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Teleology (from τέλος, telos, 'end', 'aim', or 'goal', and λόγος, logos, 'explanation' or 'reason')^[1] or finality^[2]^[3] is a branch of causality giving the reason or an explanation for something as a function of its end, its purpose, or its goal, as opposed to as a function of its cause.^[4] James Wood, in his Nuttall Encyclopaedia, explained the meaning of teleology as "the doctrine of final causes, particularly the argument for the being and character of God from the being and character of His works; that the end reveals His purpose from the beginning, the end being regarded as the thought of God at the beginning, or the universe viewed as the realisation of Him and His eternal purpose."

A purpose that is imposed by human use, such as the purpose of a fork to hold food, is called extrinsic.^[3] Natural teleology, common in classical philosophy, though controversial today,^[5] contends that natural entities also have intrinsic purposes, regardless of human use or opinion. For instance, Aristotle claimed that an acorn's intrinsic telos is to become a fully grown oak tree.^[6] Though ancient atomists rejected the notion of natural teleology, teleological accounts of non-personal or non-human nature were explored and often endorsed in ancient and medieval philosophies, but fell into disfavor during the modern era (1600–1900).

History

In Western philosophy, the term and concept of teleology originated in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle's 'four causes' give special place to the telos or "final cause" of each thing. In this, he followed Plato in seeing purpose in both human and nonhuman nature.

Etymology

The word teleology combines Greek telos (τέλος, from τελε-, 'end' or 'purpose')^[1] and logia (-λογία, 'speak of', 'study of', or 'a branch of learning'). German philosopher Christian Wolff would coin the term, as teleologia (Latin), in his work Philosophia rationalis, sive logica (1728).^[7]

Platonic

In Plato's dialogue Phaedo, Socrates argues that true explanations for any given physical phenomenon must be teleological. He bemoans those who fail to distinguish between a thing's necessary and sufficient causes, which he identifies respectively as material and final causes:^[8]

Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause, from that without which the cause would not be able to act, as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could be at this very time, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will sometime discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and 'binding' binds and holds them together.
— Plato, Phaedo, 99

Socrates here argues that while the materials that compose a body are necessary conditions for its moving or acting in a certain way, they nevertheless cannot be the sufficient condition for its moving or acting as it does. For example,^[8] if Socrates is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting, and so a physical description of his tendons can be listed as necessary conditions or auxiliary causes of his act of sitting.^[9]^[10] However, these are only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting. To give a physical description of Socrates' body is to say that Socrates is sitting, but it does not give any idea why it came to be that he was sitting in the first place. To say why he was sitting and not not sitting, it is necessary to explain what it is about his sitting that is good, for all things brought about (i.e., all products of actions) are brought about because the actor saw some good in them. Thus, to give an explanation of something is to determine what about it is good. Its goodness is its actual cause—its purpose, telos or 'reason for which'.^[11]

Aristotelian

Aristotle argued that Democritus was wrong to attempt to reduce all things to mere necessity, because doing so neglects the aim, order, and "final cause", which brings about these necessary conditions:

Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now, they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end. ...
— Aristotle, Generation of Animals 5.8, 789a8–b15

In Physics, using the hylomorphic theory, (using eternal forms as his model^{[dubious – discuss]}), Aristotle rejects Plato's assumption that the universe was created by an intelligent designer. For Aristotle, natural ends are produced by "natures" (principles of change internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle argued, do not deliberate:^[12]

It is absurd to suppose that ends are not present [in nature] because we do not see an agent deliberating.
— Aristotle, Physics, 2.8, 199b27-9^[i]

These Platonic and Aristotelian arguments ran counter to those presented earlier by Democritus and later by Lucretius, both of whom were supporters of what is now often called accidentalism:

Nothing in the body is made in order that we may use it. What happens to exist is the cause of its use.
— Lucretius, De rerum natura [On the Nature of Things] 4, 833^[ii]

Modern philosophy

The chief instance, and the largest polemic morass, of teleological viewpoint in modern cosmology and ontology is the teleological argument that posits an intelligent designer as a god.

Postmodern philosophy

Teleological-based "grand narratives" are renounced by the postmodern tradition,^[13] where teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary, and harmful to those whose stories are diminished or overlooked.^[14]

Against this postmodern position, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that a narrative understanding of oneself, of one's capacity as an independent reasoner, one's dependence on others and on the social practices and traditions in which one participates, all tend towards an ultimate good of liberation. Social practices may themselves be understood as teleologically oriented to internal goods, for example, practices of philosophical and scientific inquiry are teleologically ordered to the elaboration of a true understanding of their objects. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology of Aristotle's "metaphysical biology", but he has cautiously moved from that book's account of a sociological teleology toward an exploration of what remains valid in a more traditional teleological naturalism.^[15]

Ethics

Teleology significantly informs the study of ethics, such as in:

Business ethics: People in business commonly think in terms of purposeful action, as in, for example, management by objectives. Teleological analysis of business ethics leads to consideration of the full range of stakeholders in any business decision, including the management, the staff, the customers, the shareholders, the country, humanity and the environment.^[16]
Medical ethics: Teleology provides a moral basis for the professional ethics of medicine, as physicians are generally concerned with outcomes and must therefore know the telos of a given treatment paradigm.^[17]

Consequentialism

The broad spectrum of consequentialist ethics—of which utilitarianism is a well-known example—focuses on the result or consequences, with such principles as John Stuart Mill's 'principle of utility': "the greatest good for the greatest number". This principle is thus teleological, though in a broader sense than is elsewhere understood in philosophy.

In the classical notion, teleology is grounded in the inherent nature of things themselves, whereas in consequentialism, teleology is imposed on nature from outside by the human will. Consequentialist theories justify inherently what most people would call evil acts by their desirable outcomes, if the good of the outcome outweighs the bad of the act. So, for example, a consequentialist theory would say it was acceptable to kill one person in order to save two or more other people. These theories may be summarized by the maxim "the end justifies the means."

Deontology

Consequentialism stands in contrast to the more classical notions of deontological ethics, of which examples include Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative, and Aristotle's virtue ethics—although formulations of virtue ethics are also often consequentialist in derivation.

In deontological ethics, the goodness or badness of individual acts is primary and a larger, more desirable goal is insufficient to justify bad acts committed on the way to that goal, even if the bad acts are relatively minor and the goal is major (like telling a small lie to prevent a war and save millions of lives). In requiring all constituent acts to be good, deontological ethics is much more rigid than consequentialism, which varies by circumstance.

