The Second Barbary War, also known as the U.S.–Algerian War[2] and the Algerine War,[3] was a brief military conflict between the United States and the North African state of Algiers in 1815.

Second Barbary War
Part of the Barbary Wars

Decatur's squadron off Algiers
Date17–19 June 1815
Location
Result American victory
Belligerents
 United States Regency of Algiers
Commanders and leaders
James Madison
Stephen Decatur
Omar Agha
Raïs Hamidou 
Strength
3 frigates
3 brigs
2 schooners
2 sloops
5 frigates
7 smaller warships
Casualties and losses
40 killed and wounded[1] 53 killed
Many wounded
486 captured
2 ships captured
1 ship sunk

Piracy had been rampant along the North African "Barbary" coast of the Mediterranean Sea since the 16th century. Algerian pirates and privateers intermittently preyed on American ships, with Algiers extracting annual tribute from the U.S. since 1795; the First Barbary War in the early 19th century, fought primarily against Algiers' neighbors, failed to fully stem the problem.

In February 1815, after the end of the War of 1812, U.S. President James Madison requested that Congress declare war against Algiers; legislation was passed on 3 March 1815 authorizing the use of the U.S. Navy to protect American interests and seize Algerian assets. In May, a 10-ship squadron led by Commodore Stephen Decatur—a veteran of the First Barbary War—sailed from New York for Algiers; an even larger force, led by Commodore William Bainbridge, another Barbary War veteran, was close behind.

Following a decisive U.S. victory off the coast of Cape Gata in June 1815, and by threat of seizing Algiers itself, Commodore Decatur successfully pressed Dey Omar Agha of Algeria to sue for peace; the resulting agreement was formalized in a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate on 5 December 1815.[4] However, Agha later repudiated the treaty, as well as similar agreements with several European nations, until a combined English and Dutch force bombarded Algiers in 1816;[5] the subsequent arrival of a U.S. squadron carrying U.S. commissioner William Shaler led to a new but substantially similar treaty on 23 December 1816, which was ratified on 11 February 1822.[4]

The Algerian War resulted in the United States and Europe ceasing tribute to Algiers and marked the beginning of the end of piracy in the Mediterranean. It also further elevated U.S. military prestige and power projection capabilities that had been demonstrated in the prior Barbary War. Western nations built ever more sophisticated and expensive ships that the Barbary pirates could not match in numbers or technology, and the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 fully ended any vestige of piracy in the region.[6]

Background

edit

The First Barbary War (1801–1805) had led to an uneasy truce between the US and the Barbary states, but American attention turned to Britain and the War of 1812. The Barbary pirates returned to their practice of attacking American merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea and ransoming their crews to the United States government.[7] At the same time, the major European powers were still involved in the Napoleonic Wars, which did not fully end until 1815.[8]

At the conclusion of the War of 1812, however, the United States returned to the problem of Barbary piracy. On 3 March 1815, Congress authorized deployment of naval power against Algiers, and the squadron under the command of Commodore Stephen Decatur set sail on 20 May. It consisted of USS Guerriere (flagship), Constellation, Macedonia, Epervier, Ontario, Firefly, Spark, Flambeau, Torch, and Spitfire.[9]

Following the War of 1812, Algiers sided with the British (although the British Atlantic blockade had limited US trade in the Mediterranean region). President Madison recommended that Congress declare the "existence of a state of war between the United States and the Dey and Regency of Algiers."[10] While Congress did not formally declare a state of war, they did pass legislation, enacted on 3 March 1815, that authorized the president to use the U.S. Navy, "as judged requisite by the President" to protect the "commerce and seamen" of the United States on the "Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas."[10] Congress also authorized the president to grant the U.S. Navy the ability to seize all vessels and goods belonging to Algiers. The legislation also authorized the president to commission privateers for the same purpose. [10]

On 20 May 1815, a 10-ship squadron left New York (to be followed by a larger fleet under command of William Bainbridge).[11] Shortly after departing Gibraltar en route to Algiers, Decatur's squadron encountered the Algerian flagship Meshouda and captured it in the Battle off Cape Gata. They also managed to capture the Algerian brig Estedio in the Battle off Cape Palos. On 29 June, the squadron had reached Algiers and had initiated negotiations with the Bey. The United States made persistent demands for compensation, mingled with threats of destruction, and the Dey capitulated. He signed a treaty aboard the Guerriere in the Bay of Algiers on 3 July 1815, in which Decatur agreed to return the captured Meshuda and Estedio. The Algerians returned all American captives, estimated to be about 10, in exchange for about 500 subjects of the Dey.[12] Algeria also paid $10,000 for seized shipping. The treaty guaranteed no further tributes by the United States[13] and granted the United States full shipping rights in the Mediterranean Sea.

