Nov 25, 2021 · We prove that for log-concave sources, the expected costs of the encoder and the decoder in equilibrium decrease as the number of bins increases.

Abstract—We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized cheap talk problem for real random variables and quadratic cost criteria in which an ...

Abstract—We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized cheap talk problem for real random variables and quadratic cost criteria in which an ...

We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized cheap talk problem for real random variables and quadratic cost criteria in which an encoder ...

Sep 12, 2024 · We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder have misaligned ...

Signaling games for log-concave distributions: Number of bins and properties of equilibria. E Kazıklı, S Sarıtaş, S Gezici, T Linder, S Yüksel. IEEE ...

Jan 23, 2019 · In this paper, we discuss extensions and generalizations of strategic information transmission and cheap talk by focusing on exponential and ...

Signaling Games for Log-Concave Distributions: Number of Bins and Properties of Equilibria · no code implementations • 15 Dec 2020 • Ertan Kazıklı, Serkan ...

We investigate signaling game problems where an encoder and a decoder with misaligned objectives communicate.

Moreover, we show that an equilibrium with more bins is more informative by showing that the expected costs of the encoder and the decoder in equilibrium.