Uman–Botoșani offensive: Difference between revisions
expand on the encirclement at Kamenets-Podols, counterattack at Khotin and final positions |
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This commenced the liberation of the Moldavian SSR. Moldavian partisans actively contributed to the success of the Soviet troops. As a result of offensive the [[2nd Ukrainian Front]] in cooperation with the 1st Ukrainian Front split Army Group South into two parts. The 8th German Army was cut off from the 1st Panzer Army and assigned to [[Army Group A]]. The main effort of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was now transferred against this army group, which Soviet troops deeply enveloped from the south. A possibility arose for the 2nd Ukrainian Front by conducting the offensive in the southern direction to cut off the withdrawal routes of group beyond the Dniester and in cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front to destroy it. |
This commenced the liberation of the Moldavian SSR. Moldavian partisans actively contributed to the success of the Soviet troops. As a result of offensive the [[2nd Ukrainian Front]] in cooperation with the 1st Ukrainian Front split Army Group South into two parts. The 8th German Army was cut off from the 1st Panzer Army and assigned to [[Army Group A]]. The main effort of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was now transferred against this army group, which Soviet troops deeply enveloped from the south. A possibility arose for the 2nd Ukrainian Front by conducting the offensive in the southern direction to cut off the withdrawal routes of group beyond the Dniester and in cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front to destroy it. |
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The 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, that advanced along the east bank of the Dniester, was given the task of cutting off withdrawal routes to the south to the 1st Panzer Army, by collaborating with troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in eliminating 1st Ukrainian Front encirclement of German troops at [[Kamenets-Podolsk]] (see [[Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive]] operation). Deflecting an attempted German counter-attack at [[ |
The 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, that advanced along the east bank of the Dniester, was given the task of cutting off withdrawal routes to the south to the 1st Panzer Army, by collaborating with troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in eliminating 1st Ukrainian Front encirclement of German troops at [[Kamenets-Podolsk]] (see [[Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive]] operation). Deflecting an attempted German counter-attack at [[Khotyn]], they pressed home the attack from the bridgehead to Dniester, the 27th and 52nd armies together with detachments of the 2nd and 6th tank armies advanced to the river [[Prut]], and on 26 March reached the State border of the USSR on an 85km front north of [[Ungheni]]. |
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On the night of 28 March the Front’s forces, while pursuing the retreating enemy, conducted another assault river crossing on the move of river Prut, transferring combat actions onto Rumanian territory. Towards the middle of April their right wing reached the Carpathians, after occupying [[Botoshany]], and with the central forces they approached Yassy from the north while the left wing advanced to the approaches to Kishinev. The German command, in order to save the southern wing of its front from a complete disintegration, moved in this direction 18 divisions and 3 brigades, its last [[strategic reserve]] in the southern sector of the front. Troops of the 2nd |
On the night of 28 March the Front’s forces, while pursuing the retreating enemy, conducted another assault river crossing on the move of river Prut, transferring combat actions onto Rumanian territory. Towards the middle of April their right wing reached the Carpathians, after occupying [[Botoşani|Botoshany]], and with the central forces they approached [[Iaşi|Yassy]] from the north while the left wing advanced to the approaches to Kishinev. The German command, in order to save the southern wing of its front from a complete disintegration, moved in this direction 18 divisions and 3 brigades, its last [[strategic reserve]] in the southern sector of the front. Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, experiencing the increasing resistance of the enemy, in the middle of April were forced to go on a defensive at the reached positions of [[Dubăsari|Dubossary]], north of Yassy, and some 60km south of Botoshany. |