Aftermath

edit

Despite having successfully negotiated for their freedom, all 10 US captives perished when the ship returning them to the US, Epervier, sank in the Atlantic ocean on 9 August 1815. Although the conflict was brief and small-scale, it showed US resolve and was a victory for free trade.[11]

In early 1816, Britain undertook a diplomatic mission, backed by a small squadron of ships of the line, to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers to convince the Deys to stop their piracy and free European Christian slaves. The Deys of Tunis and Tripoli agreed without any resistance, but the Dey of Algiers was less cooperative, and the negotiations were stormy. The leader of the diplomatic mission, Admiral Edward Pellew, believed that he had negotiated a treaty to stop the slavery of Christians and returned to England. However, just after the treaty was signed, Algerian troops massacred 200 Corsican, Sicilian and Sardinian fishermen who had been under British protection thanks to the negotiations. This caused outrage in Britain and the rest of Europe, and Pellew's negotiations were seen as a failure.[14]

As a result, Pellew was ordered to sea again to complete the job and punish the Algerians. He gathered a squadron of five ships of the line, reinforced by a number of frigates, later reinforced by a flotilla of six Dutch ships. On 27 August 1816, following a round of failed negotiations, the fleet delivered a punishing nine-hour bombardment of Algiers. The attack immobilized many of the Dey's corsairs and shore batteries, forcing him to accept a peace offer of the same terms that he had rejected the day before. Pellew warned that if the terms were not accepted, he would continue the action. The Dey accepted the terms, but Pellew had been bluffing since his fleet had already spent all its ammunition.[15]

A treaty was signed on 24 September 1816. The British Consul and 1,083 other Christian slaves were freed, and the U.S. ransom money repaid.[16]

See also

edit

Further reading

edit
  • Toll, Ian W. (17 March 2008). Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0393330328.

References

edit
  1. ^ "Les Corsaires des Régences barbaresques - Page 6" (in French).
  2. ^ Micheal Clodfelter (9 May 2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts. McFarland. p. 198. ISBN 9780786474707.
  3. ^ "The Second Barbary War: The Algerine War". UM Clements Library. Retrieved 7 May 2024.
  4. ^ a b "Barbary Wars, 1801–1805 and 1815–1816". history.state.gov. Retrieved 14 January 2024.
  5. ^ Taylor, Stephen (2012). Commander: The Life and Exploits of Britain's Greatest Frigate Captain. London: faber and faber. pp. 289. ISBN 978-0-571-27711-7.
  6. ^ Leiner, Frederic C. (2007). The End of Barbary Terror, America's 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa. Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 39–50. ISBN 978-0-19-532540-9.
  7. ^ London, Joshua E. (2005). Victory in Tripoli: How America's War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. pp. 235–236. ISBN 978-1630260378.
  8. ^ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Wars of the Barbary Pirates (London: Osprey, 2006) online
  9. ^ Allen, Gardner Weld (1905). Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs. Boston, New York and Chicago: Houghton Mifflin & Co. p. 281.
  10. ^ a b c Jennifer K. Elsea; Matthew C. Weed (18 April 2014). "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 17 March 2023.
  11. ^ a b "The Second Barbary War: The Algerine War".
  12. ^ "Treaty of Peace, Signed Algiers June 30 and July 3, 1815". avalon.law.yale.edu. Retrieved 4 February 2022. ARTICLE 3rd The Dey of Algiers shall cause to be immediately delivered up to the American Squadron now off Algiers all the American Citizens now in his possession, amounting to ten more or less, and all the Subjects of the Dey of Algiers now in the power of the United States amounting to five hundred more or less, shall be delivered up to him, the United States according to the usages of civilized nations requiring no ransom for the excess of prisoners in their favor.
  13. ^ "Treaty of Peace, Signed Algiers June 30 and July 3, 1815". avalon.law.yale.edu. Retrieved 4 February 2022. ARTICLE 2d It is distinctly understood between the Contracting parties, that no tribute either as biennial presents, or under any other form or name whatever, shall ever be required by the Dey and Regency of Algiers from the United States of America on any pretext whatever.
  14. ^ Taylor, Stephen (2012). Commander: The Life and Exploits of Britain's Greatest Frigate Captain. London: faber and faber. pp. 10. ISBN 978-0-571-27711-7.
  15. ^ Taylor, Stephen (2012). Commander: The Life and Exploits of Britain's Greatest Frigate Captain. London: faber and faber. pp. 292. ISBN 978-0-571-27711-7.
  16. ^ Fremont-Barnes, pp 84-85.[full citation needed]

Sources

edit
edit