

The Israeli Radical Right: History, Culture and Politics

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1984: The Shock

Most Israelis were greatly shocked when they learned on the eve of April 27, 1984, that a plot to blow up five buses full of Arab passengers during a crowded rush hour was barely prevented. In the following week, twenty-seven men suspected of forming an anti-Arab terrorist network were arrested. It was soon disclosed that the suspects had been responsible for an attempt to assassinate the Arab mayors of three West Bank cities in 1980; a murderous attack on the Islamic college in Hebron in 1983, which took the lives of three students and wounded thirty-three; and a score of lesser acts of violence against Arabs. An elaborate plan to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock on Jerusalem's Temple Mount, the third most

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sacred place in Islam, was also on their drawing board.

What surprised observers and political analysts in April 1984 was not so much the existence of the terror group as the identity of its members. They belonged to Gush Emunim (the Block of the Faithful), a religious fundamentalist group committed to establishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank (biblical Judea and Samaria). Though an aggressive (and sometimes even illegal) settlement movement, Gush Emunim had never openly embraced an ideology of violence. Its orthodox leaders asserted a biblically based Jewish claim to Judea and Samaria but had never advocated deportation of the Arab population.¹ Instead, they professed the belief that a peaceful and productive coexistence with the Arabs, under a benevolent Israeli rule, was both possible and desirable. That any of these highly educated and responsible men, some of whom were ranking army officers and all but one of whom were heads of large families, would resort to terrorism was completely unexpected.

The exposition of "respectable" Jewish terrorism was followed, three months later, by another unexpected event: the election into the Knesset (Israel's parliament) of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, an extreme religious fundamentalist (assassinated November 5, 1990). Nearly 26,000 (1.3 percent) Israelis voted for Kach (Thus), the political party that called for the expulsion of the Arabs from historical Palestine, and 2.5 percent of Israeli soldiers were among them. Almost everybody remembered that it was Kahane who since 1974 had advocated publicly Terror Neged Terror (TNT), which in his terminology stood for Jewish terrorism versus Arab terrorism.²

The astonished Israelis did not have to wait long in order to discover what the new party was about. A day after the elections, Kahane and his supporters held a victory parade to the Western Wall in old Jerusalem. Passing intentionally through the Arab section of the old city, Kahane's excited followers smashed through the market, overturning vegetable stalls, hitting bystanders, punching the air with clenched fists, and telling the frightened local residents that the end of their stay in the Holy Land was near. This kind of street brutality has been repeated many times since especially following anti-Jewish terror incidents. But instead of being shocked by what until that time could only have been seen in old newsreels of pre-1945 central Europe or in modern scenes from Teheran, some Israelis liked what they saw. Since the mid-1980s, the number of supporters of Kahane's political stance has increased by a great amount. Polls conducted as of summer 1984 have steadily given Kahane and his advocates between 2.5 to 2.7 percent of the total vote. Several attitude studies of high school students indicate an exceptional support for Kahane among the young. A general atmosphere of forgiveness and "understanding" of the acts of the Jewish underground has also surfaced.³

A careful examination of the evolution of religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, and aggressive anti-Arab sentiment since 1984 suggests a rise that is neither accidental nor isolated. This examination tells us the story of a large political process that until now has not been properly identified and named, the reemergence of the Israeli Radical Right. Before the establishment of the State of Israel, there existed in Jewish Palestine a small ultranationalist school that propagated the creation of a monolithic Jewish regime and was hostile to the dominant Zionist socialism of the time. This school was strongly opposed to the partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs and exerted some influence over the young. The actual partition of Palestine in 1948 and the establishment of Israel under the domination of the social democratic Mapai (later the Labor movement) was responsible for the great decline of this Radical Right and for its eventual demise. The nationalist scene was monopolized by Herut (Freedom party, later expanded to the Likud), which was a more moderate political party. It now appears that the Israeli nationalist Right, which had been revitalized since the Six Days' War (1967), has undergone a significant political and ideological transformation. In the last decade and especially since 1984, it has gone from a unified political and ideological force headed unquestionably by Menachem Begin, the leader of Likud, to a camp fragmented both politically and ideologically.

The concept of the Radical Right developed in the United States is useful in the Israeli context because groups like Kach and Gush Emunim do not fit the traditional features of the Israeli nationalist Right, yet they are neither revolutionary nor Fascist. The parties to this camp earnestly believe that they are the true Israelis and the genuine Zionists. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the sequence of events that produced the Israeli Radical Right, portray it as a political culture, and examine its political dynamics.

The Ultranationalist Legacy

In the mandate period the school most identified with the idea of a Radical Right was the maximalist wing of revisionist Zionism, the ultranationalist orientation linked to organizations such as Brith Habirionim (the Covenant of Thugs) and Lehi (Israel's Freedom Fighters, also known as the Stern Gang). The old Radical Right was moved by two fundamental beliefs: that the British were oppressive rulers who had to be expelled from Palestine by force and that the emerging Extreme Right of the time, with perhaps the exception of the Nazis, represented a viable ideology and a relevant model of political action. The early ideologues of this camp, Uri Zvi Greenberg, Abba Achimeir, and Yehoshua Heshel Yevin, represented an impatient Zionism that concluded that the British betrayed the Jews and abrogated the terms of the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Fascinated by other nationalist movements, especially the Italian, the Polish, the Czech, and the Irish, all of which had reached independence through military effort, they concluded that the British had to be expelled from Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) by force. The fact that the Jews in Palestine were a small ethnic minority of mostly new immigrants and that a much larger native community questioned their very right to the land was not allowed to interfere in the great dream. Since its inception, this ultranationalist circle was characterized by a conviction that strong will and determination constitute the most important political resource and that they alone could change the world.⁴

This small group of ultranationalist ideologues, which started to write and preach in the late 1920s, was not philosophically homogeneous, for each member constructed an individual brand of ultranationalism from different historical and philosophical sources. Profoundly influenced by the growing European Radical Right, they all agreed on a principled rejection of democracy and a hostility toward socialism. Zionist socialism was perceived as a threat to nationalism. Only the Hebrew nation and its future instrument of power, the Jewish state, were sacred. Thus, in addition to their rejection of the policies of the yishuv Jewish community in Palestine) vis-à-vis the British, the revisionist ultranationalists were driven by an ideological animosity toward the workers' parties. There was another important ingredient in their thinking: a romantic return to the biblical past of the nation and the aspiration to reconstruct the days of the early Hebrews who took Canaan by force and extended it by military means to the large Davidic kingdom.⁵ Most appealing to these revolutionaries was not the image of the self-sufficient Jewish farmer-pioneer, idolized by Labor Zionism, but rather the model of the Jewish fighter, the Hebrew national who takes the land by force. *[please see the following texts on Hebrew Canaanism for background on this movement—web editor]*

By calling itself Brith Habirionim, after a faction of the first-century Zealots, the small group of Greenberg, Achimeir, and Yevin clearly communicated radicalism, antiestablishment sentiment, and defiance. The rebellion was not only directed against the British, the Arabs, and the Labor establishment but also against the religious orthodoxy for whom the concept of *birionim* was anathema because their ennoblement of the Jewish past was not Halakic or historical. It was above all a mythological rediscovery of the glorious tales of the nation, a romantic glorification of the old days of blood, soil, heroism, and

conquest. The intellectuals of Brith Habirionim mostly wrote and preached, and in the early 1930s they were involved in several symbolic demonstrations against the British, Nazi Germany, and the Arabs.⁶ Nevertheless, their politico-cultural influence was considerable. Another contribution to Zionist right-wing radicalism was made by Vladimir Jabotinsky, the founder and leader of the revisionist movement that split off from organized Zionism.⁷ Jabotinsky's admiration for Great Britain and for the virtues of democracy, liberalism, and the rule of law was responsible for his refusal to completely fight the British and relieve them from the moral duty of establishing a Jewish state as implied in the Balfour Declaration.⁸ Nevertheless, there were certain radical elements in his thinking and political style that made it possible for the members of Brith Habirionim and other radical groups to admire him and include his thought in their extremist weltanschauung.⁹ Jabotinsky's most important contribution to these younger followers was his integral nationalism, the fervent belief that the nation is the supreme foundation of legitimate political action.¹⁰ His support for civil liberties, individual freedoms, and a free economy was somewhat at odds with his nationalist rhetoric and mode of action, which stressed monism, militarism, discipline, order, and bitter defiance of Zionism.¹¹ Jabotinsky's youth movement, *Betar*, which became the main politicization agent of revisionist activists, pioneers, and fighters, was a semimilitaristic entity that stressed hierarchy, discipline, obedience to superiors, rituals, and ceremonies.¹² *Betar* members wore brown shirts and stressed military virtues as a symbol of national sovereignty and an expression of collective national liberation. Jabotinsky cultivated romantic heroism and national fighters who gave their lives for freedom. Old and new battle sites like Massada, *Betar*, and Tel Hai were made sacred pilgrimage sites for thousands of *Betar* youngsters.¹³ Other components of Jabotinsky's program included the unconditional demand that the future State of Israel be established on both sides of the Jordan River, a penchant for militarism, economic corporatism, and a fervent anti-Labor stance. As Yonathan Shapira has shown, it was highly appealing to a whole age cohort of *Betar* activists who grew up in Poland between the 1920s and 1930s under the spell of Joseph Pilsudski and the Polish Extreme Right.¹⁴

Yet as Sholomo Avineri has pointed out, Jabotinsky was fully aware of the tremendous weakness of the Jews¹⁵ and could neither support the politics of Brith Habirionim nor the underground operations of Etzel (the National Military Organization, a nationalist semimilitary organization close to *Betar*) in the closing years of the 1930s. *Betar* started to drift away,¹⁶ and especially Etzel, which since 1937 had been engaged in active anti-Arab terrorism, could not accept Jabotinsky's hesitancy. They opted for a more radical direction expressed by an active military struggle against the British and a belief in military solutions for political problems. In 1940 Abraham Stern (Yair) split away from Etzel, and established Lehi. The Stern Gang went underground and hoped to lead the entire Jewish liberation movement toward the creation of the "Kingdom of Israel" free of the British and Arabs.¹⁷

The Marginality of the Old Radical Right

Although the post-1967 Radical Right clearly has strong "classical" Zionist roots, there is hardly any question that before the Six Days' War it was a marginal phenomenon. The main force within the yishuv had been Labor Zionism. The political and cultural dominance of the Labor movement and Zionist socialism over the Zionist venture in Palestine and the emerging Zionist polity has been the subject of many studies and books.¹⁸ The ideas and programs of the Radical Right appealed to relatively few Zionists, who were politically persecuted. The 1933 assassination of Labor leader Haim Arlozoroff and

the 1935 crisis within the World Zionist Organization began a long period of marginalization of the Zionist Right and Radical Right. The "secession" of Jabotinsky from the Zionist movement and the later establishment of the "secessionist" underground, Etzel and Lehi, led to intense delegitimization of the Zionist Right.¹⁹ To be a "secessionist" in the early 1940s amounted to membership in illegitimate subversive bodies that were considered Fascist by the official interpreters of Labor Zionism. Probably no more than 10 percent to 15 percent of the yishuv supported the Right, and most of these supporters were not very radical.²⁰

The success of Labor Zionism in building the Zionist "state in the making" further diminished the historical role of the Right and the Radical Right. Etzel and Lehi played an instrumental role in driving the British out of Palestine in the 1940s—a role that was greater than was recognized by "legitimate Zionism"—but their support for the building of the Jewish polity in Palestine was minimal at best.²¹ They made almost no contribution to the self-governing institutions of the state and to building the economic infrastructures of the yishuv,²² and took almost no part in the great diplomatic effort to gain legitimacy and support for the emerging Jewish state in the United States and the post-Holocaust world. Furthermore, they were ill prepared to meet the real challenge of the newly created state: the war with the Arabs. By focusing all its efforts on the British, the Israeli nationalist Right became irrelevant the moment the British left Palestine.