Practical ethics are usually a mix of the two. For example, Mill also relies on deontic maxims to guide practical behavior, but they must be justifiable by the principle of utility.^[18]

Economics

A teleology of human aims played a crucial role in the work of economist Ludwig von Mises, especially in the development of his science of praxeology. Mises believed that an individual's action is teleological because it is governed by the existence of their chosen ends.^[19] In other words, individuals select what they believe to be the most appropriate means to achieve a sought after goal or end. Mises also stressed that, with respect to human action, teleology is not independent of causality: "No action can be devised and ventured upon without definite ideas about the relation of cause and effect, teleology presupposes causality."^[19]

Assuming reason and action to be predominantly influenced by ideological credence, Mises derived his portrayal of human motivation from Epicurean teachings, insofar as he assumes "atomistic individualism, teleology, and libertarianism, and defines man as an egoist who seeks a maximum of happiness" (i.e. the ultimate pursuit of pleasure over pain).^[20] "Man strives for," Mises remarks, "but never attains the perfect state of happiness described by Epicurus."^[20] Furthermore, expanding upon the Epicurean groundwork, Mises formalized his conception of pleasure and pain by assigning each specific meaning, allowing him to extrapolate his conception of attainable happiness to a critique of liberal versus socialist ideological societies. It is there, in his application of Epicurean belief to political theory, that Mises flouts Marxist theory, considering labor to be one of many of man's 'pains', a consideration which positioned labor as a violation of his original Epicurean assumption of man's manifest hedonistic pursuit. From here he further postulates a critical distinction between introversive labor and extroversive labor, further divaricating from basic Marxist theory, in which Marx hails labor as man's "species-essence", or his "species-activity".^[21]

Science

In modern science, explanations that rely on teleology are often, but not always, avoided, either because they are unnecessary or because whether they are true or false is thought to be beyond the ability of human perception and understanding to judge.^[iii] But using teleology as an explanatory style, in particular within evolutionary biology, is still controversial.^[22]

Since the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon, teleological explanations in physical science tend to be deliberately avoided in favor of focus on material and efficient explanations, although some recent accounts of quantum phenomena make use of teleology.^[23] Final and formal causation came to be viewed as false or too subjective.^[iii] Nonetheless, some disciplines, in particular within evolutionary biology, continue to use language that appears teleological in describing natural tendencies towards certain end conditions. Some^[who?] suggest, however, that these arguments ought to be, and practicably can be, rephrased in non-teleological forms; others hold that teleological language cannot always be easily expunged from descriptions in the life sciences, at least within the bounds of practical pedagogy.

Contemporary philosophers and scientists still debate whether teleological axioms are useful or accurate in proposing modern philosophies and scientific theories. An example of the reintroduction of teleology into modern language is the notion of an attractor.^[24] Another instance is when Thomas Nagel (2012), though not a biologist, proposed a non-Darwinian account of evolution that incorporates impersonal and natural teleological laws to explain the existence of life, consciousness, rationality, and objective value.^[25] Regardless, the accuracy can also be considered independently from the usefulness: it is a common experience in pedagogy that a minimum of apparent teleology can be useful in thinking about and explaining Darwinian evolution even if there is no true teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharp canine teeth because those teeth "serve the purpose of" predation regardless of whether there is an underlying non-teleologic reality in which evolution is not an actor with intentions. In other words, because human cognition and learning often rely on the narrative structure of stories – with actors, goals, and immediate (proximate) rather than ultimate (distal) causation (see also proximate and ultimate causation) – some minimal level of teleology might be recognized as useful or at least tolerable for practical purposes even by people who reject its cosmologic accuracy. Its accuracy is upheld by Barrow and Tipler (1986), whose citations of such teleologists as Max Planck and Norbert Wiener are significant for scientific endeavor.^[26]

Biology

Apparent teleology is a recurring issue in evolutionary biology,^[27] much to the consternation of some writers.^[22]

Statements implying that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. John Reiss argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as a watchmaker.^[28] Other arguments against this analogy have also been promoted by writers such as Richard Dawkins.^[29]

Some authors, like James Lennox, have argued that Darwin was a teleologist,^[30] while others, such as Michael Ghiselin, describe this claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.^[31]

Biologist philosopher Francisco Ayala has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.^[32] Karen Neander has argued that the modern concept of biological 'function' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.^[33]

Ernst Mayr states that "adaptedness ... is an a posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking".^[34] Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, Simon Hugh Piper Maddrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection".^[35] Likewise, J. B. S. Haldane says, "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public."^[36]^[37]

Cybernetics

Cybernetics is the study of the communication and control of regulatory feedback both in living beings and machines, and in combinations of the two.

Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow had conceived of feedback mechanisms as lending a teleology to machinery.^[38] Wiener coined the term cybernetics to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms".^[39] In the cybernetic classification presented by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, teleology is feedback controlled purpose.^[38]^[40]

The classification system underlying cybernetics has been criticized by Frank Honywill George and Les Johnson, who cite the need for an external observability to the purposeful behavior in order to establish and validate the goal-seeking behavior.^[41] In this view, the purpose of observing and observed systems is respectively distinguished by the system's subjective autonomy and objective control.^[41]

References

Notes

^ see also Physics, 2.5–6: where "natures" are contrasted with intelligence
^ cf. Lucretius, De rerum natura, 822–56
^ ^a ^b "The received intellectual tradition has it that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revolutionary philosophers began to curtail and reject the teleology of the medieval and scholastic Aristotelians, abandoning final causes in favor of a purely mechanistic model of the Universe." Johnson, Monte Ransom (2008), Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford University Press. pp. 23–24.

Citations

^ ^a ^b Partridge, Eric. 1977. Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English. London: Routledge, p. 4187.
^ Mahner, Martin; Bunge, Mario (2013-03-14). Foundations of Biophilosophy. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 9783662033685.
^ ^a ^b Dubray, Charles. 2020 [1912]. "Teleology". In The Catholic Encyclopedia 14. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved 3 May 2020. – via New Advent, transcribed by D. J. Potter
^ Júnior, Paulo Pereira Martins; Vasconcelos, Vitor Vieira (2011-12-09). "A teleologia e a aleatoriedade no estudo das ciências da natureza: sistemas, ontologia e evolução" [Teleology and randomness in the study of the natural sciences: systems, ontology and evolution]. Revista Internacional Interdisciplinar INTERthesis (in Portuguese). 8 (2): 316–334. doi:10.5007/1807-1384.2011v8n2p316. ISSN 1807-1384.
^ Allen, Colin (2003). "Teleological Notions in Biology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
^ Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a9–17
^ Wolff, Christian (1732) [1728]. Philosophia Rationalis Sive Logica: Methodo Scientifica Pertractata Et Ad Usum Scientiarum Atque Vitae Aptata. Frankfurt and Leipzig. Retrieved 2014-11-20.
^ ^a ^b Phaedo, Plato, 98–99
^ Phaedo, Plato, 99b
^ Timaeus, Plato, 46c9–d4, 69e6.
^ Timaeus, Plato, 27d8–29a.
^ Hardie, R. P., and R. K. Gaye, trans. 2007. "Aristotle – Physics". pp. 602–852 in Aristotle - Works, edited by W. D. Ross. Internet Archive (open source full text). pp. 640–644, 649.
^ Lyotard, Jean-François. 1979. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
^ Lochhead, Judy. 2000. Postmodern Music/Postmodern Thought. ISBN 0-8153-3820-1. p. 6.
^ MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR (2022). AFTER VIRTUE : a study in moral theory. [S.l.]: UNIV OF NOTRE DAME PRESS. ISBN 978-0-268-20405-1. OCLC 1287994331.
^ Brooks, Leonard J., and Paul Dunn. 2009. Brooks, Leonard J.; Dunn, Paul (31 March 2009). Business & Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives & Accountants. Cengage Learning. ISBN 9780324594553. Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-324-59455-3. p. 149.
^ Sugarman, Jeremy, and Daniel P. Sulmasy (2001). Methods in Medical Ethics. Georgetown University Press. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-87840-873-3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^ John Gray, Ed. (1998). John Stuart Mill On Liberty And Other Essays. Oxford University Press. p. ix. ISBN 0-19-283384-7.
^ ^a ^b von Mises, Ludwig. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. Princeton, NJ: David Van Nostrand. – via Mises Institute. Available in other formats.
^ ^a ^b Gonce, R. A. Natural Law and Ludwig von Mises' Praxeology and Economic Science. Chattanooga, TN: Southern Economic Association.
^ Berki, R. N. On the Nature and Origins of Marx's Concept of Labor. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
^ ^a ^b Hanke, David (2004). "Teleology: The explanation that bedevils biology". In John Cornwell (ed.). Explanations: Styles of explanation in science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 143–155. ISBN 0-19-860778-4. Retrieved 18 July 2010.
^ Simpson, W.M.R (2021). "Cosmic Hylomorphism: a powerist ontology of quantum mechanics". European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 11 (28): 28. doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00342-5. PMC 7831748. PMID 33520035.
^ von Foerster, Heinz. 1992. "Cybernetics". p. 310 in Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence 1, edited by S. C. Shapiro. ISBN 9780471503071.
^ Nagel, Thomas. 2012. Mind and Cosmos. Oxford University Press.
^ Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. 1986. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198519492.
^ Ruse, M., and J. Travis, eds. 2009. Evolution: The First Four Billion Years. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. p. 364.
^ Reiss, John O. 2009. Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker. Berkeley: University of California Press. ^{[page needed]}
^ Dawkins, Richard. 1987. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design. New York: W W Norton & Company.
^ Lennox, James G. (1993). "Darwin was a Teleologist". Biology & Philosophy 8:409–21.
^ Ghiselin, Michael T. (1994). "Darwin's language may seem teleological, but his thinking is another matter". Biology & Philosophy. 9 (4): 489–492. doi:10.1007/BF00850377. S2CID 170997321.
^ Ayala, Francisco (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology". Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
^ Neander, Karen. 1998. "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense". pp. 313–333 in Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology, edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
^ Mayr, Ernst W. 1992. "The idea of teleology". Journal of the History of Ideas 53:117–35.
^ Madrell, S. H. P. 1998. "Why are there no insects in the open sea?" The Journal of Experimental Biology 201:2461–64.
^ Hull, D. 1973. Philosophy of Biological Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
^ Mayr, Ernst. 1974. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science XIV pp. 91–117.
^ ^a ^b Rosenblueth, Arturo; Wiener, Norbert; Bigelow, Julian (1943-01-01). "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology". Philosophy of Science. 10 (1): 18–24. doi:10.1086/286788. ISSN 0031-8248. S2CID 16179485.
^ Wiener, Norbert. 1948. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine.
^ Conway, Patrick (1974). Development of volitional competence. MSS Information Corp. p. 60. ISBN 0-8422-0424-5.
^ ^a ^b George, Frank Honywill; Johnson, Les (1985). Purposive behavior and teleological explanations. Gordon and Breach. pp. xII. ISBN 2881241107.

