Ethics of care: Difference between revisions
→Relationship to traditional ethical positions: copyedit. grumble about "feminised" I know what it means and I'm not saying it isn't true. But I don't think we should be going around using words that assert "X is due to external forces affected by people through power relations" outside of discussion that explicitly discusses such issues. Rather less value laden terms should be used. |
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==Relationship to traditional ethical positions== |
==Relationship to traditional ethical positions== |
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Care ethics is different from other ethical models, such as [[consequentialism|consequentialist]] theories (e.g. [[utilitarianism]]) and [[Deontological ethics|deontological theories]] (e.g. [[Kantian ethics]]), in that it seeks to incorporate traditionally feminine virtues and values which, proponents of care ethics contend, are absent in traditional models of ethics.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/#CarEthTheDifVoi|title=Feminist Ethics|last1=Tong|first1=Rosemarie|last2=Williams|first2=Nancy|date=May 4, 2009|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab|access-date=January 6, 2017}}</ref> One of these values is the placement of caring and relationship over |
Care ethics is different from other ethical models, such as [[consequentialism|consequentialist]] theories (e.g. [[utilitarianism]]) and [[Deontological ethics|deontological theories]] (e.g. [[Kantian ethics]]), in that it seeks to incorporate traditionally feminine virtues and values which, proponents of care ethics contend, are absent in traditional models of ethics.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/#CarEthTheDifVoi|title=Feminist Ethics|last1=Tong|first1=Rosemarie|last2=Williams|first2=Nancy|date=May 4, 2009|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab|access-date=January 6, 2017}}</ref> One of these values is the placement of caring and relationship over logic and reason. In care ethics, reason and logic are subservient to natural care, that is, care that is done out of inclination. This is in contast to [[deontology]], where actions taken out of inclination are unethical.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Caring: a relational approach to ethics & moral education|last=Noddings | first= Nel |isbn=9780520957343|oclc=859158671|date = 2013-09-14}}</ref> |
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Drawing on this critique of utilitarianism and deontology, the American [[philosophy of social science|philosopher of social science]] [[Jason Josephson Storm]] has categorized the ethics of care as a |
Drawing on this critique of utilitarianism and deontology, the American [[philosophy of social science|philosopher of social science]] [[Jason Josephson Storm]] has categorized the ethics of care as a form of [[virtue ethics]]. In his 2021 book ''Metamodernism'', Storm argued for close parallels between the ethics of care and traditional [[Buddhism|Buddhist]] virtue ethics, especially the prioritization of [[compassion]] by [[Śāntideva]] and others.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Storm |first=Jason Josephson |date=2021 |title=Metamodernism: The Future of Theory |location=Chicago |publisher=[[University of Chicago Press]] |pages=263–64 |isbn=978-0-226-78665-0 |oclc=1200579878 |doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226786797.001.0001}}</ref> Other scholars had also previously connected ethics of care with Buddhist ethics.<ref>{{cite journal |last=White |first=Judith |date=May 1999 |title=Ethical comportment in organizations: a synthesis of the feminist ethic of care and the Buddhist ethic of compassion |journal=[[International Journal of Value-Based Management]] |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=109–128 |doi=10.1023/A:1007779604630}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chang |first1=Dave |last2=Bai |first2=Heesoon |date=January 2016 |title=Self-with-other in teacher practice: a case study through care, Aristotelian virtue, and Buddhist ethics |journal=Ethics and Education |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=17–28 |doi=10.1080/17449642.2016.1145491}}</ref> |
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==Care ethics as feminist ethics== |
==Care ethics as feminist ethics== |
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{{see also|Difference feminism}} |
{{see also|Difference feminism}} |
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While some feminists have criticized care-based ethics for reinforcing traditional stereotypes |
While some feminists have criticized care-based ethics for reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes,<ref name=Bartky>{{cite book | last = Bartky | first = Sandra Lee | author-link = Sandra Bartky | title = Femininity and domination: studies in the phenomenology of oppression | url = https://archive.org/details/femininitydomina00bart | url-access = registration | pages = [https://archive.org/details/femininitydomina00bart/page/104 104–105] | publisher = Routledge | location = New York | year = 1990 | isbn = 9780415901864 }}</ref> others have embraced parts of the paradigm under the theoretical concept of '''care-focused feminism'''<!--boldface per [[WP:R#PLA]]-->.<ref name="Tong, Rosmarie page 162-165">{{cite book|last=Tong|first=Rosemarie|title=Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction|publisher=Westview Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0-81-334375-4|edition=3rd|location=Boulder, Colo.|pages=162–65}}</ref> |