World War II, the Nazi and Fascist experience, and the Holocaust also contributed to the historical irrelevance of the Radical Right. In the 1930s the historical Radical Right was a relevant ideological school, seen by many as a viable alternative to world communism on the one hand and "decadent" liberal democracy on the other. Not only the Polish Radical Right but also Italian fascism were highly attractive for the radical wing of the revisionist movement. The Fascist appeal was partly responsible for Abraham Stern's bizarre 1941 effort to form an anti-British alliance with the Axis powers.²³ The experience of the war and especially the Holocaust destroyed the fascination of fascism for the vast majority of the world. The loss of the war was also an ideological disaster for world fascism, driving it at once to the very margins of modern civilization. This was even more the case for Jews and Zionists. Very few ultranationalists remained loyal to their prewar political platforms, and many of them began to deny ever being close to the European Radical Right.

The 1947 United Nations Partition Resolution, the 1948 war of independence and the establishment of the State of Israel made the grand vision of the Radical Right rather unrealistic. It was therefore natural that despite some bloody incidents between Etzel and the new Israeli army, Etzel's political successor, Herut, became part of the Israeli parliamentary system.²⁴ Mapai's shrewd politicians constantly used Herut's past radicalism, extremist rhetoric, and commitment to the dream of "Shtei gadot laYarden zo shelanu zo gam ken" (There are two banks to the Jordan River, this one is ours and the other, too)—a principled rejection of the partition of Eretz Yisrael and the aspiration for a military conquest of the Kingdom of Jordan—to keep it out of the pale of complete legitimacy.²⁵ In September 1948, Lehi veterans committed their last defiant terrorist act, the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN mediator in Palestine, and then gave up their underground life and in 1949 joined the new system. Organizing in the form of the Fighters party, they implied at least a partial recognition of the newly created Israeli state and its norms.²⁶

The only organized component of the Radical Right that remained loyal to the old ideology and continued to function after 1949 was a small ideological group, Chug Sulam (Ladder Circle). Organized by Israel Eldad, a devotee of Greenberg and a former chief ideologist of Lehi, Chug Sulam vowed to preserve the dream of the greatest Kingdom of Israel. For that purpose, it published a highly ideological magazine, *Sulam*, and organized educational and ideological activities for youth. Completely detached from the historical reality of the newly created State of Israel, *Sulam* printed anti-British articles

"exposing" the British intention to reoccupy Palestine via Jordan, antiregime articles attacking the decadent party system of the truncated Jewish state, and essays on the indivisibility of Eretz Yisrael and its promised borders. In an age of prestigious democracy, it called for the installation of a Jewish dictatorship and for a war of conquest against most of the new state's neighbors. The celebration of Israel's independence day was occasionally ended by the call "next year in Amman" (Jordan's capital).²⁷

Chug Sulam's total isolation from the nation's public life and most Israeli citizens did not prevent the establishment, in the early 1950s, of two small underground groups that vowed to topple the regime: Brith Hakanaim (Covenant of Zealots) and Macheret Malchut Yisrael (Kingdom of Israel Underground). The first operated between 1949 and 1951 and was mostly interested in fighting the secular character of the new state; the second acted between 1951 and 1953 and was involved in "defending and uplifting" the national honor. Both groups were captured by the Shin Beth (Israel's secret service) before they caused major damage, but they left an impact nevertheless. Whereas Brith Hakanaim burned nonkosher butcher shops and set ablaze cars that were being driven on the Sabbath, the Kingdom of Israel Underground was involved in larger operations. Reacting to the 1952 doctors' trial in Moscow, it blew up the Soviet consulate in Tel Aviv and did the same to the Czech consulate following the Slansky purge trials in Prague. Following the intense public debate over the German reparations, the group conducted several symbolic attacks against artists performing German music.²⁸

But the arrest of the members of this radical underground and the growing irrelevance of Chug Sulam to the problems faced by the State of Israel of the 1950s slowly brought about the final decline of the Israeli Radical Right. The army's aggressive retaliation operations against enemy targets in Jordan and Egypt in the first half of the 1950s, the 1956 Sinai campaign, and David Ben Gurion and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan's hawkish posture became attractive to many people who had rightist tendencies and backgrounds. The illustrious operations of Commando Unit 101, and later the Israeli paratroopers under the command of Major Ariel Sharon, provided the old ultranationalists with new myths of Israeli heroism.²⁹ The publication of *Sulam* was discontinued in the beginning of the 1960s and Eldad became a fulltime professor of biblical Jewish history at Technion College in Haifa. His devoted follower, Geula Cohen, started to write for Israel's daily *Maariv*, and the old Radical Right became passe. Neither its devoted ideologues nor its historical adversaries expected it to be resurrected.

The Rise of the Post-1967 Radical Right

The Israeli Radical Right was reborn on September 17, 1978. On that day, when Menachem Begin signed the famous accords with Egypt, he gave a kiss of death to the unity of the Israeli nationalist Right. His agreement to return all of Sinai to the Egyptians, as well as his initiation of the Autonomy Plan (for the Palestinians of the West Bank), struck many of his political and ideological allies like bolts out of the blue. For many years these people had led themselves to believe that Begin, as the great champion of undivided Eretz Yisrael, was their safest assurance against territorial compromise with the Arabs. Most of them, not traditional supporters of Begin, were gradually swept into his political camp, which had gained national fame and legitimacy following 1967. In 1977 they were all thrilled when after thirty years of political opposition their man finally made it to the top. Immediately following his election, Begin pledged to have "many more Elon Morehs." Elon Moreh was the most controversial Gush Emunim illicit settlement in the West Bank. Located in the heartland of the Arab populated Samaria, it was never officially recognized by the previous Labor administration. The pledge signified Begin's total

commitment to the settlement of all Eretz Yisrael.³⁰

Most of the groups that were to form the new Radical Right had a distinct identity prior to 1978. The most influential among them was the Land of Israel Movement (LIM). This movement, a direct offspring of the Six Days' War, did not draw its ideas from the traditional ideology of Vladimir Jabotinsky—the fountainhead of Begin's convictions. Rather, it was a newly born ultranationalist creature that brought together strange bedfellows: religious fundamentalists, military hard-liners, and labor-settlement fanatics. As diverse as the LIM people were, they shared two politico-ideological characteristics that set them apart from other political schools: an immense confidence in Israel's might and a total suspicion of the Arabs. "Peace for peace" was their political slogan. It amounted to the proposition that under no conditions should Israel respond to an Arab proposal for peace by territorial concessions.³¹

The Land of Israel Movement was not the only component of the would be Radical Right. Two other organized entities joined its elderly true believers in the 1970s: Gush Emunim and Kach. Gush Emunim was established as an independent movement in 1974. Its members were never fully detached from the LIM, and some of their spiritual authorities belonged to the founders of this movement. But there existed a major sociological difference between the two. The leading figures of the Land of Israel Movement were elderly secular notables, well known and established in Israel's public life, whereas the Gush people were young, inexperienced, and fresh. Totally religious, messianic, and fundamentalist in their beliefs, they introduced a new component to the life of the nationalist Right, operational messianism.³² In the settlement of Judea and Samaria they saw not only a political act but a religious and metaphysical commandment. According to their theology, pioneering settlement meant a direct contribution to the imminent process of redemption. It was consequently carried out with utmost enthusiasm and total devotion. No wonder that the new spirit soon lighted the hearts of many Israelis, right-wing and non-right-wing alike. Many Labor veterans, especially from kibbutzim and moshavim (collective and cooperative villages), were deeply moved. For years these people had been longing for the lost old spirit of Zionist pioneering. Charmed by the new mystique of Gush Emunim, they did not care a great deal about the full politico-religious message of the new movement.

Although the official establishment of Gush Emunim did not take place until 1974, Rabbi Meir Kahane appeared on the scene in 1971. Kahane, the former head of the vigilante Jewish Defense League (JDL) in the United States, established the Israeli branch of the JDL, which was later to become Kach. Less than a year after his arrival, he discovered the Arab issue and never let it go. By 1973 the well-known pattern of provocative visits to Arab villages was established. Kahane, surrounded by several followers, would go to an Arab town, demand to talk to its *mughtar* (village head), and deliver the message that there was no room for Arabs in the Holy Land.

Although the Land of Israel Movement, Gush Emunim, and Kach maintained their organizational and ideological independence, they had one common thread: a great admiration for Menachem Begin. This ardent nationalist had become their chief flag captain. In the elections of 1973, the LIM, including former Labor members of the movement, endorsed Begin. This was a watershed. One of the oldest legacies in Zionist history, the hatred between Labor and revisionism, was overcome. Gush Emunim had also become close to this old commander of Etzel. The movement, initially a faction within the National Religious party (NRP), severed these ties a short time after its establishment. Unhappy with the NRP's partnership in a Labor government that did not pursue a total "Israelization" of Judea and Samaria, the youngsters of Gush Emunim decided to abandon politics and concentrate on settlement.³³ No such frictions, on this issue or others, existed with Begin, the leader of the opposition. He was a frequent visitor of their illicit settlements. In time he would describe them as his "dear children."