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Short description|Thinking in terms of destiny or purpose}}
+[[File:Sanzio 01 Plato Aristotle.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|[[Plato]] (left) and [[Aristotle]], depicted here in ''[[The School of Athens]]'', both developed philosophical arguments addressing the universe's apparent order (''[[logos]]'')]]
-{{Multiple issues|
-{{Original research|date=April 2022}}
-{{Lead rewrite|date=August 2022}}
-}}
-[[File:Sanzio 01 Plato Aristotle.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|[[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], depicted here in ''[[The School of Athens]]'', both developed philosophical arguments addressing the universe's apparent order (''[[logos]]'')]]
-'''Teleology''' (from {{Lang-grc|τέλος|lit=end,' 'aim,' or 'goal,|translit=[[telos (philosophy)|telos]]|label=none}} and {{Lang-grc|λόγος|label=none|lit=explanation' or 'reason|translit=[[-logy|logos]]}})<ref name=":0">Partridge, Eric. 1977. [https://books.google.com/books?id=xA9dxrhfa5kC ''Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English'']. London: Routledge, p. 4187.</ref> or '''finality'''<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2rJ9CAAAQBAJ&q=%22teleology+or+finality%22&pg=PA368|title=Foundations of Biophilosophy|last1=Mahner|first1=Martin|last2=Bunge|first2=Mario|date=2013-03-14|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|isbn=9783662033685|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":1">Dubray, Charles. 2020 [1912]. "[https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14474a.htm Teleology]." In ''The Catholic Encyclopedia'' 14. New York: [[Robert Appleton Company]]. Retrieved 3 May 2020. – via ''[[New Advent]]'', transcribed by D. J. Potter</ref> is a reason or an explanation for something which serves as a function of its end, its purpose, or its goal, as opposed to something which serves as a function of its cause.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Júnior|first1=Paulo Pereira Martins|last2=Vasconcelos|first2=Vitor Vieira|date=2011-12-09|title=A teleologia e a aleatoriedade no estudo das ciências da natureza: sistemas, ontologia e evolução|trans-title=Teleology and randomness in the study of the natural sciences: systems, ontology and evolution|url=https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/interthesis/article/view/15788|journal=Revista Internacional Interdisciplinar INTERthesis|language=pt|volume=8|issue=2|pages=316–334|doi=10.5007/1807-1384.2011v8n2p316|issn=1807-1384|doi-access=free}}</ref>
+'''Teleology''' (from {{Langx|grc|τέλος|lit=end', 'aim', or 'goal|translit=[[telos (philosophy)|telos]]|label=none}}, and {{Langx|grc|λόγος|label=none|lit=explanation' or 'reason|translit=[[-logy|logos]]}})<ref name=":0">Partridge, Eric. 1977. [https://books.google.com/books?id=xA9dxrhfa5kC ''Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English'']. London: Routledge, p. 4187.</ref> or '''finality'''<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2rJ9CAAAQBAJ&q=%22teleology+or+finality%22&pg=PA368|title=Foundations of Biophilosophy|last1=Mahner|first1=Martin|last2=Bunge|first2=Mario|date=2013-03-14|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|isbn=9783662033685|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":1">Dubray, Charles. 2020 [1912]. "[https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14474a.htm Teleology]". In ''The Catholic Encyclopedia'' 14. New York: [[Robert Appleton Company]]. Retrieved 3 May 2020. – via ''[[New Advent]]'', transcribed by D. J. Potter</ref> is a branch of [[Causality|causality]] giving the reason or an explanation for something as a function of its end, its purpose, or its goal, as opposed to as a function of its cause.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Júnior|first1=Paulo Pereira Martins|last2=Vasconcelos|first2=Vitor Vieira|date=2011-12-09|title=A teleologia e a aleatoriedade no estudo das ciências da natureza: sistemas, ontologia e evolução|trans-title=Teleology and randomness in the study of the natural sciences: systems, ontology and evolution|url=https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/interthesis/article/view/15788|journal=Revista Internacional Interdisciplinar INTERthesis|language=pt|volume=8|issue=2|pages=316–334|doi=10.5007/1807-1384.2011v8n2p316|issn=1807-1384|doi-access=free}}</ref> [[James Wood (encyclopaedist)|James Wood]], in his ''[[The Nuttall Encyclopædia|Nuttall Encyclopaedia]]'', explained the meaning of ''teleology'' as "the doctrine of final causes, particularly the argument for the being and character of God from the being and character of His works; that the end reveals His purpose from the beginning, the end being regarded as the thought of God at the beginning, or the universe viewed as the realisation of Him and His eternal purpose."
-A purpose that is imposed by human use, such as the purpose of a fork to hold food, is called ''[[Intrinsic and extrinsic properties (philosophy)|extrinsic]]''.<ref name=":1" /> ''Natural teleology,'' common in [[classical philosophy]], though controversial today,<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Teleological Notions in Biology|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/|last=Allen|first=Colin|date=2003|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> contends that natural entities also have ''intrinsic'' purposes, regardless of human use or opinion. For instance, [[Aristotle]] claimed that an acorn's intrinsic ''[[telos (philosophy)|telos]]'' is to become a fully grown oak tree.<ref>[[Aristotle]], ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', 1050a9–17</ref> Though ancient [[atomist]]s rejected the notion of natural teleology, teleological accounts of non-personal or non-human nature were explored and often endorsed in ancient and medieval philosophies, but fell into disfavor during the modern era (1600–1900).
+A purpose that is imposed by human use, such as the purpose of a fork to hold food, is called ''[[Intrinsic and extrinsic properties (philosophy)|extrinsic]]''.<ref name=":1" /> ''Natural teleology'', common in [[classical philosophy]], though controversial today,<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Teleological Notions in Biology|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/|last=Allen|first=Colin|date=2003|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> contends that natural entities also have ''intrinsic'' purposes, regardless of human use or opinion. For instance, [[Aristotle]] claimed that an acorn's intrinsic ''[[telos (philosophy)|telos]]'' is to become a fully grown oak tree.<ref>[[Aristotle]], ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', 1050a9–17</ref> Though ancient [[atomist]]s rejected the notion of natural teleology, teleological accounts of non-personal or non-human nature were explored and often endorsed in ancient and medieval philosophies, but fell into disfavor during the modern era (1600–1900).
+== History ==
-In the late 18th century, [[Immanuel Kant]] used the concept of telos as a regulative principle in his ''[[Critique of Judgment]]'' (1790).