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Care-focused feminism, alternatively called ''gender feminism'',<ref>{{cite book |last=Tong |first=Rosemarie |title=Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction |date=2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-81-335023-3 |edition=Student economy edition, 4th |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cSZhDwAAQBAJ&q=%22gender+feminism%22 }}</ref> is a branch of feminist thought informed primarily by ethics of care as developed by [[Carol Gilligan]] and [[Nel Noddings]].<ref name="Tong, Rosmarie page 162-165"/> This |
Care-focused feminism, alternatively called ''gender feminism'',<ref>{{cite book |last=Tong |first=Rosemarie |title=Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction |date=2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-81-335023-3 |edition=Student economy edition, 4th |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cSZhDwAAQBAJ&q=%22gender+feminism%22 }}</ref> is a branch of feminist thought informed primarily by the ethics of care as developed by [[Carol Gilligan]] and [[Nel Noddings]].<ref name="Tong, Rosmarie page 162-165"/> This theory is critical of how caring is socially engendered, being assigned to women and consequently devalued. "Care-focused feminists regard women's capacity for care as a human strength"<ref name="Tong, Rosmarie page 162-165"/> which can and should be taught to and expected of men as well as women. Noddings proposes that ethical caring could be a more concrete evaluative model of moral dilemma, than an ethic of justice.<ref>{{cite book|last = Noddings | first= Nel |title = Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education | pages= 3–4 | publisher = University of California Press |location= Berkeley | date= 1984|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u7MwDwAAQBAJ|isbn=9780520275706}}</ref> Noddings' care-focused feminism requires practical application of [[Nel Noddings#Nel Noddings' relational ethics|relational ethics]], predicated on an ethic of care.<ref>{{cite book| last = Noddings | first = Nel |title= Women and Evil | page = 222 |publisher = University of California Press | location = Berkeley | date = 1989 | isbn = 9780520074132 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i-zN_8h_3l8C}}</ref> |
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Ethics of care is |
Ethics of care is a basis for care-focused feminist theorizing on maternal ethics. These theories recognize caring as an ethically relevant issue.<ref>Held, Virginia. Ethics of Care, page 64. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.</ref> Critical of how society engenders caring labor, theorists [[Sara Ruddick]], [[Virginia Held]], and [[Eva Feder Kittay]] suggest caring should be performed and care givers valued in both public and private spheres.<ref>Kittay, Eva Feder: Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency, page 20. Routledge, New York, 1999.</ref> This proposed paradigm shift in ethics encourages the view that an ethic of caring be the social responsibility of both men and women. |
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[[Joan Tronto]] argues that the definition of |
[[Joan Tronto]] argues that the definition of "ethic of care" is ambiguous due in part to it not playing a central role in moral theory.<ref name="Tronto">{{citation | last = Tronto | first = Joan C. | author-link = Joan Tronto | contribution = An ethic of care | editor-last1 = Cudd | editor-first1 = Ann E. | editor-last2 = Andreasen | editor-first2 = Robin O. | editor-link1 = Ann Cudd | title = Feminist theory: a philosophical anthology | pages = 251–263 | publisher = Blackwell Publishing | location = Oxford, UK Malden, Massachusetts | year = 2005 | isbn = 9781405116619 | postscript = .}}</ref> She argues that considering moral philosophy is engaged with human goodness, then care would appear to assume a significant role in this type of philosophy.<ref name="Tronto"/> However, this is not the case and Tronto further stresses the association between care and "naturalness". The latter term refers to the socially and culturally constructed gender roles where care is mainly assumed to be the role of the woman.<ref name="Tronto"/> As such, care loses the power to take a central role in moral theory. |
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Tronto states there are four ethical qualities of care: |
Tronto states there are four ethical qualities of care: |
Revision as of 00:00, 26 March 2023
The ethics of care (alternatively care ethics or EoC) is a normative ethical theory that holds that moral action centers on interpersonal relationships and care or benevolence as a virtue. EoC is one of a cluster of normative ethical theories that were developed by some feminists and environmentalists since the 1980s.[1] While consequentialist and deontological ethical theories emphasize generalizable standards and impartiality, ethics of care emphasize the importance of response to the individual. The distinction between the general and the individual is reflected in their different moral questions: "what is just?" versus "how to respond?".[2] Carol Gilligan, who is considered the originator of the ethics of care, criticized the application of generalized standards as "morally problematic, since it breeds moral blindness or indifference".[3]
Assumptions of the framework include: appeciating varying degrees of dependence and interdependence between people, considering the consequences of actions should be assessed in proportion to the vulnerability of those affected, using situational details to assess how to safeguard and promote interests.