Of all the would-be Radical Right, Kahane alone did not endorse the Likud in the elections of 1973 and

1977 but was a devotee of Begin, whom he saw as the true successor of Jabotinsky and the spirit of Betar.³⁴ Kahane was an old Betar man. In 1947 in Brooklyn, he picketed Ernest Bevin, the hated British foreign minister who was responsible for pro-Arab politics in Palestine. This demonstration led to Kahane's first arrest under the banner of Betar.³⁵ His races for the Knesset in 1973 and 1977 were not directed against Begin but were meant to strengthen Begin's hand in the Knesset. He argued that he, as an orthodox rabbi, was capable of introducing a genuine nationalist religious party, one that could stand by Begin without selling out to Labor.³⁶ Kahane's reaction to Begin's 1977 election was total jubilation:

For the first time since its establishment, the State of Israel has as its prime minister potential a man who thinks like a Jew, acts like a Jew, faces television with a yarmulke on his head, and actually speaks the "one little word" that we have waited to hear from the lips of Ben Gurion, Sharett, Eshkol, Golda, Rabin, and Peres. Menachem Begin, the potential prime minister of Israel, faces the nation and the world and thanks God, the one little word that the polysyllabic Eban finds impossible to pronounce. And he reads from Psalms and thanks the Almighty. Miracle? Miracle of miracles.³⁷

The Camp David accords turned out to be a historic moment of truth. For the vast majority of the nationalist Right, Begin became a superhero. In less than a year the man had done the impossible. He first defeated the Left in the elections and later stole the whole "peace show" from their hands. For the minority, he instantly became a traitor, an imposter who either could not stand the pressures of the Gentiles or was never truly loyal to the nationalist legacy. They could never trust him or most of his Likud again.

The rise of the Radical Right from the ashes of Camp David was slow and tortuous. It was not easy to confront in public the immense elation of the majority of Israelis or to challenge the victorious prime minister. Several leaders of Gush Emunim were stunned. Camp David signified for them a religious affront of the first degree. It meant an inexplicable delay of national redemption, something they could not believe to be possible. Some of them renounced their Gush Emunim activity for a while and went back to their yeshivoth for several months of reflection and soul-searching.³⁸ But despite this first shock, the potential radicals survived. They apparently had sufficient stamina to endure and to start on a course based on strong political and ideological foundations.

The structure of the present-day Radical Right was shaped by three overlapping beginnings that took place at the end of 1978. The creation of Banai (the covenant of Eretz Yisrael's loyalists) and the establishment of the Tehiya (Renaissance) party, the ideological break of Kahane with Begin, and the crisis within Gush Emunim that produced (among other developments) the Jewish underground. At the time only the emergence of Banai was noticeable, but the other developments were to play a significant role.

Established on November 1, 1978, as a direct response to the "betrayal" of Menachem Begin, Banai-Brith Ne'emanai Eretz Yisrael (Covenant of Eretz Yisrael Loyalists) was a large coalition composed of prominent members of the Land of Israel Movement, Ein Vered circle (kibbutzim and moshavim supporters of the maximalist cause), Gush Emunim, and the Loyalists of Herut's Principles. Representatives of the settlers in northern Sinai and a small student organization named False Peace also joined.³⁹ At first, the movement did not consider itself a political association with electoral aspirations. It only tried to alert the public to the grave error Begin had committed. Its very establishment, however, indicated a significant political break. It was the first internal ideological revolt against the founding father of the party. Some of the rebels, the Loyalists of Herut's Principles, were old revisionists. They challenged Begin in the sacred name of Jabotinsky. Their leader, Gershon Solomon, was a distinguished representative of Herut (Begin's own party) in the municipal council of Jerusalem. Upon the prime

minister's return from Camp David to Jerusalem, Solomon met him at the city gate carrying a large black umbrella, thus symbolically associating Begin's act with the shameful peace British prime minister Neville Chamberlain signed with Hitler in 1939.⁴⁰ The new movement operated on two levels. It organized public demonstrations in the streets of Israel's main cities and, in a desperate attempt to bring the nationalist Right back to its senses, lobbied within the Likud and NRP. But on March 29, 1979, any illusion of retreating from the Camp David accords disappeared. Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, and Jimmy Carter signed the official peace treaty in Washington. The only hope left for the opponents of the treaty was to take the issue to the Israeli voter. Yuval Neeman, a noted scientist, took the lead. Following Neeman's call, more than 1,000 people signed on to take political action. Gershon Shafat and Hanan Porat of Gush Emunim were highly supportive, and there was a growing interest in other circles. When the new religious secular effort of professor Ne'eman got the blessing of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, the revered mentor of Gush Emunim, the other hesitant elements opposed to Camp David joined in. They established the Tehiya, a party totally devoted to the delegitimization of Camp David.⁴¹

The Camp David accords also had a profound impact on the stature of Meir Kahane. In the 1970s the vigilante rabbi was a very marginal figure. Only a small cabal of young, former American JDL members and Russian immigrants followed him. His efforts to establish in Jerusalem an influential ideological center under the title Jewish Idea were largely frustrated by lack of funds and supporters. The creation of Gush Emunim in 1974 and the highly acclaimed pioneering activities of its members left little room for Kach's self-styled radicalism before the accords with Egypt. But after Camp David, the previously admired prime minister of Israel became a traitor. By succumbing to the pressure of the Gentiles, "substituting fear of the finite gentile for Jewish faith in the God of creation and history," he had committed *hillul hashem*, "the humiliation and desecration of the name of God" to be fearful of the Gentiles.⁴² Kahane was finally relieved of his former ideological allegiance to the successor of Jabotinsky. He was now free from an additional bond: the remainder of his loyalty to Israel's democracy. Kahane, it is true, had never been a great champion of democracy. But as long as he believed that a legally elected government under Begin was capable of solving the pressing problems of Eretz Yisrael, he maintained some allegiance to the system. Now it was all gone. Begin had proven himself part of a rotten system and the whole secular framework was corrupt. The post-1978 Kahane became a different political animal. Racial overtones entered his terminology as well as the operations of his followers. The first ideological target became Israel's declaration of independence. The 1948 document, which promised equal rights to all the inhabitants of the Jewish state, race, religion, and nationality notwithstanding, was now presented by Kahane as a contradictory document. Israel could not be Jewish and democratic at the same time because that meant political equality for too many hostile Arabs. So it had to be just Jewish.⁴³ Kahane's people in Kiryat Arba, the Jewish city adjacent to Hebron, acted accordingly. They accentuated their positions vis-à-vis the Arabs and became prime catalysts in the growing Jewish, anti-Arab violence in the area.⁴⁴

The most extreme reaction to the Camp David accords was the crisis within Gush Emunim that resulted in the secretive establishment, in 1978, of what became known in 1984 as the Jewish underground. Until 1980, the only issue on the agenda of the group was the blowing up of the "abomination," the Muslim Dome of the Rock. The idea was brought up by two exceptional individuals, Yeshua Ben-Shoshan and Yehuda Etzion. Although both were closely affiliated with Gush Emunim and its settlement drive, neither was a typical member. More than most of their colleagues, they were intensely preoccupied with the mysteries of the process of regeneration that was about to bring the Jewish people, perhaps in their own lifetime, to its redemption. The two convinced themselves that the historic setback of Camp David must have had a deeper cause than Begin's simple weakness. It may have been a direct signal from heaven that a major national offense had been committed, a mistake that was responsible for the political disaster. Only one prominent act of desecration could match the magnitude of the setback: the presence, sanctioned by the government of Israel, of the "infidels" and their shrine on the Temple Mount, the

holiest Jewish site, the sacred place of the first, second, and third (future) temple.⁴⁵

Students of messianic movements have long noted that millenarian types are driven to extreme and antinomian acts when the imminent process of redemption is suddenly stalled. They become convinced that an exceptional operation is needed in order to calm the Lord's anger. Only such an action can restore the messianic process and ensure its consummation.⁴⁶ This psychological mechanism was probably involved in the Temple Mount plan. But the plan had an additional goal: Its perpetrators believed that it would ruin the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and stop the evacuation of Sinai.⁴⁷ Following several tête-à-têtes between Etzion and Ben-Shoshan in which they cautiously studied the possibility of an operation on the Temple Mount, the two decided to extend the circle. They brought in several trusted friends. Three years were devoted to preparing the operation, and in 1982, just prior to the final Israeli retreat from Sinai, everything was ready. The plan, however, was shelved, because none of the rabbis with whom they consulted approved of the idea.

But though the Temple Mount operation was postponed indefinitely, other acts did take place. When six yeshiva students were brutally murdered by Arab terrorists in Hebron in May 1980 and a general outcry for revenge emerged in the community, it was only natural that Terror Neged Terror would strike, its members already having conspired to commit a major act of terror. Seeing it as a way to restore law and order at once, they attempted to assassinate the mayors of several Arab cities. With the same conviction—the belief that they, as the most dedicated, idealistic and pure had to fulfill the act⁴⁸—some of these people attacked the Muslim college of Hebron in 1983 and prepared in the same year to blow up five Arab buses.

An event that greatly shaped the identity and style of the emerging Radical Right was the struggle of the Movement to Halt the Retreat in Sinai (MHRS). Mostly a Gush Emunim entity, the MHRS was organized at the end of 1981. It came into being following Begin's success in the elections of that year and the failure of the Tehiya to stop the peace process at the polls. The messianic members of Gush Emunim stepped in when all hopes for a secular solution faded. Armed with their illicit settlement experience of the previous decade, they convinced themselves that immense dedication and self-sacrifice could entice God to stop the evacuation of Sinai and prevent the self-imposed destruction of Jewish settlements. In line with Gush Emunim's tradition, the settlements of the Rafiah Salient in Sinai were flooded with colleagues from the West Bank. They came with their families, rabbis, yeshivah, and logistics. All the veteran settlers, the heroes of the extralegal settlement of the early 1970s, were there. They prayed, conducted Torah courses, and were determined to reconstruct normal life in the area as if no evacuation were to take place in less than six months. It was an unparalleled show of faith and conviction.⁴⁹ All three Knesset members of Tehiya joined the struggle and settled in Yamit.