-Contemporary philosophers and scientists still debate whether teleological [[axiom]]s are useful or accurate in proposing modern philosophies and scientific theories. An example of the reintroduction of teleology into modern language is the notion of an ''[[attractor]]''.<ref>[[Heinz von Foerster|von Foerster, Heinz]]. 1992. "Cybernetics." P. 310 in [https://books.google.com/books?id=fKURAQAAMAAJ&q=Teleology+modern+dress+attractors ''Encyclopedia of Artificial'' Intelligence] 1, edited by S. C. Shapiro. {{ISBN|9780471503071}}.</ref> Another instance is when [[Thomas Nagel]] (2012), though not a biologist, proposed a non-[[Darwinism|Darwinian]] account of [[evolution]] that incorporates impersonal and natural teleological laws to explain the existence of life, [[consciousness]], [[rationality]], and objective value.<ref>[[Thomas Nagel|Nagel, Thomas.]] 2012. ''[[Mind and Cosmos]].'' [[Oxford University Press]].</ref> {{Anchor|Pedagogical_allowances}} Regardless, the accuracy can also be considered independently from the usefulness: it is a common experience in [[pedagogy]] that a minimum of apparent teleology can be useful in thinking about and explaining Darwinian evolution even if there is no true teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharp [[canine tooth|canine teeth]] because those teeth "serve the purpose of" [[predation]] regardless of whether there is an underlying non-teleologic reality in which evolution is not an actor with intentions. In other words, because human [[cognition]] and [[learning]] often rely on the narrative structure of stories – with actors, goals, and immediate (proximate) rather than ultimate (distal) causation (see also [[proximate and ultimate causation]]) – some minimal level of teleology might be recognized as useful or at least tolerable for practical purposes even by people who reject its [[cosmology|cosmologic]] accuracy. Its accuracy is upheld by Barrow and Tipler (1986), whose citations of such teleologists as [[Max Planck]] and [[Norbert Wiener]] are significant for scientific endeavor.<ref>Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. 1986. ''The Anthropic Cosmological Principle''. New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|9780198519492}}.</ref>
-==History==
 In [[Western philosophy]], the term and concept of ''teleology'' originated in the writings of [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]]. Aristotle's '[[four causes]]' give special place to the telos or "final cause" of each ''thing''. In this, he followed Plato in seeing purpose in both human and nonhuman nature.
-===Etymology===
+=== Etymology ===
-The word ''teleology'' combines [[Ancient Greek|Greek]] ''telos'' ({{Lang-grc|{{wikt-lang|en|τέλος}}|label=none}}, from {{Lang-grc|τελε-|label=none|lit=end' or 'purpose}})<ref name=":0" /> and ''logia'' ({{Lang-grc|{{wikt-lang|en|-λογία}}|label=none|lit=speak of', 'study of', or 'a branch of learning"}}). [[German philosophy|German philosopher]] [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] would coin the term, as {{Lang-la|teleologia|label=none}} (Latin), in his work ''Philosophia rationalis, sive logica'' (1728).<ref>
+The word ''teleology'' combines [[Ancient Greek|Greek]] {{Lang|grc-latn|telos}} ({{Langx|grc|{{wikt-lang|en|τέλος}}|label=none}}, from {{Langx|grc|τελε-|label=none|lit=end' or 'purpose}})<ref name=":0" /> and {{Lang|grc-latn|logia}} ({{Langx|grc|{{wikt-lang|en|-λογία}}|label=none|lit=speak of', 'study of', or 'a branch of learning}}). [[German philosophy|German philosopher]] [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] would coin the term, as {{Langx|la|teleologia|label=none}} (Latin), in his work {{Lang|la|Philosophia rationalis, sive logica}} (1728).<ref>
 {{cite book|last1=Wolff|first1=Christian|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uQg_AAAAcAAJ|title=Philosophia Rationalis Sive Logica: Methodo Scientifica Pertractata Et Ad Usum Scientiarum Atque Vitae Aptata|year=1732|location=Frankfurt and Leipzig|author-link1=Christian Wolff (philosopher)|access-date=2014-11-20|orig-year=1728}}
 </ref>
-===Platonic===
+=== Platonic ===
 In [[Plato|Plato's]] dialogue ''[[Phaedo]]'', [[Socrates]] argues that true explanations for any given physical phenomenon must be teleological. He bemoans those who fail to distinguish between a thing's necessary and sufficient causes, which he identifies respectively as [[Four causes#Material cause|material]] and [[Four causes#Final cause|final]] causes:<ref name=":2">''[[Phaedo]]'', [[Plato]], 98–99</ref>
 {{blockquote|Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause, from that without which the cause would not be able to act, as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could be at this very time, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will sometime discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and 'binding' binds and holds them together.|Plato|title=''[[Phaedo]]''|source=99}}
-Socrates here argues that while the materials that compose a body are necessary conditions for its moving or acting in a certain way, they nevertheless cannot be the ''sufficient'' condition for its moving or acting as it does. For example,<ref name=":2" /> if Socrates is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting, and so a physical description of his tendons can be listed as ''necessary conditions'' or ''auxiliary causes'' of his act of sitting.<ref>''[[Phaedo]]'', Plato, 99b</ref><ref>''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'', Plato, 46c9–d4, 69e6.</ref> However, these are only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting. To give a physical description of Socrates' body is to say ''that'' Socrates is sitting, but it does not give any idea why ''it came to be'' that he was sitting in the first place. To say why he was sitting and not ''not'' sitting, it is necessary to explain what it is about his sitting that is ''good'', for all things brought about (i.e., all products of actions) are brought about because the actor saw some good in them. Thus, to give an explanation of something is to determine what about it is good. Its goodness is its ''actual cause''—its purpose, ''[[telos (philosophy)|telos]]'' or "reason for which."<ref>''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'', Plato, 27d8–29a.</ref>
+Socrates here argues that while the materials that compose a body are necessary conditions for its moving or acting in a certain way, they nevertheless cannot be the ''sufficient'' condition for its moving or acting as it does. For example,<ref name=":2" /> if Socrates is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting, and so a physical description of his tendons can be listed as ''necessary conditions'' or ''auxiliary causes'' of his act of sitting.<ref>''[[Phaedo]]'', Plato, 99b</ref><ref>''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'', Plato, 46c9–d4, 69e6.</ref> However, these are only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting. To give a physical description of Socrates' body is to say ''that'' Socrates is sitting, but it does not give any idea why ''it came to be'' that he was sitting in the first place. To say why he was sitting and not ''not'' sitting, it is necessary to explain what it is about his sitting that is ''good'', for all things brought about (i.e., all products of actions) are brought about because the actor saw some good in them. Thus, to give an explanation of something is to determine what about it is good. Its goodness is its ''actual cause''—its purpose, ''[[telos (philosophy)|telos]]'' or 'reason for which'.<ref>''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'', Plato, 27d8–29a.</ref>
-===Aristotelian===
+=== Aristotelian ===
 [[Aristotle]] argued that [[Democritus]] was wrong to attempt to reduce all things to mere necessity, because doing so neglects the aim, order, and "final cause", which brings about these necessary conditions:
-{{blockquote|Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now, they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end.…|Aristotle|title=''[[Generation of Animals]]'' 5.8|source=789a8–b15}}
+{{blockquote|Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now, they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end.&nbsp;...|Aristotle|title=''[[Generation of Animals]]'' 5.8|source=789a8–b15}}
-In ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'', using the [[Hylomorphism|hylomorphic theory]], (using eternal [[Platonic form|forms]] as his model{{Dubious|date=July 2021}}), Aristotle rejects Plato's assumption that the universe was created by an intelligent designer. For Aristotle, natural ends are produced by "natures" (principles of change internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle argued, do not deliberate:<ref>Hardie, R. P., and R. K. Gaye, trans. 2007. "Aristotle - Physics." Pp. 602–852 in ''[https://archive.org/details/AristotleOrganon Aristotle - Works]'', edited by W. D. Ross. [[Internet Archive]] ([[open source]] full text). pp.&nbsp;[[iarchive:AristotleOrganon/page/n640/mode/2up|640]]–644, [[iarchive:AristotleOrganon/page/n647/mode/2up|649]].</ref>