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As a result the Uman-Botoshany Offensive, the German 8th Army was destroyed, and the 1st Panzer Army was partially destroyed, while the front of Army Group South was split into [[Army Group South Ukraine]] under command of |
As a result the Uman-Botoshany Offensive, the German 8th Army was destroyed, and the 1st Panzer Army was partially destroyed, while the front of Army Group South was split into [[Army Group South Ukraine]] under command of general [[Ferdinand Schörner]], and [[Army Group North Ukraine]] commanded by field marshal [[Walter Model]]. Ten Axis divisions lost 50-75% of personnel and almost all heavy armament. In the course of offensive the forces of front advanced 200-250 km, liberating significant parts of the right-bank Ukraine and Moldavia, and entered northeastern regions of Rumania. |
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The offensive was the first in which three tank armies were used were used simultaneously simultaneously in the composition of main grouping of the front on a narrow sector. The forces of the front conducted the offensive under the conditions of a [[spring flood]] and rasputitsa consecutively conducted assault crossings from the move of six rivers: Gorniy Tikach, Yuzhny Bug, Dniester, [[Reut]], Prut, and [[Siret]]. [[Uman]], [[Vapnyarka]], [[Pervomaysk]], [[Novoukrainka]] and other towns were liberated. |
The offensive was the first in which three tank armies were used were used simultaneously simultaneously in the composition of main grouping of the front on a narrow sector. The forces of the front conducted the offensive under the conditions of a [[spring flood]] and rasputitsa consecutively conducted assault crossings from the move of six rivers: Gorniy Tikach, Yuzhny Bug, Dniester, [[Reut]], Prut, and [[Siret]]. [[Uman]], [[Vapnyarka]], [[Pervomaysk]], [[Novoukrainka]] and other towns were liberated. |
Revision as of 03:26, 8 October 2008
Dnepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive | |
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Operational scope | Breach the German Dnepr defensive line "East Wall" in south-western Ukraine, and advance to the foothills of the Carpathian mountains. |
Planned | November - December 1943 |
Planned by | Stavka |
Objective | multiple objectives primarily concerned with the destruction of Army Group South |
Date | 24 December 1943 - 17 April 1944 |
Executed by | 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Ukrainian Fronts, and Byelorussian Front |
Outcome | Decisive strategic victory with Army Group South split into two |
Casualties | Soviet killed or permanently disabled 270,198, returned to service wounded 839,330 |
Uman-Botoshany Offensive | |||||||
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Part of Dnepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Soviet Union | Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Ivan Konev | Erich von Manstein |
The Uman-Botoshany Offensive (Russian: Уманско-ботошанская наступательная операция) was a part of the strategic offensive of the Red Army in the right-bank (western) Ukrainian SSR. The offensive operation was conducted by the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front during World War II, from March 5 to 17 April in 1944 for the purpose of inflicting a crushing defeat of the German “Uman group” of forces, the splitting of the troops of Army Group South, and the liberation of south-western Ukraine region. After the completion of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Offensive, the main forces of 2nd Ukrainian Front (Marshal Konev) were opposed by the 8th Army of Army Group South (Gen.-Feldm. Manstein). At the start of the operation the Soviet troops exceeded those of their German adversaries in the personnel and tanks by 1.5:1, in artillery 2.5:1 and achieved parity in aviation forces.
The Stavka concept of the operation was: to destroy the 8th Army, to bisect the front of the of Army Group South, and to cut off withdrawal routes of the 1st Panzer Army in the southern direction, contributing to 1st Ukrainian Front’s objective of its defeat. The main offensive effort was to be delivered from the staging areas at Vinograd, Zvenigorodok, and Shpola in the direction of Uman by forces of the 27th, 52nd, 4th Guard all arms, 2nd, 5th Guard and 6th Tank armies (415 tanks and 147 SPAs), supported by the 5th Air Army. The 7th and 5th Guard armies delivered supporting attacks from the region of Kirovograd in the direction of Novoukrainka. During preparation for the operation the military councils of the Front and armies gave considerable attention the mobilisation of personnel and unit composition for overcoming of the difficulties due to rasputitsa, the generally poor weather conditions, and the need for conducting numerous assault river crossings that were expected to inhibit operational mobility.