But Begin was determined to keep his word and was backed by his minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, a former ally of Gush Emunim. A full 20,000 experienced soldiers were mobilized for the evacuation, which only miraculously ended with no fatalities. Nevertheless, fierce struggles between soldiers and desperate settlers resulted. Distinguished rabbis were beaten up. Laws, rules, and formal regulations were systematically disregarded. The Israeli public witnessed the longest and most intense period of civil disobedience and organized extralegalism in the history of the state. Several members of the MHRS seriously considered armed resistance, and others suggested mass suicide. Twelve followers of Kahane locked themselves in an underground shelter full of gas tanks and explosives and threatened to blow themselves up. Begin had their rabbi rushed in from the United States and flown to Yamit by a special military helicopter in order to convince his devotees to give in.

When Yamit was finally evacuated on April 28, 1982, the exact date set by the peace treaty, it was clear that Begin's grand move was successful. However, it was also the coming of age of a new political camp

and culture, a conglomerate of activists and movements whose loyalty to Israel's traditional foundations was significantly limited. The leaders and followers of the MHRS, who were taken from the scene bitter and frustrated, left no doubt that the struggle in Yamit had been a lesson. It was a warning of what would be done if the government of Israel ever conceived of territorial concessions in Judea and Samaria. The increased electoral strength of the Tehiya in the elections of 1984 (five Knesset members), the election of Kahane, and the growing support for "Kahanism" in the streets brought the large extremist movement into full swing.

Culture

Each of the responses to the Camp David accords was to evolve on its own course. But with time and against the background of a stagnating peace with Egypt, a sick Begin, a failing economy, and the fiasco in Lebanon, these responses also led to the formation of an unprecedented radical rhetoric and unrestrained street behavior. Extreme attitudes regarding the land and the Arabs, special expressions implying war and a never-ending struggle against the terrorism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), enthusiastic utterances about redemption, and a constant siege mentality have in recent years expanded upon the nationalist rhetoric of Herut's "New Zionism."⁵⁰ For a sizable public, these attitudes have produced more than a bitter mood; they have created a unique political and cultural life-style.

Within the nationalist camp, the Israeli Radical Right is presently a great deal more than the movements that are directly associated with it. It is a general climate of opinion and constitutes a syndrome of political behavior. It crosses party lines, economic divisions, and educational strata. The Israeli Radical Right is today again an integral part of the thriving general nationalist camp. But five salient themes, which bring together theory, practice, and special symbols, set it apart from the larger right-wing camp that wants Eretz Yisrael to remain undivided.

First, there is the nostalgia for the prestate Zionist community. In contrast to the popular image promoted by its rivals, the Israeli Radical Right is not Fascist. The political and social model that appeals to most of its leaders is neither drawn from foreign ideologies nor caters to antibourgeois, antiparliamentary, or antidemocratic ideas. It is instead a model of a limited democracy taken from the past, from the era that preceded the 1948 formation of Israel. Most of the leaders and followers of the Israeli Radical Right cherish the memories of the Zionist founding fathers, their values, and their behavior. Just like those members of the American Radical Right who constantly go back to the founding fathers, the Constitution, the rugged individualism of the time before Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the "American way of life," the Israeli radicals are nostalgic about the old days of the yishuv, the days when each Zionist settlement counted and Hagana (Defense Force) was a real thing; the times when Jews worried about Jews, not about Arabs. As Rabbi Moshe Levinger, Gush Emunim's settler number one, describes it, "In the old days Labor people have worked for settlement, immigration, security and peace with our neighbors. Today the political program of Labor has only one item, an agreement with the neighbors."⁵¹

The spokespersons of the Israeli Radical Right, very much like right-wing radicals in other countries, do not really understand what has become of their people, what corrupted them and turned them so soft, so liberal, and so pluralistic. They see themselves as perfect Zionists, the true inheritors of the old, pre-state yishuv. Many of them also consider themselves good democrats or, more precisely, good Jewish democrats.⁵² The Zionist yishuv, they argue, was established in a democratic way and was operated as a

democracy. But everybody functioned in the framework of a limited democracy and did not think in terms of universal pluralism. The Zionist founding fathers were, therefore, not antidemocratic, but they were no fools either. Instead of reciting John Stuart Mill or John Dewey all day long, they set out to build a viable polity for their own people. The conclusion of this line of thinking is thus very clear. When the legal and duly elected government of Israel stands in violation of the primary tenets of Zionism, it has to be resisted just as the legal British government was resisted in the 1930s and 1940s by the Zionist founding fathers. Its "anti-Zionist" acts have to be overruled just as similar acts of the official organizations of the yishuv itself were overruled by zealous pioneers. "How is it possible to act against the government and the law?" asks an anonymous writer in an early Gush Emunim information leaflet, and answers:

All through the history of yishuv, settlements were established as a result of a grassroots pressure, and official approval was only granted later. Ein Harod was established with no official license in 1921. ... Following the Six Days' war, settlements in the Golan Heights, Gush Etzion, and Kiryat Arba were formed in this way. ... The same procedure has been reactivated in the settlement of Keshnet near Kuneitra. ... Blocking Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael, by force, is graver when it is committed by a Jewish government than by foreign rule.⁵³

The attachment to the yishuv era and to its political style, however, is not concrete but selective and normative. The leaders and the ideologues of this camp do not really want to go back to the old presovereign days. What attracts them is that aspect of the value system of the early days that prescribed and helped operate a framework of Zionist norms free of legalistic barriers and excessive democratic obsessions.

The second theme that distinguishes the Israeli Radical Right from the right wing in general is a religious fundamentalism or a secular neofundamentalism. The Israeli Right, like several similar movements in other countries, contains a prestigious fundamentalist element. The embodiment of this component is Gush Emunim and its ideology. This orientation is also evident in Kahane's writings. The special attraction of Emunim's belief in the fundamental truths of the Bible is that it is a partial system. It concentrates almost exclusively on the territorial sacredness of the "Kingdom of Israel in the making," which is the status of the present State of Israel. Unlike the ultraorthodox anti-Zionist fundamentalists, who live by every single rule of medieval Halakah as if the state did not exist and the world had not changed, the fundamentalists of Gush Emunim are modern, nationalist, and pragmatic.⁵⁴ They are full of admiration for the state and the instruments of its sovereignty—the government and the military. Their fundamentalism commands them to sanctify every single grain of soil that God promised to Abraham. It tells them that they are living in an age of redemption in which it is mandatory to follow the course of the great biblical conquerors, Joshua and King David. It requires them to become pioneers and personally to settle all the territories of Eretz Yisrael that were recovered by the joshuas of our time. Benny Katzover, a leading figure in Gush Emunim, illuminated the group's special territorial fundamentalism: "In every age and time, there is one point, a special point, through which all that is good sheds light. ... In the beginning of the messianic age, the critical point is Eretz Israel and everything else derives from it. Without its settlement no holiness operates in the world."⁵⁵

This new fundamentalism fits perfectly the psychology of many secular maximalists and the people who are nostalgic about the old Zionist community. The majority of these people, who were very active in pioneering settlement and defense in the prestate era, are charmed by the vigor and vitality of the youngsters of Gush Emunim's theology from a nonorthodox angle. The main proposition of the neofundamentalist school is that Zionism, though secular, was never devoid of deeply seated religious beliefs. It had been preceded by centuries of aspirations of returning to Eretz Yisrael. The theologians of Gush Emunim, the late rabbis Kook (father and son), had discovered the correct formula for future

political Zionism according to neofundamentalist thinking. Arguing that the secular Zionists are as legitimate partners in the process of redemption as orthodox Jews, they made it possible for orthodox and nonorthodox Jews to ally and strive together for national grandeur.⁵⁶

Third is the legitimation of radical right direct action and illegal practices. Students of the history of Israel's right-wing radicals are familiar with the methods of political protest, illicit settlement, and civil disobedience the radicals have introduced since 1973.⁵⁷ But they also remember that in the beginning and the mid-1970s, this camp was inexperienced and uncertain. Gush Emunim, whose theology had always expressed a great respect for the government, was highly apologetic. Its leaders conducted many soul-searching sessions in which a genuine attempt was made to limit excesses to the very minimum. Menachem Begin, for example, at that time the leader of the opposition, was especially equivocal. On the one hand he truly loved the youngsters of the Gush and visited some of their illicit settlements, but on the other he maintained a great respect for the rule of law and avoided many other settlements.⁵⁸ For most of the members of the Gush, the Camp David accords terminated the period of uncertainty. It was now clear to the growing Radical Right that efforts to maintain its grip on the totality of Eretz Yisrael had to involve a great amount of extralegalism. The parliamentary nationalist Right could no longer be trusted, and the land had to be defended by all available methods. In 1982 all the Tehiya Knesset members went down to resettle Yamit. By their very action they introduced a new doctrine that implied that illegal extraparliamentarianism, just as legal parliamentary action, was a legitimate avenue of action. The new doctrine has, since the retreat from Sinai, been widely applied. It became the guideline of Kahane's actions in the streets and has led many other Israelis to disregard law and order.

The extralegal doctrine of the Radical Right, which matured between 1979 and 1984, had a by-product that also emerged at that time: the settlers' conception of self-defense and vigilantism. Despite the successful attempts of the Likud government to intensify the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, the settlers underwent in those years a crisis of confidence with the cabinet and especially with Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman. Arab violence and terrorism in the West Bank had intensified a great deal, and the settlers argued that because the state was not defending them, they were entitled to do it on their own. They developed a vigilante philosophy that prescribed that every Arab act they considered illegal called for retaliation. An investigative report written by the state deputy attorney, Judith Karp, in 1982 revealed a comprehensive system of Jewish reprisals and retaliations.⁵⁹ The whole phenomenon was verified by an academic study published in 1984. Of a random sample of settlers, 68 percent answered positively to the question, "Is it necessary for the settlers to respond independently and swiftly to Arab attacks on settlers and settlements?" The 13 percent that disagreed represented a minority opinion that was occasionally heard but was increasingly isolated.⁶⁰ Settlers' raids of Arab towns and villages, in reaction to previous acts of terrorism, have become a common West Bank practice.

