massively misdirects. Really they should just use "presupposing a premise".
January 21, 2020
An excellent introduction to the major questions in the philosophy of mind. The author breaks down complicated arguments about esoteric topics in as laymen manner as possible. The arguments are very nuanced across all the different topics and take time to think through thoroughly, making this neither a quick nor an easy read.
Highly recommended for anyone interested in this field.
Highly recommended for anyone interested in this field.
May 3, 2024
some solid, well-defined information in there, but damn, this made me lose my interest in the philosophy of mind the further we got into it. for a moment, i wasn't sure whether that was on kim or me, and then i changed to john heil's book for a couple of chapters and, woosh, intrigue returned. in other words, dense and unengaging as fuck.
Shelved as 'to-keep-reference'
November 1, 2019Citado en La mente Pág.160
June 23, 2020
Baffled. Blurb says "comprehensive survey of the subject" "clear and fair" also a review says "introductory survey."
I'm a beginner with philosophy so thought this would be a good read but really it's not for beginners. It's dry, heavy, long-winded and as I say baffling.
One to go back on eBay.
I'm a beginner with philosophy so thought this would be a good read but really it's not for beginners. It's dry, heavy, long-winded and as I say baffling.
One to go back on eBay.
April 27, 2021
I have read and shared this book with some friends. This is a very good textbook for people who want to know the main topics of philosophy of mind. I have a particular interest in the mind experiments from this field, like the Chinese Room.
February 8, 2020
A good textbook.
Informative and detailed.
Not as preachy or biased as I see other books on this topic.
Informative and detailed.
Not as preachy or biased as I see other books on this topic.
November 15, 2020
Excellent as an introduction of philosophy of mind...
December 23, 2022
Kim is a top-of-field modern philosopher who deserves to be read and taken seriously. He writes with clarity & concision while profiling many of the major theories and arguments behind philosophy of mind issues. He is generally fair and gracious, even in his critiques - a far different tone than many contemporaries such as Paul Churchland and Ian Ravenscroft in their summary texts on the subject. I do have several issues with the arguments Kim raises, the seemingly incontrovertible (as he presents them) nature of some (which are indeed surmountable), and his generally short dealings with dualist thought. However, I appreciate his scholarship, general graciousness, and clarity. Even if we don’t agree, I see great worth in this title as an excellent introduction and broad-view of the field.
June 18, 2024
The perfect book for understanding the mind from different views.
July 15, 2013
It's hard to really go into a ton of detail of an overview like this; by necessity, it's all over the place and doesn't delve into specific detail or make a drawn-out argument for a specific conclusion. While Kim's in favor of a physicalist-ish approach personally, he doesn't let that overwhelm the book in any way, only briefly and tangentially mentioning it toward the end of some chapters. I do think he treats each of the approaches pretty fairly: following the development of the field as each new school emerged to solve the problems of the pre-existing solutions, laying out the reasons to favor and disfavor each specific approach, and ultimately indicating their relative popularity in the state of the field as it stands.
But beyond a certain point, disputing the arguments is left as an exercise for the reader, and I found myself pulled various ways by the examples throughout. Rejecting some appraches was easy—Cartesian Dualism will always be a silly idea that creates more problems than it solves.
Yet others have more subtle issues. For example, the usual formulation of identity physicalism (saying the mind is the brain, and nothing more complex than that) seems to imply that there can be only one mental state correlated to a single feeling at any given time. But that seems patently absurd: at any given times we can describe a multitude of feelings fighting for their attention. And it seems like we can reformulate that same identity relationship without boiling things down to a unitary relationship, or without resorting to some of the more abstracted approaches like functionalism or behaviorism.
Kim will lay out some of the canonical arguments against the different approaches, but it can be hard to tell how those map against specific lines of reasoning like the one above. That said, he'll often pick up those reservations (or similar ones) in later chapters; for example, the argument I just outlined is in some sense picked up by non-computational functionalism.
I really shouldn't give Kim too much grief about this. Beyond being a limitation of philosophical writing itself, it's certainly asking too much of an overview. But there are some significant omissions that would tackle other aspects of the problem. The biggest example I noticed was the total lack of Bayesian reasoning in the chapter on mental content (i.e. beliefs). Without it, Kim can't really broach the problem of uncertainty, or even begin to tackle how our account of whether beliefs have external content will depend on whether we believe perceptions have inherently external content.
In any case, this is an excellent way in to the field, and the one I chose to re-enter philosophy after over four years away from the subject. You'll get a sense of why this kind of thinking is so exciting, but without being so abstract that the concerns seem too insubstantial to warrant further study (which can be a huge problem outside of political and moral philosophy). And the writing is both precise and accessible, a difficult balance to reach in philosophy, and one that is immeasurably kind to the reader.
But beyond a certain point, disputing the arguments is left as an exercise for the reader, and I found myself pulled various ways by the examples throughout. Rejecting some appraches was easy—Cartesian Dualism will always be a silly idea that creates more problems than it solves.
