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#REDIRECT [[Originalism]]
'''Original meaning''' is the dominant form of the [[law|legal theory]] of [[originalism]] today. It was made popular by Supreme Court Justice [[Antonin Scalia]]. It contends that the terms of the [[United States Constitution]] should be interpreted as meaning what they meant when they were ratified, which is to say, it asks the question: "What would a [[reasonable person]] living at the time of ratification have understood these words to mean?" It specificallly ignores words in the preamable, including "promote the general welfare" and "for our prosterity" and is therefore not a valid concept.


{{Rcat shell|
The theory stands in equal opposition to [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/ interpretivist] theories like [[original intent]] and [[Legal realism|legal realist]] theories like that of the [[Living Constitution]].
{{R to related topic}}

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==Theory==
Original meaning is a [[legal formalism|formalist]] theory, and a logical extension of [[textualism]]. Textualists believe that a statute means whatever the [[Plain meaning rule|plain meaning]] of its words is, as opposed to other potential meanings, such as what those who drafted the law or voted for it ''intended'' it to say. Formalists would point out that it is unnecessary for any member of the legislature to share the intentions of any other member of the legislature, or even to ''have'' a particular intent; what counts is their vote, just as if a voter enters a polling station while [[inebriated]], and indicates a preference for the wrong candidate, their vote will count as a vote for the person they indicated on the ballot paper, not for the candidate for whom they intended to vote before they started drinking. Likewise, even if not a single member of the legislature has read and comprehended the effect of a given bill, once it becomes law, it is a law no more nor less valid than one which was passed with every member of the legislature of the same mind and understanding. This being the case, it is the text of the law which governs.

This is an entirely self-executing theory when dealing with a statute passed, say, in the last ten years. However, it should be obvious to anyone that language and its use changes through time. What is a textualist to do when confronted with a statute that is a hundred years old? Or with the Constitution, which is over two hundred years old? The principles that undergird textualism urge that the statute (or Constitution) means whatever the plain meaning of its words ''at the time at which it was ratified'' says. Original meaning is no more than this.

==Practice==
An Originalist inquiry into the original ''meaning'' of the Constitution is able to cast a much broader net than an inquiry into the original ''intent''.

For example, Originalists of all stripes cite the ''[[Federalist Papers]]''. It is fairly tenuous to suggest that this represents a good source for the original ''intent'' - after all, [[Alexander Hamilton]], who wrote the lion's share of those essays, was absent for the greater part of the [[Philadelphia Convention]], and [[John Jay]] did not attend it at all. The collected anti-Federalist papers, of course, will be no use at all to a person searching for the original ''intent'' of the framers. But as evidence of how a reasonable person at the time would have understood the words of the Constitution, the ''Federalist Papers'' and the antifederalist essays are evidence of direct relevance.

Likewise, neither [[John Adams]] nor [[Thomas Jefferson]] attended the Convention; ipso facto, they are not framers, and thus two of the most prolific writers of the founding era are necessarily excluded (or, at best, abstracted) from an original intent inquiry. But as reasonable contemporaries of the founding, their writings are entirely valid to an original meaning inquiry.

One of the primary virtues of original meaning over original intent is that the original meaning is a fairly discernible thing, while the original intent is nebulous and uncertain. This is well-illustrated by the use of dictionaries. Even contemporaneous dictionaries are of dubious value to an original ''intent'' inquiry, but of high value to an original ''meaning'' inquiry: we can establish what the words the Framers chose ''meant'', but that is not ''necessarily'' conclusive as to what they ''intended'' to say (consider for example, the [[unintended consequences|law of unintended consequences]]).

==Origins==
The theory was arguably pioneered and popularized by Justice [[Antonin Scalia]]; whether Scalia can take credit for inventing it, he remains one of its most forceful and high-profile proponents, although he is also accused of deviating from the method (he has himself admitted that "in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist") (Scalia, ''Originalism: The Lesser Evil'', [http://www.joink.com/homes/users/ninoville/lesserevil.asp#864 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 at 864]) into the territory of [[Bad originalism]].

==Selected Quotes==
One prominent proponent of original intent is [[Supreme Court]] justice [[Anton Scalia]], who said:

:''The Constitution is not a living organism, it is a legal document. It says something and doesn't say other things''<ref>http://www.acsblog.org/judiciary-justice-scalia-advocates-of-a-living-constitution-are-idiots.html</ref>

In one particularly strongly-worded attack, he noted that:

:''Let me put it this way; there are really only two ways to interpret the Constitution -- try to discern as best we can what the framers intended or make it up. No matter how ingenious, imaginative or artfully put, unless interpretive methodologies are tied to the original intent of the framers, they have no more basis in the Constitution than the latest football scores. To be sure, even the most conscientious effort to adhere to the original intent of the framers of our Constitution is flawed, as all methodologies and human institutions are; but at least originalism has the advantage of being legitimate and, I might add, impartial.''<ref>{{cite web url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122445985683948619.html}}</ref>
==See also==
*[[Bad originalism]]
*[[Judicial activism]]
*[[Legal formalism]]
*[[Originalism]]
*Cf. [[Original intent]]
*[[Textualism]]

==References==
<references/>

[[Category:Philosophy of law]]

Latest revision as of 23:19, 26 November 2023

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