The extralegal attitude of the radicals reached its peak in the fall of 1985. When Moetzet Yesha (the council of the settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) learned about the prime minister's new initiative for peace (which involved the possibility of further territorial concessions), it issued the unprecedented warning that any Israeli government that would give up Jewish territories would lose its legal basis.⁶¹ Elyakim Haetzni, a prominent attorney who stood behind the pronouncement, did not hesitate to tell Prime Minister Shimon Peres that a territorial concession would put him in the position of French general Pétain, who collaborated with the Nazis in World War II and was later tried for treason.⁶²

Finally, there were the themes of militarism and a belief in the use of force. A leading segment within the Israeli Radical Right was convinced that Israel's immense military might could be translated at any given moment into political power and national achievements. A quick examination reveals that the source of this conviction goes back twenty years, to the Six Days' War. The 1967 campaign, in which three Arab armies were defeated in six days, proved that Israel was a major power and that a well-coordinated

military operation could change the balance of power in the area. For the fundamentalist elements of the Radical Right, Israel's might does not require a rational explanation. In the age of redemption, in which the nation is expected to reclaim the land, God is definitely standing behind the army. This is, for example, the reason Kahane believed that it was *hillul hashem* (the desecration of the name of God) to be fearful of the Gentiles.⁶³

The secular neofundamentalists, in contrast, do not need the religious argument. Zahal (Israel Defense Force) is for them a highly qualified and welltrained army that can beat any combination of its enemies at any given time. The military setbacks that took place in the Yom Kippur War were caused by a non repeatable combination of surprise attack and erroneous operation of the army. Against all these odds, the war was won militarily. The same thing happened in Lebanon in 1982. Had the army been led by a determined government, the war would have been terminated by a great victory and with the possible annexation of biblical Jewish territories.

Thus for the militaristic school of the Radical Right, there is only one explanation why the great potential of the nation is not realized. Israel's political life is dominated by a handful of leftists, Zionists without vision, and weak and hesitant individuals. The ranks of the people who do not stand up to the greatness of the nation are not only manned by Labor and left politicians but also by Likud members who are scared of their own shadows. Israel, according to this school, has never been so strong. Had military force been used correctly, the Jewish state would not now be in trouble. Judea and Samaria would have long since been annexed and PLO bases all around the Mediterranean destroyed. The Temple Mount's Muslim shrines would either have been demolished or kept under tight Israeli control and the "shameful escape" from Lebanon would have been prevented.⁶⁴

The Israeli Radical Right, despite its consistent growth in power and popularity, is living a paranoid life. Its leaders and spokespersons are convinced that a conspiracy to betray the people of Israel and the destiny of Zionism is under way. Many political agents play leading roles in the grand conspiracy: the Jewish Ashafists (PLO members) who collaborate willingly with the enemy; the leftists who care about the sentiments of the international Left more than they do about their homeland; President Sadat (when he was alive), who "fooled" Israel into a phony peace; and the evil-mongers of the U.S. State Department. The result of all these evildoings is a Palestinization of the Jewish mind:

Filastin [Palestine in Arabic] infiltrates Eretz Yisrael slowly through the radio and T.V. and not in the least through the military broadcasting system. Filastin is served by many of Israel's experts on the Middle East. Filastin has almost completely monopolized Israel's literature and poetry, theater and movies. Filastin does increasingly penetrate the schools and the youth movements and the army's chief educational officer invites Israelis, who are supportive of the Palestinian claim for rights in Eretz Israel (including Jerusalem), to "educate" the military. Former presidents of the World Jewish Congress are working hard to get money for Filastin and a helpful prime minister meets King Hussein's cousin, with whom Israel is in a state of war. ... A bridge for Filastin is constructed by thousands of Jewish demonstrators in "solidarity" protest in the midst of Ramaalla and Hebron and at the gates of Um-AI-Fahm and Ixal.⁶⁵

It may of course be argued that because overt plans for territorial compromise with a Jordanian-Palestinian entity are constantly raised and discussed, fears such as those expressed above can be seen to be genuine. However, the writings and remarks of the spokespeople of the Radical Right disclose the difference. Most of the fundamentalists and neofundamentalists of this camp are unable to make the distinction between legitimate opposing schemes and conspiracy. Their political epistemology is not pluralistic but monistic. Their ideational world is simply divided between the children of light and the children of darkness. In such a world no room is left for legitimate opposition. Every political rival is a

conspirator.

An outstanding example of the conspiracy mentality is the Radical Right view of the Israeli media. The spokespersons of the Radical Right are convinced that Israel's public television, the only channel in the country, is full of anti-Zionist leftists. These traitors project in their stories a negative image of the Right and instead of boosting public morale impair it greatly. The media are seen to be constantly presenting the case of the PLO and avoiding "constructive" national projections. They are responsible for Israel's lost war in Lebanon and for much of the present gloomy spirit of the nation. Elyakim Haetzni, a leading Tehiya activist and a Knesset member since 1990, reacted to a television interview with Shimon Peres: "The interviewers begged most of the political questions. But why the surprise? It was already pointed out by our Elders that a self-imprisoned person can never free himself from jail. Few television interviewers are people who are not imprisoned with Peres in the same spiritual and ideological jail of leftist, 'Peace Now' concepts." ⁶⁶

Politics

Although the Israeli Radical Right is gradually becoming a salient political culture, shared and espoused by many unrelated groups and individuals, it has at its core a very determined political infrastructure. The leaders of the movements that shaped the new culture know that as favorable as the Israeli political conditions have been to them in the last decade, nothing would have happened without their incessant struggle. They recognize just as well that none of their ultimate political goals have been secured and that the creeping annexation of the occupied territories has not yet reached the stage of irreversibility. This is the reason they continue to work hard and are today by far the most energetic ideological and cultural force in Israel. The radicals may not yet represent the majority of the nationalist Right, but their intensity and devotion make up for large numbers. These efforts help them create many "accomplished facts." Four movements or political schools—attracting only 5 percent of Israel's voters—shape the present and the future of the Radical Right: Gush Emunim, the Tehiya and its satellites, Kach, and those who might be called concealed radicals. Each of the groups and most of the individuals involved were active in the late 1970s when the Radical Right reemerged, but each has changed, grown up, and developed new perspectives. Thus despite some unavoidable internal conflicts and controversies, the Radical Right is a functional system in which each of the components fulfills a different role and appeals to a different public.

Gush Emunim

Gush Emunim is by far the most dynamic component of the new radicalism. Between 12,000 and 15,000 settlers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza consider themselves active members of this movement. Despite several recent internal conflicts that have damaged the political unity of the movement, Gush remains a homogeneous revitalization movement held together by a cohesive ideology, mutual sociocultural origins, common existential interests, and shared aspirations.⁶⁷ Most of the members are well educated, idealistic, and hardworking. They relate nearly every aspect of their daily lives to national goals and understand their existence in the context of a divine order. The leadership of the movement is made up of talented and devoted individuals who bring together exemplary spiritual authority and first-class political

performance.

As important as the spiritual devotion of the young members of Gush is, the movement does not exist by enthusiasm alone. Its present power and influence are based on dozens of settlements and on a sophisticated organizational infrastructure. Ever since they assumed the mission of settling Judea and Samaria, Emunim's leaders wanted to obtain legal status and institutional legitimacy. They were anxious to shed the youthful and adventurous image that made them look like a belated youth movement during the 1970s. This goal was achieved during Begin's first administration. In 1978 Gush Emunim was allowed to establish Amanas (Covenant), an official and state-supported settlement movement. By this very act it obtained the same legal status as the prestigious kibbutzim and moshavim movements of Israel. A civic legalization of Emunim's settlements as ordinary rural and regional Israeli localities followed suit. The movement's most talented leaders, who previously excelled as lawbreakers, became municipal and district officials overnight, they and their councils entitled to state budgets and to allocations from the funds of the World Zionist Organization.⁶⁸

Gush Emunim today is a great deal more than the political movement of penniless true believers it was in the 1970s. From an organizational perspective it is a highly effective machine. Its members are spread out in many West Bank settlements and control Moetzet Yesha, the actual government of the West Bank. Through Moetzet Yesha and its regional councils, they are now establishing economic corporations that could help them regain future independence from external constraints.⁶⁹ Moetzet Yesha, via its security committee, also has a say in military matters. Its experts, some of whom are ranking army officers in the reserves, maintain close contact with the military government of the occupied territories. The settlers' opinion is heard and attended to not because of its professional quality but because it reflects the attitude of those who are involved in the routine security of the area. Ever since 1979 this sensitive job has been handed out to the Regional Defense Unit, a local militia composed of armed settlers in the reserves. During the recent Arab uprising in the occupied territories, the settlers were kept constantly informed by the highest military authorities. The officials of Moetzet Yesha and the heads of Emunim's other organs are welcomed in the offices of the Knesset, the government, the administration, and the military. Several of their leaders, such as Hanan Porat and Gershon Shafat, have been Knesset members for years. This representation, and their very effective lobbying in the parliament and cabinet, make the Gush leaders partners to some of the most delicate political and military deliberations that take place.⁷⁰ No wonder that private interviews with these people reveal competence and self-confidence. Despite the historic setback of Camp David and the recent Palestinian uprising, most of Emunim's activists believe that they are, politically, in good shape and that their course is successful. At present unable to attract large numbers of new pioneering settlers or to get significant governmental support for newly planned settlements, they constantly strengthen their organizational infrastructure and are further developing existing settlements. Many of Emunim's members are scornful of Israel's established politicians and are certain about their ability to manipulate the system no matter which political party is in charge.⁷¹

Tehiya and Its Satellites

If Gush Emunim provides the radical right with pioneering quality and material resources, three political parties—the Tehiya (Renaissance), Tzomet (Crossroad), and Moledet (Homeland), together representing 5% of the nation in the Knesset—are its political spearhead. Tzomet and Moledet were formed in 1986 and 1987, respectively, as a result of disagreements within the Tehiya but have otherwise advocated the same ultranationalist views. They have also endorsed all the activities and positions of Gush Emunim. But there are, nevertheless, significant cultural and social differences between the Gush and its parliamentary supporters. Gush Emunim is a religious movement, solidified by a unique theology of

national redemption, whereas the Tehiya and its satellites are basically heterogeneous secular parties. Their leaders are not religious, and all the political operations they conduct are explained in the context of secular symbols.⁷² Two elements make this alliance possible: agreement on long-range goals and the neofundamentalism of many of the secular leaders. Many observers associate the radicalism of the parliamentary Radical Right with either the theology of Gush Emunim or the ultranationalist tradition of Lehi, whose main representative is outspoken Knesset member Geula Cohen. What they fail to recognize is that the dominant individuals in these parties identify with the prestigious tradition of Israel's Labor movement. The spokespersons of this school believe that they are the true successors of the "vigorous" David Ben Gurion (of the 1940s and 1950s).⁷³ They are convinced that the security of the State of Israel requires every single square inch of Eretz Yisrael, as well as a very tough stand vis-à-vis the Arabs. Raphael Eitan, the head of Tzomet and Israel's former chief of staff, is a typical representative of this school. He is an old Mapai man, a rugged moshavnik, who is ready to do whatever is necessary for security. If removal of an Arab village is needed in order to further advance the Jewish hold on the land, then it should be done, according to Eitan, "swiftly and without excessive noise."