Historical background
Carol Gilligan and In a Different Voice
The originator of the ethics of care was Carol Gilligan, an American ethicist and psychologist. Gilligan created this model in contrast to the model of her mentor developmental psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg, for whom she was a student. Gilligan argued that Kohlberg's model of stages of moral development found boys to be more morally mature than girls, and this result extended into adults (although when education is controlled for there are no gender differences).[4] Gilligan further argued that Kohlberg's model was not an objective, but rather a masculine perspective on morality, founded on principles of justice and abstract duties or obligations. Dana Ward stated, in an seemingly unpublished, that the scale is psychometrically sound.[5]
Gilligan's In a Different Voice offered the perspective that men and women have tendencies to view morality in different terms. Her theory claimed women tended to emphasize empathy and compassion over the notions of morality that are privileged in Kohlberg's scale.[6] Subsequent research suggests that the differences in care-based or justice-based ethical approaches may be due to gender differences, or differences in life situations of genders.[7]
Relationship to traditional ethical positions
Care ethics is different from other ethical models, such as consequentialist theories (e.g. utilitarianism) and deontological theories (e.g. Kantian ethics), in that it seeks to incorporate traditionally feminine virtues and values which, proponents of care ethics contend, are absent in traditional models of ethics.[8] One of these values is the placement of caring and relationship over logic and reason. In care ethics, reason and logic are subservient to natural care, that is, care that is done out of inclination. This is in contast to deontology, where actions taken out of inclination are unethical.[9]
Drawing on this critique of utilitarianism and deontology, the American philosopher of social science Jason Josephson Storm has categorized the ethics of care as a form of virtue ethics. In his 2021 book Metamodernism, Storm argued for close parallels between the ethics of care and traditional Buddhist virtue ethics, especially the prioritization of compassion by Śāntideva and others.[10] Other scholars had also previously connected ethics of care with Buddhist ethics.[11][12]
Care ethics as feminist ethics
While some feminists have criticized care-based ethics for reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes,[13] others have embraced parts of the paradigm under the theoretical concept of care-focused feminism.[14]
Care-focused feminism, alternatively called gender feminism,[15] is a branch of feminist thought informed primarily by the ethics of care as developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings.[14] This theory is critical of how caring is socially engendered, being assigned to women and consequently devalued. "Care-focused feminists regard women's capacity for care as a human strength"[14] which can and should be taught to and expected of men as well as women. Noddings proposes that ethical caring could be a more concrete evaluative model of moral dilemma, than an ethic of justice.[16] Noddings' care-focused feminism requires practical application of relational ethics, predicated on an ethic of care.[17]
Ethics of care is a basis for care-focused feminist theorizing on maternal ethics. These theories recognize caring as an ethically relevant issue.[18] Critical of how society engenders caring labor, theorists Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held, and Eva Feder Kittay suggest caring should be performed and care givers valued in both public and private spheres.[19] This proposed paradigm shift in ethics encourages the view that an ethic of caring be the social responsibility of both men and women.
Joan Tronto argues that the definition of "ethic of care" is ambiguous due in part to it not playing a central role in moral theory.[20] She argues that considering moral philosophy is engaged with human goodness, then care would appear to assume a significant role in this type of philosophy.[20] However, this is not the case and Tronto further stresses the association between care and "naturalness". The latter term refers to the socially and culturally constructed gender roles where care is mainly assumed to be the role of the woman.[20] As such, care loses the power to take a central role in moral theory.
Tronto states there are four ethical qualities of care:
- Attentiveness: Attentiveness is crucial to the ethics of care because care requires a recognition of others' needs in order to respond to them.[20] The question which arises is the distinction between ignorance and inattentiveness.[20] Tronto poses this question as such, "But when is ignorance simply ignorance, and when is it inattentiveness"?[20]
- Responsibility: In order to care, we must take it upon ourselves, thus responsibility. The problem associated with this second ethical element of responsibility is the question of obligation. Obligation is often, if not already, tied to pre-established societal and cultural norms and roles. Tronto makes the effort to differentiate the terms "responsibility" and "obligation" with regards to the ethic of care. Responsibility is ambiguous, whereas obligation refers to situations where action or reaction is due, such as the case of a legal contract.[20] This ambiguity allows for ebb and flow in and between class structures and gender roles, and to other socially constructed roles that would bind responsibility to those only befitting of those roles.
- Competence: To provide care also means competency. One cannot simply acknowledge the need to care, accept the responsibility, but not follow through with enough adequacy - as such action would result in the need of care not being met.[20]
- Responsiveness: This refers to the "responsiveness of the care receiver to the care".[20] Tronto states, "Responsiveness signals an important moral problem within care: by its nature, care is concerned with conditions of vulnerability and inequality".[20] She further argues responsiveness does not equal reciprocity.[20] Rather, it is another method to understand vulnerability and inequality by understanding what has been expressed by those in the vulnerable position, as opposed to re-imagining oneself in a similar situation.[20]
In 2013, Tronto added a fifth ethical quality:
- Plurality, communication, trust and respect; solidarity or caring with: Together, these are the qualities necessary for people to come together in order to take collective responsibility, to understand their citizenship as always imbricated in relations of care, and to take seriously the nature of caring needs in society.[21]
In mental health
Psychiatrist Kaila Rudolph noted that care ethics aligns with a trauma-informed care framework in psychiatry.[22]
See also
Theorists
References
- ^ Sander-Staudt, Maureen. "Care Ethics". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. Retrieved June 4, 2022.
