"A Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Crowdsensing Systems with Max-Min ..."

He Huang et al. (2017)

> Home

Details and statistics

DOI: 10.1109/WCNC.2017.7925505

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2017-12-02

- view
  - electronic edition via DOI
  - unpaywalled version
  authority control:
- export record
  dblp key:
  - conf/wcnc/HuangXSY17
- ask others
- share record
  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/conf/wcnc/HuangXSY17
He Huang, Yu Xin, Yu-e Sun, Wenjian Yang:
A Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Crowdsensing Systems with Max-Min Fairness. WCNC 2017: 1-6

manage site settings

To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.