A most controversial concept has been added to the slogans of the Israeli parliamentary Radical Right in 1987, the concept of transfer, a shorthand for the removal of the Palestinians of the occupied territories and their resettlement in the neighboring Arab countries. The concept was first introduced by a retired general, Rehavam Zeevi, the leader of Moledet. Zeevi argues that because the West Bank and Gaza are essential for the security of Israel and their 1.5 million hostile Palestinians are a mortal liability, the local residents have to be transferred out.⁷⁴ The introduction of the transfer to the nation's public agenda can be seen as a strong indication of the intense radicalization of the Extreme Right and its supporters. In 1984 there was only one party whose program called for the removal of the Arabs from the occupied territories; Kach of Rabbi Kahane. At that time everyone, including most of the spokespersons of the Radical Right, saw Kahane as a racist and believed that his opinions were beyond the pale of legitimacy. But during the middle of the 1980s, the public climate changed dramatically. The increasing friction between Jews and Arabs in the West Bank, the Palestinian uprising, as well as the intense Palestinization of the Israeli Arabs produced an atmosphere in which every radical solution became legitimate.

Kach

Whereas Gush Emunim and the parliamentary groups project the positive and creative face of the Radical Right in Israel, Kahane's movement, barred in 1988 from running for the Knesset, casts a hostile and negative image. Kach is a classical angry movement of protest, a right-wing backlash that is politically organized. The vast majority of the people who support Kahane have never read his books. They hardly know the man or his long-range goals. The movement has mostly been a one-man show that responds to events spontaneously and has a weak organization. Meir Kahane was the movement. He was the sole theoretician, its only public speaker, top organizer, fund-raiser, and treasurer. There were many indications that his departure would mark the end of the movement.⁷⁵

The recent decline of Kach, which is a direct result of the disqualification of the movement by Israel's supreme court, stands in some contradiction to the lingering popularity of Kahane's ideas and to the continuous functioning of his movement. A more general explanation for the Kahane phenomenon is therefore needed. Students of right-wing radicalism know the conditions likely to give rise to right-wing protest drives, which are neither anchored in a solid social class nor in significant economic resources. They know that what is mostly needed for the consummation of such drives are a prolonged sense of social alienation, a continuous period of economic insecurity, and the uneasy and threatening presence of

an alien community.⁷⁶ It appears that the existence of a respectable right-wing radicalism, external threats, and military dangers also produce the conditions for the rise of a movement of this type. In the 1980s Israeli society experienced plenty of these conditions. The traditional social alienation of Jews from North Africa and the Far East and the security pressures of Arab terrorism have been joined by the grave agonies of economic insecurity and the political growth of a respectable Radical Right.⁷⁷ Kahane, who once lived in Israel's political wilderness, was able in the 1980s to emerge from his isolation not because of an ideological compromise on his behalf but as a result of the movement of the entire political culture in his direction. Extremist messages of racism and violence that were unheard of in the 1970s became acceptable in the 1980s. Kahane gradually became a legitimate vehicle for the enraged, the alienated, and the deserted. These people—the representatives of the weakest and most vulnerable stratum of Israeli society—could never be attracted by the cultural elitism of the Tehiya and Gush Emunim. For a long time they supported Likud. But following the retirement of Begin, the fiasco in Lebanon, and the economic blunders of their party, they discovered the eloquent rabbi.

The portrayal of the disqualified Kach as the protest component of the Radical Right does not exhaust the phenomenon. Rightwing protest movements vary a great deal. Kach, it appears, belongs to the quasi-Fascist breed that includes political groups that do not profess full ideological fascism but display typical Fascist behavior and politics. Kahane was never attracted by secular fascism. His belief system was always very religious and very Jewish. The special ideology that he carved out of his Betar training, rabbinical studies, and Brooklyn experience was always a mixed bag of fundamentalist readings of the holy scriptures, immense anti-Gentile sentiment, and an admiration of physical force. Today what makes Kach a quasi-Fascist phenomenon is not Kahane's ideology but Kahane's practice. The man was a combination of a very violent character with unrestrained ambitions. He was especially unable to separate strategy from tactics: The Arabs should be expelled *now*; Palestinian terrorism must be destroyed (by Israeli counterterrorism) *today*; the government, which does not do its job, ought to be brought down *tomorrow*. The sociopolitical result of this impatience cannot produce anything but Fascist behavior and politics. The syndrome is well known. It includes the preaching of vulgar Social Darwinism and anti-alien racism, a public legitimization of violence and terrorism, and a rapid shift from ideology to propaganda and from propaganda to smear campaign. It ends in street hooliganism and in the personality cult of the leader.⁷⁸ The quasi-Fascist nature of Kach has been most apparent since its 1988 disqualification. Followers of Kahane first formed an organization called the Independent State of Judea and later a secret assassin group named Sicarii. Although advocating typical Kahane ideas, both organizations gained notoriety for the application of unrestrained anti-Arab violence in the West Bank and for threatening moderate Israelis and issuing phony death sentences to Jews advocating direct talks with the PLO. Many of their activists have been detained and arrested.

The Concealed Radicals

Unlike the institutionalized movements of the Radical Right—Gush Emunim, the Tehiya and its satellites, and Kach—the fourth component of this camp, which I suggest naming the concealed radicals, has no formal existence. Its general ideological orientation lies somewhere between Kahane and Gush Emunim, but it is not yet clear whether its members will assume an independent existence or remain politically dispersed. Concealed radicals are people who, though they believe that Jewish moralists stand above conventional moralists and that the Arab question should be solved by deportation, do not propagate these views in public. They disapprove of the personality of the violent rabbi and were disgusted with his unpredictable drives, his rude style, and his vulgar propaganda. They think Kahane spoke too much and was therefore counterproductive. Things that may be done in ten, twenty, or thirty years (i.e., a possible expulsion of Arabs and a takeover of all the Temple Mount) should not be spelled

out today.⁷⁹

The concealed radicals come from the extremist circles of the settler community in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza and from former Kahane associates. Their radical approach is an ideological extension of the collective mood that was created by the crisis of Camp David, the struggle in Yarmit, and the failure of the government to stop PLO terrorism in the West Bank. Many of the individuals who may be said to belong to this group did not study in Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav, the spiritual center of Gush Emunim; and were not students of Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook, the mentor of the movement. Thus they have little patience with what they perceive as Emunim's excessive homage to the Israeli government and its agencies. They are militant fundamentalists who trust the sword as much as they trust the book. Among them it is possible to identify some well-known rabbis such as Israel Ariel, the former cohead of Y. Amit's yeshiva, and Dov Lior, the cohead of Kiryat Arba's yeshiva. Several members of the Gush Emunim underground, like Yehuda Etzion and Menachem Livni, and some former Kahane supporters, such as Yoel Lerner and Yosef Dayan, also qualify as concealed radicals. A small Jerusalem youth movement, Hashmonaim, whose political activity rises and declines occasionally, may also be counted within this group.

The unorganized yet concrete existence of the concealed radicals is epitomized by the Jewish underground. It is clear today that the underground was not a hit squad of Gush Emunim, selected and operated by its heads in order to strike hard at the PLO centers in Judea and Samaria. Rather, it was a self-selected splinter group whose leaders had come to the conclusion that neither the government of Israel nor the settler community responded correctly to the post-1978 conditions. It is not clear how many of the concealed radicals were aware of the existence of the underground and of the theories of its leaders, but those who were not involved had entertained similar ideas in isolation. When the underground was exposed, the concealed radicals were thrilled. Although most members of Gush Emunim were greatly shocked and critical, the concealed radicals responded vigorously and in the summer of 1984 established a supporting association named *Tzvia* (Looking Ahead). They also started a new magazine under the same title and took upon themselves the job of challenging the moderate position of *Nekuda* (Point), the Gush Emunim-oriented journal of the settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Yehuda Etzion, the leading spiritual force of the underground, has become an influential voice in *Tzvia*. In an exemplary act of moral support, Ephraim Caspi, the magazine's publisher, printed Etzion's account of his Temple Mount ideology.⁸⁰ In addition to supporting Etzion's "liberation theology," the magazine published extremist essays on the Arabs, on the need for a further territorial expansion, and on the misconduct of the Israeli government.

A typical concealed radical is Rabbi Ariel. In a private interview, he did not hide his opinion that it was high time for the nation to wage a war of conquest of all the biblical promised land (from the Euphrates to the Nile). Asked about current political constraints and diplomatic limitations, the rabbi replied that "Joshua had far worse political constraints and limitations but he did not question God's command to conquer the Land." When further pressed about potential casualties and national losses, the fundamentalist rabbi referred to a Halakic ruling that in a holy war no question about casualties is legitimate until one-sixth of the nation is extinct.⁸¹

At present the concealed radicals are not organized politically and cannot be seen as an active agent of political action. Some of them operate in the framework of the Temple Mount Loyalists, a small movement dedicated to the full Jewish return to the Temple Mount. Others collaborate with Kahane's people in several West Bank communities like Kiryat Arba, and still others teach and preach in their own yeshivah or internal circles. Their impact and influence within the Radical Right should not, however, be underestimated. There is a qualitatively distinct voice. In my opinion they form the potential nucleus that can play a critical role in times of national crisis. If the Radical Right is ever pushed to a final showdown, most probably in a situation of territorial compromise in the West Bank, they are likely to become the focus of armed resistance. The concealed radicals will draw the support of both Kahane's hard-liners, who

would not trust the emotional and unstable rabbi, and Gush Emunim extremists. The concealed radicals of today may very well lead the real Sicarii of tomorrow.

The Impact of the Radical Right

Few observers, Israeli or non-Israeli, are prepared to recognize the magnitude of the new Israeli Radical Right and its influence on national politics. When faced with the attitudes of this camp and the operations of its members, they argue that it is made up of the lunatic fringe. As disturbing as these activities might be, so runs the argument, the Radical Right has no say in the government and its impact on critical national decisions is dismal at best. A formal examination of the case tends to support this proposition. The hard-core movements and parties of the Radical Right are small, young, and have relatively few economic assets. Their representation in the Knesset does not exceed 5 percent. They are no match for Israel's older and larger political parties such as Labor, Likud, the National Religious party, and even the smaller ultraorthodox parties of Agudat Israel and Shas. They cannot compete with the powerful Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) or challenge the old and prestigious kibbutz and moshav settlement movements.