+In ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'', using the [[Hylomorphism|hylomorphic theory]], (using eternal [[Platonic form|forms]] as his model{{Dubious|date=July 2021}}), Aristotle rejects Plato's assumption that the universe was created by an intelligent designer. For Aristotle, natural ends are produced by "natures" (principles of change internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle argued, do not deliberate:<ref>Hardie, R. P., and R. K. Gaye, trans. 2007. "Aristotle – Physics". pp. 602–852 in ''[https://archive.org/details/AristotleOrganon Aristotle - Works]'', edited by W. D. Ross. [[Internet Archive]] ([[open source]] full text). pp.&nbsp;[[iarchive:AristotleOrganon/page/n640/mode/2up|640]]–644, [[iarchive:AristotleOrganon/page/n647/mode/2up|649]].</ref>
 {{blockquote|It is absurd to suppose that ends are not present [in nature] because we do not see an agent deliberating.|Aristotle|title=''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]''|source=2.8, 199b27-9<ref group=lower-roman>see also ''Physics'', 2.5–6: where "natures" are contrasted with intelligence</ref>}}
@@ Line 48: / Line 40: @@
 The chief instance, and the largest polemic morass, of teleological viewpoint in modern cosmology and ontology is the [[teleological argument]] that posits an [[intelligent designer]] as a [[god]].
+== Postmodern philosophy ==
-==Economics==
+Teleological-based "[[grand narrative]]s" are renounced by the [[Postmodernism|postmodern]] tradition,<ref>[[Jean-François Lyotard|Lyotard, Jean-François]]. 1979. [[The Postmodern Condition|''The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge'']].</ref> where teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary, and harmful to those whose stories are diminished or overlooked.<ref>Lochhead, Judy. 2000. ''Postmodern Music/Postmodern Thought''. {{ISBN|0-8153-3820-1}}. p. 6.</ref>
-A teleology of human aims played a crucial role in the work of [[economist]] [[Ludwig von Mises]], especially in the development of his science of ''[[praxeology]]''. Mises believed that an individual's action is teleological because it is governed by the existence of their chosen ends.<ref name=":4">[[Ludwig von Mises|von Mises, Ludwig]]. ''[https://cdn.mises.org/Ultimate%20Foundation%20of%20Economic%20Science_3.pdf The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science]''. Princeton, NJ: [[David Van Nostrand]]. – via [[Mises Institute]]. [https://mises.org/library/ultimate-foundation-economic-science Available in other formats].</ref> In other words, individuals select what they believe to be the most appropriate means to achieve a sought after goal or end. Mises also stressed that, with respect to human action, teleology is not independent of causality: "No action can be devised and ventured upon without definite ideas about the relation of cause and effect, teleology presupposes causality."<ref name=":4" />
+Against this postmodern position, [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] has argued that a narrative understanding of oneself, of one's capacity as an independent reasoner, one's dependence on others and on the social practices and traditions in which one participates, all tend towards an ultimate good of liberation. Social practices may themselves be understood as teleologically oriented to internal goods, for example, practices of philosophical and scientific inquiry are teleologically ordered to the elaboration of a true understanding of their objects. MacIntyre's ''[[After Virtue]]'' (1981) famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology of Aristotle's "metaphysical biology", but he has cautiously moved from that book's account of a sociological teleology toward an exploration of what remains valid in a more traditional teleological naturalism.<ref name="MACINTYRE 2022 p.">{{cite book |last=MACINTYRE |first=ALASDAIR |title=AFTER VIRTUE : a study in moral theory. |date=2022 |publisher=UNIV OF NOTRE DAME PRESS |isbn=978-0-268-20405-1 |publication-place=[S.l.] |page= |oclc=1287994331}}</ref>
-Assuming reason and action to be predominantly influenced by ideological credence, Mises derived his portrayal of human motivation from [[Epicureanism|Epicurean teachings]], insofar as he assumes "atomistic individualism, teleology, and libertarianism, and defines man as an egoist who seeks a maximum of happiness" (i.e. the ultimate pursuit of pleasure over pain).<ref name=" Gonce ">Gonce, R. A. ''Natural Law and Ludwig von Mises' Praxeology and Economic Science''. Chattanooga, TN: Southern Economic Association.</ref> "Man strives for," Mises remarks, "but never attains the perfect state of happiness described by [[Epicurus]]."<ref name=" Gonce " /> Furthermore, expanding upon the Epicurean groundwork, Mises formalized his conception of pleasure and pain by assigning each specific meaning, allowing him to extrapolate his conception of attainable happiness to a critique of liberal versus socialist ideological societies. It is there, in his application of Epicurean belief to political theory, that Mises flouts Marxist theory, considering labor to be one of many of man's 'pains', a consideration which positioned labor as a violation of his original Epicurean assumption of man's manifest hedonistic pursuit. From here he further postulates a critical distinction between [https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Introversive_labor introversive labor] and [https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Extroversive_labor extroversive labor], further divaricating from basic Marxist theory, in which Marx hails labor as man's "[[Marx's theory of human nature|species-essence]]", or his "species-activity".<ref>[[R. N. Berki|Berki, R. N.]] ''On the Nature and Origins of Marx's Concept of Labor''. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.</ref>
+== Ethics ==
-==Postmodern philosophy==
-Teleological-based "[[grand narrative]]s" are renounced by the [[Postmodernism|postmodern]] tradition,<ref>[[Jean-François Lyotard|Lyotard, Jean-François]]. 1979. [[The Postmodern Condition|''The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge'']].</ref> where teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary, and harmful to those whose stories are diminished or overlooked.<ref>Lochhead, Judy. 2000. ''Postmodern Music/Postmodern Thought.'' {{ISBN|0-8153-3820-1}}. p. 6.</ref>
-Against this postmodern position, [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] has argued that a narrative understanding of oneself, of one's capacity as an independent reasoner, one's dependence on others and on the social practices and traditions in which one participates, all tend towards an ultimate good of liberation. Social practices may themselves be understood as teleologically oriented to internal goods, for example, practices of philosophical and scientific inquiry are teleologically ordered to the elaboration of a true understanding of their objects. MacIntyre's ''[[After Virtue]]'' (1981) famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology of Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology', but he has cautiously moved from that book's account of a sociological teleology toward an exploration of what remains valid in a more traditional teleological naturalism.<ref name="MACINTYRE 2022 p.">{{cite book |last=MACINTYRE |first=ALASDAIR |title=AFTER VIRTUE : a study in moral theory. |date=2022 |publisher=UNIV OF NOTRE DAME PRESS |isbn=978-0-268-20405-1 |publication-place=[S.l.] |page= |oclc=1287994331}}</ref>
-==Ethics==
 Teleology significantly informs the study of [[ethic]]s, such as in:
+* '''Business ethics''': People in business commonly think in terms of purposeful action, as in, for example, [[management by objectives]]. Teleological analysis of [[business ethics]] leads to consideration of the full range of [[Stakeholder (corporate)|stakeholder]]s in any business decision, including the management, the staff, the customers, the shareholders, the country, humanity and the environment.<ref>Brooks, Leonard J., and Paul Dunn. 2009. {{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9x5Yj3nApN4C&pg=PT169|title=Business & Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives & Accountants|isbn=9780324594553|url-access=limited|last1=Brooks|first1=Leonard J.|last2=Dunn|first2=Paul|date=31 March 2009|publisher=Cengage Learning }} [[Cengage|Cengage Learning]]. {{ISBN|978-0-324-59455-3}}. p. 149.</ref>
-* '''Business ethics''': People in business commonly think in terms of purposeful action, as in, for example, [[management by objectives]]. Teleological analysis of [[business ethics]] leads to consideration of the full range of [[Stakeholder (corporate)|stakeholder]]s in any business decision, including the management, the staff, the customers, the shareholders, the country, humanity and the environment.<ref>Brooks, Leonard J., and Paul Dunn. 2009. {{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9x5Yj3nApN4C&pg=PT169|title=Business & Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives & Accountants|isbn=9780324594553|url-access=limited|last1=Brooks|first1=Leonard J.|last2=Dunn|first2=Paul|date=31 March 2009}} [[Cengage|Cengage Learning]]. {{ISBN|978-0-324-59455-3}}. p. 149.</ref>
 * '''Medical ethics''': Teleology provides a moral basis for the professional ethics of medicine, as physicians are generally concerned with outcomes and must therefore know the ''telos'' of a given treatment paradigm.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Sugarman, Jeremy, and Daniel P. Sulmasy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-5a0nza21ZMC&pg=PA78|title=Methods in Medical Ethics|publisher=Georgetown University Press|year=2001|isbn=978-0-87840-873-3|page=78|url-access=limited}}</ref>
-===Consequentialism===
+=== Consequentialism ===
 {{Main|Consequentialism}}
-The broad spectrum of [[Consequentialism|''consequentialist'' ethics]]—of which [[utilitarianism]] is a well-known example—focuses on the result or consequences, with such principles as [[John Stuart Mill]]'s 'principle of utility': "the greatest good for the greatest number." This principle is thus teleological, though in a broader sense than is elsewhere understood in philosophy.
+The broad spectrum of [[Consequentialism|''consequentialist'' ethics]]—of which [[utilitarianism]] is a well-known example—focuses on the result or consequences, with such principles as [[John Stuart Mill]]'s 'principle of utility': "the greatest good for the greatest number". This principle is thus teleological, though in a broader sense than is elsewhere understood in philosophy.
 In the classical notion, teleology is grounded in the inherent nature of things themselves, whereas in ''consequentialism'', teleology is imposed on nature from outside by the human will. Consequentialist theories justify inherently what most people would call evil acts by their desirable outcomes, if the good of the outcome outweighs the bad of the act. So, for example, a consequentialist theory would say it was acceptable to kill one person in order to save two or more other people. These theories may be summarized by the maxim "{{Wikt-lang|en|the end justifies the means}}."
@@ Line 79: / Line 65: @@
 '''Practical ethics''' are usually a mix of the two. For example, Mill also relies on deontic maxims to guide practical behavior, but they must be justifiable by the principle of utility.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/onlibertyotheres00mill |url-access=registration |title=John Stuart Mill On Liberty And Other Essays |author=John Gray, Ed. |page=ix |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-283384-7 |year=1998 }}</ref>
-==Science==
+== Economics ==
+A teleology of human aims played a crucial role in the work of [[economist]] [[Ludwig von Mises]], especially in the development of his science of ''[[praxeology]]''. Mises believed that an individual's action is teleological because it is governed by the existence of their chosen ends.<ref name=":4">[[Ludwig von Mises|von Mises, Ludwig]]. ''[https://cdn.mises.org/Ultimate%20Foundation%20of%20Economic%20Science_3.pdf The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science]''. Princeton, NJ: [[David Van Nostrand]]. – via [[Mises Institute]]. [https://mises.org/library/ultimate-foundation-economic-science Available in other formats].</ref> In other words, individuals select what they believe to be the most appropriate means to achieve a sought after goal or end. Mises also stressed that, with respect to human action, teleology is not independent of causality: "No action can be devised and ventured upon without definite ideas about the relation of cause and effect, teleology presupposes causality."<ref name=":4" />
+Assuming reason and action to be predominantly influenced by ideological credence, Mises derived his portrayal of human motivation from [[Epicureanism|Epicurean teachings]], insofar as he assumes "atomistic individualism, teleology, and libertarianism, and defines man as an egoist who seeks a maximum of happiness" (i.e. the ultimate pursuit of pleasure over pain).<ref name=" Gonce ">Gonce, R. A. ''Natural Law and Ludwig von Mises' Praxeology and Economic Science''. Chattanooga, TN: Southern Economic Association.</ref> "Man strives for," Mises remarks, "but never attains the perfect state of happiness described by [[Epicurus]]."<ref name=" Gonce " /> Furthermore, expanding upon the Epicurean groundwork, Mises formalized his conception of pleasure and pain by assigning each specific meaning, allowing him to extrapolate his conception of attainable happiness to a critique of liberal versus socialist ideological societies. It is there, in his application of Epicurean belief to political theory, that Mises flouts Marxist theory, considering labor to be one of many of man's 'pains', a consideration which positioned labor as a violation of his original Epicurean assumption of man's manifest hedonistic pursuit. From here he further postulates a critical distinction between introversive labor and extroversive labor, further divaricating from basic Marxist theory, in which Marx hails labor as man's "[[Marx's theory of human nature|species-essence]]", or his "species-activity".<ref>[[R. N. Berki|Berki, R. N.]] ''On the Nature and Origins of Marx's Concept of Labor''. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.</ref>
+== Science ==
 {{See also|Four causes#The four causes in modern science}}
@@ Line 88: / Line 79: @@
 Since the ''[[Novum Organum]]'' of [[Francis Bacon]], teleological explanations in [[Outline of physical science|physical science]] tend to be deliberately avoided in favor of focus on material and efficient explanations, although some recent accounts of quantum phenomena make use of teleology.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Simpson|first=W.M.R|title=Cosmic Hylomorphism: a powerist ontology of quantum mechanics|date=2021|journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Science|volume=11|issue=28|page=28|doi=10.1007/s13194-020-00342-5|pmid=33520035|pmc=7831748}}</ref> Final and formal causation came to be viewed as false or too subjective.<ref name="aristotle" group="lower-roman" /> Nonetheless, some disciplines, in particular within [[evolutionary biology]], continue to use language that appears teleological in describing natural tendencies towards certain end conditions. Some{{Who|date=May 2020}} suggest, however, that these arguments ought to be, and practicably can be, rephrased in non-teleological forms; others hold that teleological language cannot always be ''easily'' expunged from descriptions in the life sciences, at least within the bounds of practical [[pedagogy]].