The offensive began on 5 March on a 175km sector of the front between Dnepropetrovsk and Belaya Tserkov after powerful artillery preparation, and developed successfully. For the increase in the force of impact, and development of the offensive on the main direction, the 2nd and 5th Guard Tank armies were introduced into the offensive on the first day. Already on the third day of the offensive they conducted an assault river crossing of Gorny Tikach from the move, overcame the last defence line occupied by German troops on the way to river Yuzhny Bug, and begun to conduct pursuit. Following the 2nd and 5th Guard Tank armies advanced the 6th Tank Army. After liberation of Uman on 10 March, the advance detachments of the armies reached river Yuzhny Bug. Crossing the river was accomplished on a 100km front on the move via seized crossings, and also on pontoons, boats and other improvised means. For maintaining the high rate of advance during the offensive, the 6th Tank Army was introduced after the Yuzhny Bug crossing. After crossing the Yuzhny Bug, the tank armies continued to conduct the advance to the Dniester. On 17 March the advance units of the the right wing of the Front took bridgeheads on the right bank south of Mogilev-Podolskiy area. This commenced the liberation of the Moldavian SSR. Moldavian partisans actively contributed to the success of the Soviet troops. As a result of offensive the 2nd Ukrainian Front in cooperation with the 1st Ukrainian Front split Army Group South into two parts. The 8th German Army was cut off from the 1st Panzer Army and assigned to Army Group A. The main effort of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was now transferred against this army group, which Soviet troops deeply enveloped from the south. A possibility arose for the 2nd Ukrainian Front by conducting the offensive in the southern direction to cut off the withdrawal routes of group beyond the Dniester and in cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front to destroy it.
The 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, that advanced along the east bank of the Dniester, was given the task of cutting off withdrawal routes to the south to the 1st Panzer Army, by collaborating with troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in eliminating 1st Ukrainian Front encirclement of German troops at Kamenets-Podolsk (see Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive operation). Deflecting an attempted German counter-attack at Khotyn, they pressed home the attack from the bridgehead to Dniester, the 27th and 52nd armies together with detachments of the 2nd and 6th tank armies advanced to the river Prut, and on 26 March reached the State border of the USSR on an 85km front north of Ungheni.
On the night of 28 March the Front’s forces, while pursuing the retreating enemy, conducted another assault river crossing on the move of river Prut, transferring combat actions onto Rumanian territory. Towards the middle of April their right wing reached the Carpathians, after occupying Botoshany, and with the central forces they approached Yassy from the north while the left wing advanced to the approaches to Kishinev. The German command, in order to save the southern wing of its front from a complete disintegration, moved in this direction 18 divisions and 3 brigades, its last strategic reserve in the southern sector of the front. Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, experiencing the increasing resistance of the enemy, in the middle of April were forced to go on a defensive at the reached positions of Dubossary, north of Yassy, and some 60km south of Botoshany.
As a result the Uman-Botoshany Offensive, the German 8th Army was destroyed, and the 1st Panzer Army was partially destroyed, while the front of Army Group South was split into Army Group South Ukraine under command of general Ferdinand Schörner, and Army Group North Ukraine commanded by field marshal Walter Model. Ten Axis divisions lost 50-75% of personnel and almost all heavy armament. In the course of offensive the forces of front advanced 200-250 km, liberating significant parts of the right-bank Ukraine and Moldavia, and entered northeastern regions of Rumania.
The offensive was the first in which three tank armies were used were used simultaneously simultaneously in the composition of main grouping of the front on a narrow sector. The forces of the front conducted the offensive under the conditions of a spring flood and rasputitsa consecutively conducted assault crossings from the move of six rivers: Gorniy Tikach, Yuzhny Bug, Dniester, Reut, Prut, and Siret. Uman, Vapnyarka, Pervomaysk, Novoukrainka and other towns were liberated.
The operation was characterised by flexible control, quick response of command to changes in the situation and by the clear organisation of interaction between the armies and the aviation of front. Soviet troops showed a high degree of military skill in conduct of operations, particularly in conduct of assault crossings during execution of operational manoeuvres.