But the proponents of this argument are missing three elements that make the Radical Right a most effective agent in present-day Israeli politics and culture: its sophisticated penetration of the larger parties, the exceptional determination of its members, and the strategic location of its constituency. One of the great successes of the Radical Right has been its ability to penetrate the Likud and National Religious party. Thus about 25 percent of the leaders of the Likud, and their followers, look at the world today through the ideological and symbolic prism of the Radical Right. The most outstanding representative of this Likud radical "rightism" is former cabinet member Ariel Sharon, a person with great charisma and a large following who thinks and talks like the ideologues of the Extreme Right and exerts a significant influence in the party's councils. The NRP, an old power broker in Israeli politics, has also been a target of the Radical Right, especially of the young and talented activists of Gush Emunim. Indeed, between 1986 and 1988 the NRP underwent a quiet ideological reshuffle that drove it to the bosom of the Radical Right. Two of the first three Knesset members of the NRP are devoted radicals, and its political platform reads almost like a Gush Emunim pamphlet. The radical leaders of the Likud and the NRP are not isolated in the Knesset. Their opinions are shared by several Knesset members of the ultraorthodox Agudat Israel and Shas, and they enjoy the support of hundreds of thousands of Israelis. In my estimation Radical Right ideas pertain to 20 to 25 percent of the Jewish citizens of Israel and are felt everywhere: in schools, military camps, the markets, and synagogues.⁸² A proper measure of the real parliamentary power of the Radical Right is the recently established Eretz Yisrael Front in the Knesset, a political lobby of about thirty Knesset members (one-fourth of Israel's parliament), who have constituted themselves in order to express concern about the undue moderation of the 1989 Unity government and to block any compromise on the occupied territories.

Another fact about the Israeli Radical Right that many observers ignore is the high intensity of its operations and the great effectiveness of its activists. Israelis in general have never been silent, but some have been more vocal than others and much more effective. The hard core of the Israeli Radical Right is made up of true believers who are also pragmatic and politically skillful. These activists are totally committed to the defense of Greater Israel and will advance this cause in many sophisticated ways. Their leaders are good communicators, excellent political lobbyists, and, when necessary, skillful demonstrators and extraparliamentary activists. Several leaders of the Israeli Radical Right are former illustrious generals, scientists, and mainstream Zionist public figures who have been converted to the cause of Greater Eretz Yisrael by the traumatic experience of the Six Days' War. They speak in the name

of traditional Zionism, of which they believe they are the only remaining representatives, and manipulate national symbols such as pioneering, settlement, and defense. Their leadership and dedication are respected well beyond their immediate constituency.

But perhaps the most important asset of the Israeli Radical Right is the strategic location of its hard core, the settlements of the West Bank. The Radical Right was crystallized around the demand to annex the occupied territories to Israel and has emerged in response to political developments that led Israeli leaders in the opposite direction. It is therefore no surprise that the settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, for whom the dilemma of annexation versus evacuation is an essential issue, have always been the most determined part of this camp. The Jewish underground of Gush Emunim was made up of devoted settlers; several supporters of Rabbi Kahane who are presently active in a few conspiratorial groups organized to prevent a similar retreat in the West Bank, also come from settler circles. The settler community may not be very large, about 110,000 strong in 1992, but it represents for many Israelis the true pioneering of the 1990s, the only meaningful Zionism of our time. The ethos of the Zionist pioneers who expanded the boundaries of the small Jewish community in Palestine and built this land from scratch is still very strong in Israel. Gush Emunim in particular represents for the entire Israeli Right (about 50 percent of the nation) the idealism and self-sacrifice of the good old days. In many respects the group fulfills for the Right the role the tiny kibbutz movement once fulfilled for the Labor movement. The settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza are also the ones who maintain the daily contact with over 1.5 million unhappy Palestinians. In that capacity they have an impact on national politics that far exceeds their sheer numbers. In spite of the heavy presence of the army in the West Bank, the settlers, who are armed and well organized, could turn the occupied territories into hell if they wanted to. Therefore even hostile cabinets cannot afford to ignore the attitudes and demands of the Radical Right. Rabbi Kahane's thugs may still be beyond the pale, but not Gush Emunim, Tzomet, and Moledet. These movements and their leaders are part and parcel of the Israeli body politic and are considered legitimate partners to the political process. This is the reason why the presence of the Radical Right in Israeli collective existence casts a large shadow over the future of the Jewish state and is deeply involved in questions of peace and war. What the Radical Right does or does not do is a major question that no Israeli, Arab, or anyone interested in the Middle East can afford to ignore.

No fact dramatizes the centrality of the Radical Right to the life of Israel more than the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. It is true that the *intifada*, which broke out in December 1987, was not directed against the Israeli Radical Right and the settlers but was instead a Palestinian cry for self-determination, directed at Israel's occupation in general. But the outbreak of the *intifada* cannot be explained without the growing Arab-Israeli friction in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the Palestinian fear that the Jews are about to take over the entire area through massive settlement. The settler community in the occupied territories and the spokespersons of the Radical Right have played a crucial role in instilling this fear in the collective consciousness of the Palestinians and, more importantly, in realizing it through the establishment of over 100 settlements in the occupied territories. Even moderate critics of the settlers maintain that they have created for Israel a huge time bomb whose safe detonation is becoming harder each day the occupation continues. There is, furthermore, no doubt that the settler community and the Radical Right are among the most concrete stumbling blocks against Israeli compromises with the Palestinians and the Arab world, a significant force to be reckoned with whenever a peace plan is worked out or speculated about.

Conclusion

The Radical Right can be viewed as a growing success story. Polls conducted since the 1987 beginning of the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza showed a growing radicalization within the Israeli Right and a movement of some of Herut's supporters to the small parliamentary ultranationalist parties. The Radical Right appears, in this perspective, as a thriving public culture and a sophisticated political system. Even strong adversaries agree that a long time will pass before the present rise of this camp is reversed or brought to a halt. By that time the Jewish polity is likely to be greatly different from the Israel of David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, and even Menachem Begin.

Notes

1. See author's *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On Gush Emunim, see Gideon Aran, "From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion: The Roots of Gush Emunim," in Peter Medding (ed.), *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); David Newman (ed.), *The Impact of Gush Emunim* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Zvi Raanan, *Gush Emunim* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1980); Danny Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side: Gush Emunim* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hama'achad, 1982); Ehud Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model of Political Extremism" (Hebrew), in *Medina Mimshal Vevehasim Beinleumiim*, no.17 (Fall 1981); Ehud Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Politics of Zionist Fundamentalism in Israel" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1986); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim," in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, no.2 (April 1987).

2. Cf. Yair Kotler, *Heil Kahane* (New York: Adam Books, 1986) chapter 16; Ehud Sprinzak, "Kach and Kahane: The Emergence of Jewish Quasi-Fascism," in Asher Arian and Michael Shamir (eds.) *The Elections in Israel 1984* (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 1986) p. 182. Also essays by Aviezer Ravitzki, Ruth Gabizon, Jerald Krumer, and Ehud Sprinzak in *The Ideology of Meir Kahane and His Supporters* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute Publications, 1986).

3. The Jerusalem Van Leer Foundation conducted three surveys of the political attitudes of Israel's high school generation (those fifteen to eighteen years old). The September 1984 study found that 60 percent of the respondents thought Arabs did not deserve full equality and 42 percent were in favor of restricting rights for non-Jews. A subsequent survey, taken in May 1985, showed that 40 percent agreed with Kahane's opinions and 11 percent were ready to vote for him. A further breakdown of the results indicated exceptionally strong support for Kahane's ideas among religious youth (59 percent) and among young people of North African and Far Eastern origin (50 percent). The April 1986 survey, which was conducted after an intense anti-Kahane campaign throughout most of the political system, showed a small decline in support for the rabbi's positions. Only one-third of the respondents thought Kahane's opinions were right and 7.5 percent said they would vote for him. However, 50 percent were still favorable to the

idea of restricting the rights of Arabs and 56 percent opposed equal rights for non-Jews. For a further description of the growth of Israeli ultranationalism, see Charles S. Liebman, "Jewish Ultra-Nationalism in Israel: Converging Strands," in William Frankel (ed.) *Survey of Jewish Affairs* (London: Associated Universities Press, 1985).

4. Cf. Yaacov Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1988) chapters 3 and 4.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.

6. Cf. Joseph Heller, *Lehi: Ideology and Politics 1940-1949* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1989) pp. 19-35.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-31.

8. *Ibid.*

9. For a different version, see Joseph Schechtman, *The Life and Times of Vladimir Jabotinsky: Fighter and Prophet* (Silver Springs, Md.: Eshel Books, 1986) pp. 434-441.

10. Cf. Shlomo Avineri, *Varieties of Zionist Thought* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1980) pp. 195-202.

11. For an impressive although somewhat ahistorical attempt to portray Jabotinsky as a classical Western liberal, see Raphaella Bilski Ben-Hur, *Every Individual Is a King: The Social and Political Thought of Zeev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988) chapter 2.

12. See Yonathan Shapira, *The Road of Herut to Power: A Socio-Political Explanation* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, forthcoming) pp. 30-36.

13. Cf. Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 74-76.

14. Shapira, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-52.

15. Cf. Avineri, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-215.

16. Sasson Sofer, *Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) pp. 19-24; Shapira, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-81.

17. On Stern and Lehi, see Heller, *op. cit.*, chapter 4.

18. See, for example, Yonathan Shapira, *Democracy in Israel* (Ramat Gan: Massad, 1977); Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977 [Hebrew]); Peter Medding, *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Myron Aronoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israeli Labor Party* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1977).

19. Cf. Shavit, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-357; Ehud Sprinzak, "Atalena, Thirty Years After: Some Political Thoughts" (in Hebrew) in *Medina mimshal veuehasim bein leumiim*, no. 14 (Spring 1979).