Yet others have more subtle issues. For example, the usual formulation of identity physicalism (saying the mind is the brain, and nothing more complex than that) seems to imply that there can be only one mental state correlated to a single feeling at any given time. But that seems patently absurd: at any given times we can describe a multitude of feelings fighting for their attention. And it seems like we can reformulate that same identity relationship without boiling things down to a unitary relationship, or without resorting to some of the more abstracted approaches like functionalism or behaviorism.
Kim will lay out some of the canonical arguments against the different approaches, but it can be hard to tell how those map against specific lines of reasoning like the one above. That said, he'll often pick up those reservations (or similar ones) in later chapters; for example, the argument I just outlined is in some sense picked up by non-computational functionalism.
I really shouldn't give Kim too much grief about this. Beyond being a limitation of philosophical writing itself, it's certainly asking too much of an overview. But there are some significant omissions that would tackle other aspects of the problem. The biggest example I noticed was the total lack of Bayesian reasoning in the chapter on mental content (i.e. beliefs). Without it, Kim can't really broach the problem of uncertainty, or even begin to tackle how our account of whether beliefs have external content will depend on whether we believe perceptions have inherently external content.
In any case, this is an excellent way in to the field, and the one I chose to re-enter philosophy after over four years away from the subject. You'll get a sense of why this kind of thinking is so exciting, but without being so abstract that the concerns seem too insubstantial to warrant further study (which can be a huge problem outside of political and moral philosophy). And the writing is both precise and accessible, a difficult balance to reach in philosophy, and one that is immeasurably kind to the reader.
January 8, 2017
i think about human mind that how they think? and how they become thinker? and why people become mental?
what is philosophy of mind ?
what is philosophy of mind ?
March 10, 2008
One of the better introductions to Philosophy of Mind that I have read. Kim is fair and balanced--he does not give in to the other-view-bashing that is unfortunately typical in other books in the field.
I found his chapter on Functionalism particularly helpful, and appreciated his unique discussions of qualia, mental causation and non-reductive physicalism.
His philosophical style seems to be closer to Heil, as far as philosophers of mind I have read go, in that he employs a more metaphysical approach--but I think he pulls it off better than Heil.
One technical flaw: he seems to be mistaken on the relationship between physiological events (P), neural events (N) and mental events (M), and more specifically, their temporal relation to each other. In other words, he seems to be missing out on the James-Lange theory of emotion or contemporary adjustments of this theory. I am not yet sure how this would affect the theories he is talking about, if at all.
I found his chapter on Functionalism particularly helpful, and appreciated his unique discussions of qualia, mental causation and non-reductive physicalism.
His philosophical style seems to be closer to Heil, as far as philosophers of mind I have read go, in that he employs a more metaphysical approach--but I think he pulls it off better than Heil.
One technical flaw: he seems to be mistaken on the relationship between physiological events (P), neural events (N) and mental events (M), and more specifically, their temporal relation to each other. In other words, he seems to be missing out on the James-Lange theory of emotion or contemporary adjustments of this theory. I am not yet sure how this would affect the theories he is talking about, if at all.
April 9, 2012
Overall, very good. It kinda felt like it all came together in the last chapter on the Physicalist position as a whole.
Looking at a past paper for my university's Philosophy of Mind course, I'm no expert in Philosophy of Mind. I am not currently equipped to answer questions on this past paper like 'Is there self-deception without selves?' and would only just about know what issues a question like 'Does the holism of the mental undermine attempts to naturalize intentionality?' and 'Are there mental actions?' To be fair, if this is intended to be an introductory textbook, it hasn't done too bad a job at introducing the main issues (half the paper is about qualia and functionalism, and I kind of know most of what's needed there, just haven't read enough to know the potential nuances in the arguments). I would also complain about his constant use of pain as an example throughout the book; in some cases, it would have been worth using other examples.
Looking at a past paper for my university's Philosophy of Mind course, I'm no expert in Philosophy of Mind. I am not currently equipped to answer questions on this past paper like 'Is there self-deception without selves?' and would only just about know what issues a question like 'Does the holism of the mental undermine attempts to naturalize intentionality?' and 'Are there mental actions?' To be fair, if this is intended to be an introductory textbook, it hasn't done too bad a job at introducing the main issues (half the paper is about qualia and functionalism, and I kind of know most of what's needed there, just haven't read enough to know the potential nuances in the arguments). I would also complain about his constant use of pain as an example throughout the book; in some cases, it would have been worth using other examples.
November 5, 2016
At times it is indeed dry and technical it is a fantastic introduction to the philosophy of mind. If you're prepared to read some heavy analytic philosophy geared philosophy of mind it does pay off in the form of knowing more about the historical and current views in the philosophy of mind and in the later chapters of consciousness.
A fine read indeed.
A fine read indeed.
January 27, 2014
I am not a philosopher, so I've used this book as a companion to Kim's book on Physicalism. Both books have similar structure and arguments, though there are more basic explanations and definitions in this book and less of the advanced and complex discussions of Physicalism.
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May 6, 2007Probably the best intro to Phil Mind
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