Nov 1, 2013 · We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences ...
We show that the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners' revenue is larger than their fair share.
This implies that, if less than 100% of the miners are honest, the system may not be incentive compatible: The first selfish miner will earn proportionally ...
This work shows that the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive-compatible, and proposes a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects ...
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Mar 18, 2015 · We show that the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair ...
Literature review revealed five major shortcomings of Bitcoin—weak substitute for traditional currency, higher volatility, idiosyncratic risks, uncertain ...
Nov 4, 2013 · A one-off subgame of bitcoin mining is not incentive compatible. This is no surprise to anyone. One well-known reason is the 51% attack. There ...
Oct 22, 2024 · We show that the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners' revenue is larger than their fair share.
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Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable · Deconstructing Decentralised Exchanges · The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain · Blockchain ...