20. Cf. Horowitz and Lissak, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-117.

21. Cf. Michael J. Cohen, *Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) chapter 10.
22. Cf. Horowitz and Lissak, op. cit., pp. 137-146; Itzhak Galnur, *Steering the Polity: Communications and Politics in Israel* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1985) pp. 103-112.
23. Cf. Heller, op. cit., pp. 113-135.
24. Cf. Shapira, op. cit., p. 92; Amos Perlmutter, *The Life and Times of Menachim Begin* (New York: Doubleday, 1987) and Sofer, op. cit., chapter 5.
25. On Herut's maximalist program and radical myths, see Shapira, op. cit., pp. 138-151.
26. Cf. Heller, op. cit., chapter 12.
27. Cf. Sulam, vol. 3, no.3 (June 1951) p. 32. For a general background on the group, see Israel Eldad, *The First Tenth* (Tel Aviv: Hadar, 1975) pp. 385-400, and Isser Havel, *The Truth about the Kastner Murder* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1985), pp. 47-48.
28. Cf. Isser Harel, *Security and Democracy* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1989) chapter 10.
29. Personal interview with Israel Eldad, February 28, 1985.
30. Cf. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimension of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983) pp. 170-171.
31. Cf. Rael Jean Isaac, *Israel Divided : Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) chapter 3.
32. On the distinction between Gush Emunim fundamentalism and messianism, see Ehud Sprinzak, "Fundamentalism, Terrorists, and Democracy: The Case of Gush Emunim Underground" Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987) p.9.
33. Cf. Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model," op. cit., p. 23.
34. Personal interview with Meir Kahane, April 18, 1973.
35. Cf. Kotler, op. cit., p. 21.
36. Personal interview with Kahane.
37. Meir Kahane, "The Activist Column: Reflections on the Elections" in *The Jewish Press* (June 3, 1977) p. 20.
38. Danny Rubinstein, op. cit., pp. 147-152; Sprinzak, "the Iceberg Model," op. cit., p. 27.
39. Personal interview with Geula Cohen, August 23, 1985.
40. Personal interview with Gershon Solomon, February 14, 1985.

41. Cf. Rubinstein, op. cit., pp. 152-156; personal interviews with Geula Cohen and Gershon Solomon.
42. Meir Kahane, "The Second Revolution," in *Jewish Press* (October 20, 1978).
43. Meir Kahane, *Thorns in Your Eyes* (in Hebrew) (New York: Druker, 1981) chapter 4.
44. Sprinzak, "Kahane and Kach," op. cit., pp. 175-176.
45. Cf. Haggai Segal, *Dear Brothers* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1987) pp.4757; Sprinzak, "Fundamentalism, Terrorism," op. cit., pp. 5-6.
46. Cf. David Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," in *Comparative Politics*, vol. 20, no. 2 (January 1988) pp. 204-205.
47. Segal, op. cit., p. 55; Ehud Sprinzak, "From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of Gush Emunim Underground," in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol.10, no.4 (December 1987) p. 200.
48. In May 1980 Menachem Livni, the "leader" of the underground, told Rabbi Levinger, his religious mentor, "for these purposes we have to choose pure people, highly observant and sinless, people with no shred of violence in them and who are disciplined to reckless action." M. Livni, interrogation (court documents, May 18, 1984).
49. Cf. Gideon Aran, *Eretz Israel: Between Politics and Religion* (Jerusalem: Institute for the Study of Israel, 1985, Hebrew publication) pp. 36-43.
50. On Herut's New Zionism as an ideology, culture, civic religion, and symbolic system, see Ofira Seliktar, *New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Croom Helm, 1986) chapters 3 and 4; Liebman and Don-Yehiya, op. cit., p. 234; Myron J. Aronoff, "Establishing Authority: The Memorialization of Jabotinsky and the Burial of the Bar-Kocha Bones in Israel Under the Likud" in Myron J. Aronoff (ed.), *The Frailty of Authority*, vol. 5 of *Political Anthropology* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986).
51. Moshe Levinger, "Old Flags Should Not Be Thrown Away" (in Hebrew), in *Nekuda*, no. 97 (March 25, 1986) p. 8.
52. Personal interviews with Geula Cohen and Gershon Solomon.
53. *We Struggle for the Integrity of the Land* (in Hebrew), undated early pamphlet of Gush Emunim.
54. For an excellent discussion of the fundamentalism of ultraorthodoxy in Israel in relation to the new Zionist fundamentalism of the Radical Right, see Aviezer Ravitsky, "Messianism, Zionism, and the Future of Israel in the Divided Religious Schools in Israel," (in Hebrew) in Alouph Haraven, ed., *Towards the 21st Century* (Jerusalem: Van Leer, 1984); Menachem Friedman, "Radical Religious Groups in Israel: Conservatism and Innovation," in Emanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman, (eds.), *Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1990).
55. Benny Katzover, "The Gravitation Point," in *Nekuda*, no. 27 (April 17, 1981) p.
56. The main representative of this approach was the late Eliezar Livneh in *Israel and the Crisis of Western Civilization* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1972). For years the same approach dominated *Zot haretz*, the

magazine of the Land of Israel Movement that was later channeled into *Nekuda*.

57. Cf. Ehud Sprinzak, "Extreme Politics in Israel," in *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 15 (Fall 1977), and Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model," *op. cit.*

58. Many members of Gush Emunim never trusted Begin and his declarative, but impractical, commitment to settling Judea and Samaria. Personal interview with Rabbi Yoel Ben Nun, June 20, 1985.

59. Judith Carp, "Investigation of Suspicions Against Israelis in Judea and Samaria: A Report of the Follow Up Committee" (in Hebrew), May 23, 1982. See also Dedi Zuker, "A Study of Human Rights in the Territories Administered by the IDF, 1979-1983: Interim Report" (International Institute for Peace in the Middle East, 1983).

60. David Weisburd with Yered Vinitzky, "Vigilantism as Rational Social Control: The Case of the Gush Emunim Settlers," in Myron J. Aronoff (ed.), *Cross Currents in Israeli Culture and Politics, vol. 4 of Political Anthropology* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984) p. 74.

61. Cf. *Nekuda*, no. 93 (November 22, 1985).

62. Cf. Avinoam Bar Yosef and Yehoshua Bitzur, "A Prime Minister That Surrenders Parts of Eretz Israel Will Be Considered a Traitor," in *Yediot Achronot* (November 8, 1986).

63. Meir Kahane, "The Second Revolution," in *Jewish Press* (October 20, 1978).

64. Cf. *Nekuda* editorial and Yehoshua Zohar, "The Retreat from Lebanon: Spiritual Weakness," in *Nekuda*, no. 83 (February 1, 1985) pp. 5-7; also, the *Tzfi* report on the establishment of a *gariin* (a settlement nucleus) for a future settlement in Lebanon in *Tzfi*, no. 2 (Spring 1985) pp. 95-96.

65. Elyakim Haetzni, "A State with No Protection Against Internal Erosion," in *Nekuda*, no. 84 (March 1, 1985) p. 22.

66. Elyakim Haetzni, "The 'Focus' That Was Not Focused," in *Nekuda*, no. 97 (March 3, 1986) p. 14.

67. Cf. Myron Aronoff, "The Internationalization and Cooptation of a Charismatic, Messianic, Religious-Political Revitalization Movement," in Newman, *op. cit.*

68. Cf. Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984) pp. 52-63; and Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim," *op. cit.*, pp. 18-22.

69. Cf. Meron Benvenisti, *1986 Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social and Political Developments in the West Bank* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1986) pp. 57-62.

70. Otniel Schneller, the secretary general of Moetzet Yesha, told me in an interview (August 5, 1985) that the government's most secretive deliberations about Judea, Samaria, and Gaza are confided to him by friendly cabinet members within half an hour of the discussion. See also Yael Yishai, *Land or Peace: Whither Israel?* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987) pp. 124-126.

71. "We have become such an influential body that no minister can afford not to see me, not even Itzhak Rabin. Rabin knows that if he wants Judea and Samaria quiet and the settlers out of the roads, he has to talk to me." Personal interview with Otniel Schneller, August 5, 1985.

72. See Tehiya original manifesto, *Kol korah*, 1979. In the 1992 elections, Tehiya failed to return to the Knesset. Tzomet and Moledet, however, increased their share to 11 seats (9.5 percent).
73. The approach is mostly stressed by the influential *chug* (circle) Ein Vered, which is composed of Mapai and Hakibbutz Hameuchad Veterans. Personal interview with Ephraim Ben Haim, May 5, 1985.
74. Cf. *Moledet: The Movement of the Eretz Yisrael Loyalists*, no.1 (platform explanations, 1988).
75. Cf. Sprinzak, "Kahane and Kach," op. cit., pp. 185-187.
76. Cf. Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," in Bell, ed., *The Radical Right* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 1-45; M. Billig, *Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front* (London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978); E. Bonachich, "The Past, Present and Future of Split Market Theory," in *Research in Race and Ethnic Relations*, no. 1 (1979); S. Cummings, "White Ethnics, Racial Prejudices and Labor Market Segmentation," in *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 85, 4, (1980); G. P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and the British Experience, 1945-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); C. T. Husbands, "Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in Western European Democracies: A Review Article," in *European Journal of Political Research* no.9 (1981); and S. M. Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," in D. Bell, op. cit.
77. Cf. Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, "Thorns in Your Eyes: The Socioeconomic Basis of the Kahane Vote," in Arian and Shamir, op. cit.
78. Cf. Sprinzak, "Kahane and Kach," op. cit., pp. 181-185; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Kahane Movement in Comparative Perspective," in *The Ideology of Meir Kahane and His Supporters* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Van Leer Publications, 1986).
79. This judgment is based on interviews with Yoel Lerner (December 12, 1984), Rabbi Israel Ariel (January 31, 1985), Ephraim Caspi (July 16, 1984), and Rabbi Dov Lior (January 19, 1985).
80. Cf. Yehuda Etzion, *Temple Mount* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: E. Caspi, 1985).
81. Personal interview with Ariel. See also Ariel's essay, "Is It Really a Rebellion Against the Kingdom?" in *Nekuda*, no.73 (May 25, 1984); Ariel, "Things as They Are" in *Tzfia*, no.1 (Summer 1984); and Ariel, "When Will the Temple Be Built?" in *Tzfia* no.2 (Spring 1985).
82. My estimation is conservative and is based on regular opinion polls that indicate an 8 percent to 12 percent support for Tehiya, Tzomet, and Kahane; a 10 percent to 12 percent support for the Sharon camp and other radicals in the Likud and an additional 3 percent to 5 percent support for the Radical Right within such parties as NRP, Shas, and the right-wing fringes of Labor.

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