- ^ Gilligan, Carol. "Moral Orientation and Moral Development." The Feminist Philosophy Reader. By Alison Bailey and Chris J. Cuomo. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008. N. pag. 469 Print.
- ^ Gilligan, Carol. "Moral Orientation and Moral Development." In Alison Bailey and Chris J. Cuomo (eds.). The Feminist Philosophy Reader. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008. N. pag. 471 Print.
- ^ Walker, L.J. (1991). "Sex differences in moral reasoning." In W.M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (eds.) Handbook of moral behavior and development: Vol, 2. Research. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- ^ Ward, Dana (2000). "Still Hearing Voice: The Persistent Myth of Gendered Judgment," Keynote address presented at the VIIIth Biennial conference of the International Society for Justice Research, Rishon LeZion, Israel.
- ^ Gilligan, Carol. In A Different Voice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1982)
- ^ Ford and Lowery (1986). "Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning: A Comparison of the Use of Justice and Care Orientations". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 50(4), 777-783; Rothbart, Hanley and Albert (1986). "Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning." Sex Roles. 15 (11&12), 645-653; and Krebs, D.L., Vermeulen, S.C., Denton, K., and Carpendale, J. I. (1994). "Gender and perspective differences in moral judgment and moral orientation". Journal of Moral Education. 23, 17-26.
- ^ Tong, Rosemarie; Williams, Nancy (May 4, 2009). "Feminist Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab. Retrieved January 6, 2017.
- ^ Noddings, Nel (2013-09-14). Caring: a relational approach to ethics & moral education. ISBN 9780520957343. OCLC 859158671.
- ^ Storm, Jason Josephson (2021). Metamodernism: The Future of Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 263–64. doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226786797.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-226-78665-0. OCLC 1200579878.
- ^ White, Judith (May 1999). "Ethical comportment in organizations: a synthesis of the feminist ethic of care and the Buddhist ethic of compassion". International Journal of Value-Based Management. 12 (2): 109–128. doi:10.1023/A:1007779604630.
- ^ Chang, Dave; Bai, Heesoon (January 2016). "Self-with-other in teacher practice: a case study through care, Aristotelian virtue, and Buddhist ethics". Ethics and Education. 11 (1): 17–28. doi:10.1080/17449642.2016.1145491.
- ^ Bartky, Sandra Lee (1990). Femininity and domination: studies in the phenomenology of oppression. New York: Routledge. pp. 104–105. ISBN 9780415901864.
- ^ a b c Tong, Rosemarie (2009). Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction (3rd ed.). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. pp. 162–65. ISBN 978-0-81-334375-4.
- ^ Tong, Rosemarie (2018). Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction (Student economy edition, 4th ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-81-335023-3.
- ^ Noddings, Nel (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 3–4. ISBN 9780520275706.
- ^ Noddings, Nel (1989). Women and Evil. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 222. ISBN 9780520074132.
- ^ Held, Virginia. Ethics of Care, page 64. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
- ^ Kittay, Eva Feder: Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency, page 20. Routledge, New York, 1999.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Tronto, Joan C. (2005), "An ethic of care", in Cudd, Ann E.; Andreasen, Robin O. (eds.), Feminist theory: a philosophical anthology, Oxford, UK Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 251–263, ISBN 9781405116619.
- ^ Tronto, Joan (2013). Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. New York: New York University Press. ISBN 9780814782781.
- ^ Rudolph, Kaila (2021). "Ethical Considerations in Trauma-Informed Care". Psychiatric Clinics of North America. 44 (4): 521–535. doi:10.1016/j.psc.2021.07.001. PMID 34763786.
Further reading
- "Care Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Gilligan, Carol (1982). In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674445444.
- Held, Virginia (2005). The ethics of care. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195180992.001.0001. ISBN 9780195180992.
- Held, Virginia (1993). Feminist morality: transforming culture, society, and politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226325934.
- Jagger, Alison (1995), "Caring as a feminist practice of moral reason", in Virginia, Held (ed.), Justice and care: essential readings in feminist ethics, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, ISBN 9780813321622.
- Noddings, Nel (2005). Educating citizens for global awareness. New York: Teachers College Press. ISBN 9780807745342.
- Slote, Michael A. (2007). The ethics of care and empathy. London ; New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-77200-6.
- Tronto, Joan C. (September 2012). "Partiality based on relational responsibilities: another approach to global ethics". Ethics and Social Welfare. 6 (3): 303–316. doi:10.1080/17496535.2012.704058. S2CID 143230526.