gested itself was, that it neglected to enquire into the conditions of self-existence.
For here, I am convinced, and not in the fallacies which have often been noted as the basis of subjective idealism, lies the fundamental ground for placing mind in the centre of reality. And, even in the case of subjective idealism, I am sure that the genuine logical motive is the same in principle. It is not the failure to distinguish between an act and an object of mind. It is not any simple prejudice that mind can apprehend only what is a part of itself. But it is the insight—an insight substantially just—that a universe severed from the life of mind can never fulfil the conditions of self-existence. We saw that to overlook the character of mind which bears on this point, when stating the simplest facts of perception, is to be misled ab initio. Mind is always a world; its objects are always fragments.
This nature, the nature of being a world or whole, is what I take to be the condition of self-existence. It is an old argument for