+Contemporary philosophers and scientists still debate whether teleological [[axiom]]s are useful or accurate in proposing modern philosophies and scientific theories. An example of the reintroduction of teleology into modern language is the notion of an ''[[attractor]]''.<ref>[[Heinz von Foerster|von Foerster, Heinz]]. 1992. "Cybernetics". p. 310 in [https://books.google.com/books?id=fKURAQAAMAAJ&q=Teleology+modern+dress+attractors ''Encyclopedia of Artificial'' Intelligence] 1, edited by S. C. Shapiro. {{ISBN|9780471503071}}.</ref> Another instance is when [[Thomas Nagel]] (2012), though not a biologist, proposed a non-[[Darwinism|Darwinian]] account of [[evolution]] that incorporates impersonal and natural teleological laws to explain the existence of life, [[consciousness]], [[rationality]], and objective value.<ref>[[Thomas Nagel|Nagel, Thomas.]] 2012. ''[[Mind and Cosmos]]''. [[Oxford University Press]].</ref> {{Anchor|Pedagogical_allowances}} Regardless, the accuracy can also be considered independently from the usefulness: it is a common experience in [[pedagogy]] that a minimum of apparent teleology can be useful in thinking about and explaining Darwinian evolution even if there is no true teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharp [[canine tooth|canine teeth]] because those teeth "serve the purpose of" [[predation]] regardless of whether there is an underlying non-teleologic reality in which evolution is not an actor with intentions. In other words, because human [[cognition]] and [[learning]] often rely on the narrative structure of stories – with actors, goals, and immediate (proximate) rather than ultimate (distal) causation (see also [[proximate and ultimate causation]]) – some minimal level of teleology might be recognized as useful or at least tolerable for practical purposes even by people who reject its [[cosmology|cosmologic]] accuracy. Its accuracy is upheld by Barrow and Tipler (1986), whose citations of such teleologists as [[Max Planck]] and [[Norbert Wiener]] are significant for scientific endeavor.<ref>Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. 1986. ''The Anthropic Cosmological Principle''. New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|9780198519492}}.</ref>
-===Biology===
+=== Biology ===
 {{Main|Teleology in biology}}
 Apparent teleology is a recurring issue in [[evolutionary biology]],<ref>Ruse, M., and J. Travis, eds. 2009. ''Evolution: The First Four Billion Years''. Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press|Belknap Press]]. p. 364.</ref> much to the consternation of some writers.<ref name="Hanke2004"/>
-Statements implying that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival, appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. John Reiss argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as a [[watchmaker analogy|watchmaker]].<ref>Reiss, John O. 2009. ''Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker''. Berkeley: [[University of California Press]]. {{Page needed|date=September 2011}}</ref> Other arguments against this analogy have also been promoted by writers such as [[Richard Dawkins]].<ref>[[Richard Dawkins|Dawkins, Richard]]. 1987. ''The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design''. New York: [[W. W. Norton & Company|W W Norton & Company]].</ref>
+Statements implying that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. John Reiss argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as a [[watchmaker analogy|watchmaker]].<ref>Reiss, John O. 2009. ''Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker''. Berkeley: [[University of California Press]]. {{Page needed|date=September 2011}}</ref> Other arguments against this analogy have also been promoted by writers such as [[Richard Dawkins]].<ref>[[Richard Dawkins|Dawkins, Richard]]. 1987. ''The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design''. New York: [[W. W. Norton & Company|W W Norton & Company]].</ref>
-Some authors, like [[James G. Lennox|James Lennox]], have argued that [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] was a teleologist,<ref>[[James G. Lennox|Lennox, James G.]] (1993). "Darwin was a Teleologist." ''[[Biology & Philosophy]]'' 8:409–21.</ref> while others, such as [[Michael Ghiselin]], describe this claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ghiselin|first1=Michael T.|author-link=Michael Ghiselin|year=1994|title=Darwin's language may seem teleological, but his thinking is another matter|journal=[[Biology & Philosophy]]|volume=9|issue=4|pages=489–492|doi=10.1007/BF00850377|s2cid=170997321}}</ref>
+Some authors, like [[James G. Lennox|James Lennox]], have argued that [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] was a teleologist,<ref>[[James G. Lennox|Lennox, James G.]] (1993). "Darwin was a Teleologist". ''[[Biology & Philosophy]]'' 8:409–21.</ref> while others, such as [[Michael Ghiselin]], describe this claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ghiselin|first1=Michael T.|author-link=Michael Ghiselin|year=1994|title=Darwin's language may seem teleological, but his thinking is another matter|journal=[[Biology & Philosophy]]|volume=9|issue=4|pages=489–492|doi=10.1007/BF00850377|s2cid=170997321}}</ref>
-Biologist philosopher [[Francisco J. Ayala|Francisco Ayala]] has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.<ref name="Ayala 1998">[[Francisco J. Ayala|Ayala, Francisco]] (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology." ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology''. Cambridge: [[MIT Press]].</ref> [[Karen Neander]] has argued that the modern concept of biological '[[Biological functionalism|function]]' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.<ref>[[Karen Neander|Neander, Karen]]. 1998. "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense." Pp. 313–33 in ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology'', edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder. Cambridge, MA: [[MIT Press]].</ref>
+Biologist philosopher [[Francisco J. Ayala|Francisco Ayala]] has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.<ref name="Ayala 1998">[[Francisco J. Ayala|Ayala, Francisco]] (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology". ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology''. Cambridge: [[MIT Press]].</ref> [[Karen Neander]] has argued that the modern concept of biological '[[Biological functionalism|function]]' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.<ref>[[Karen Neander|Neander, Karen]]. 1998. "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense". pp. 313–333 in ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology'', edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder. Cambridge, MA: [[MIT Press]].</ref>
-[[Ernst Mayr]] states that "adaptedness…is an ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' result rather than an ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' goal-seeking."<ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst W.]] 1992. "The idea of teleology." ''[[Journal of the History of Ideas]]'' 53:117–35.</ref> Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, [[Simon Hugh Piper Maddrell]] writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection."<ref>Madrell, S. H. P. 1998. "Why are there no insects in the open sea?" ''[[The Journal of Experimental Biology]]'' 201:2461–64.</ref> Likewise, [[J. B. S. Haldane]] says, "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public."<ref>Hull, D. 1973. ''Philosophy of Biological Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series.'' Englewood Cliffs, NJ: [[Prentice Hall]].</ref><ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst]]. 1974. ''Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science'' XIV pp. 91–117.</ref>
+[[Ernst Mayr]] states that "adaptedness ... is an ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' result rather than an ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' goal-seeking".<ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst W.]] 1992. "The idea of teleology". ''[[Journal of the History of Ideas]]'' 53:117–35.</ref> Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, [[Simon Hugh Piper Maddrell]] writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection".<ref>Madrell, S. H. P. 1998. "Why are there no insects in the open sea?" ''[[The Journal of Experimental Biology]]'' 201:2461–64.</ref> Likewise, [[J. B. S. Haldane]] says, "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public."<ref>Hull, D. 1973. ''Philosophy of Biological Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series''. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: [[Prentice Hall]].</ref><ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst]]. 1974. ''Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science'' XIV pp. 91–117.</ref>
-''Selected-effects'' accounts, such as the one suggested by Neander, face objections due to their reliance on [[Etiology|etiological]] accounts, which some fields lack the resources to accommodate. Many such sciences, which study the same traits and behaviors regarded by evolutionary biology, still correctly attribute teleological functions without appeal to selection history. Corey J. Maley and [[Gualtiero Piccinini]] are proponents of one such account, which focuses instead on goal-contribution. With the objective goals of organisms being survival and inclusive fitness, Piccinini and Maley define teleological functions to be “a stable contribution by a trait (or component, activity, property) of organisms belonging to a biological population to an objective goal of those organisms.”<ref>Maley, Corey J., and [[Gualtiero Piccinini]]. 2018 [2017]. "[https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780199685509.001.0001/oso-9780199685509-chapter-11 A Unified Mechanistic Account of Teleological Functions for Psychology and Neuroscience]." Ch. 11 in ''Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science'', edited by D. M. Kaplan. [[Oxford Scholarship Online]]. {{ISBN|9780199685509}}. {{doi|10.1093/oso/9780199685509.003.0011}}</ref>
-===Cybernetics===
+=== Cybernetics ===
 {{Main|Cybernetics}}
 [[Cybernetics]] is the study of the [[communication]] and [[control theory|control]] of [[regulatory feedback]] both in living beings and machines, and in combinations of the two.
-[[Arturo Rosenblueth]], [[Norbert Wiener]], and [[Julian Bigelow]] had conceived of [[feedback|feedback mechanisms]] as lending a teleology to machinery.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last1=Rosenblueth|first1=Arturo|last2=Wiener|first2=Norbert|last3=Bigelow|first3=Julian|date=1943-01-01|title=Behavior, Purpose and Teleology|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/286788|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=10|issue=1|pages=18–24|doi=10.1086/286788|s2cid=16179485|issn=0031-8248}}</ref> Wiener coined the term ''[[cybernetics]]'' to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms."<ref>[[Norbert Wiener|Wiener, Norbert]]. 1948. ''[[Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine]]''.</ref> In the cybernetic classification presented by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, ''teleology'' is feedback controlled purpose.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{cite book |last=Conway |first=Patrick |title=Development of volitional competence |publisher=MSS Information Corp |year=1974 |pages=60 |isbn=0-8422-0424-5}}</ref>
+[[Arturo Rosenblueth]], [[Norbert Wiener]], and [[Julian Bigelow]] had conceived of [[feedback|feedback mechanisms]] as lending a teleology to machinery.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last1=Rosenblueth|first1=Arturo|last2=Wiener|first2=Norbert|last3=Bigelow|first3=Julian|date=1943-01-01|title=Behavior, Purpose and Teleology|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/286788|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=10|issue=1|pages=18–24|doi=10.1086/286788|s2cid=16179485|issn=0031-8248}}</ref> Wiener coined the term ''[[cybernetics]]'' to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms".<ref>[[Norbert Wiener|Wiener, Norbert]]. 1948. ''[[Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine]]''.</ref> In the cybernetic classification presented by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, ''teleology'' is feedback controlled purpose.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{cite book |last=Conway |first=Patrick |title=Development of volitional competence |publisher=MSS Information Corp |year=1974 |pages=60 |isbn=0-8422-0424-5}}</ref>
 The classification system underlying cybernetics has been criticized by [[Frank Honywill George]] and Les Johnson, who cite the need for an external observability to the purposeful behavior in order to establish and validate the goal-seeking behavior.<ref name=":6" /> In this view, the purpose of observing and observed systems is respectively distinguished by the system's subjective [[autonomy]] and objective control.<ref name=":6">{{cite book |last=George| first=Frank Honywill |author-link=Frank Honywill George|author2=Johnson, Les |title=Purposive behavior and teleological explanations |publisher=Gordon and Breach |pages=xII |year=1985| isbn=2881241107 }}</ref>
-==See also==
+== See also ==
 {{cols|colwidth=21em}}
 * {{annotated link|Anthropic principle}}
@@ Line 140: / Line 131: @@
 === Notes ===
-{{Reflist|group=lower-roman}}
+{{reflist|group=lower-roman}}
+=== Citations ===
-=== Citations<!--See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Footnotes for an explanation of how to generate footnotes using the <ref(erences/)> tags--> ===
 {{reflist|30em}}
-==Further reading==
+== Further reading ==
 {{div col|colwidth=30em}}
+* {{Nuttall|title=Teleology}}
 * Espinoza, Miguel.  [https://www.academia.edu/5413977/La_finalité_le_temps_et_les_principes_de_la_physique "La finalité, le temps et les principes de la physique"].
-* [[Allan Gotthelf|Gotthelf, Allan]]. 1987. "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality." In ''Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology'', edited by A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-52-131091-1|978-0-52-131091-8}}
+* [[Allan Gotthelf|Gotthelf, Allan]]. 1987. "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality". In ''Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology'', edited by A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-52-131091-1|978-0-52-131091-8}}
 * [[Max Horkheimer|Horkheimer, Max]], and [[Theodor Adorno]]. ''Dialectic of Enlightenment''. {{ISBN|0-8047-3632-4|}}
 * Johnson, Monte Ransome. 2005. ''Aristotle on Teleology''. New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-928530-6|978-0-19-928530-3}}
 * Knight, Kelvin. 2007 ''Aristotelian Philosophy: Ethics and Politics from Aristotle to MacIntyre''. New York: [[Polity Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0-7456-1977-4|0-745-61977-0}}
-* [[Georg Lukács|Lukács, Georg]]. ''History and Class Consciousness.'' {{ISBN|0-262-62020-0|}}
+* [[Georg Lukács|Lukács, Georg]]. ''History and Class Consciousness''. {{ISBN|0-262-62020-0|}}
-* MacIntyre, Alasdair. 2006. "First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues." ''The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays'' 1, edited by A. MacIntyre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-875108-7|978-0-19-875108-3}}
+* MacIntyre, Alasdair. 2006. "First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues". ''The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays'' 1, edited by A. MacIntyre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-875108-7|978-0-19-875108-3}}
 *  Makin, Stephen. 2006. ''Metaphysics Book Theta'', by Aristotle, with an introduction and commentary by S. Makin. New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-521-67061-6|0-521-67061-6}}
 * [[Herbert Marcuse|Marcuse, Herbert]]. ''Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity''. {{ISBN|0-262-13221-4|}}

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