Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2016 December 27

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December 27

Cultural structure of social media communities

Are there any sociological studies about the cultural structure of social media communities?

Dan Howell made a video about the Five Pillars of Tumblr, and it made me wonder if there's any validity to that idea.

Benjamin (talk) 02:20, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

What do you mean by "cultural structure"? ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 05:40, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

Subcultures, like the Five Pillars. Benjamin (talk) 20:23, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

Which Five pillars are you referring to, if any - or is it all of them? ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 21:37, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

What is wrong with trying to clarify a question? Why should the above be hatted? The person posting the original question is engaging in dialogue. Why not allow the dialogue to continue? Bus stop (talk) 03:09, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

There's nothing wrong with asking for clarifications on a Q, and the hatting, which I've now removed, was completely inappropriate. StuRat (talk) 04:51, 30 December 2016 (UTC)

Good catch. The hatting was done here,[1] by the ref desk troll. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 05:21, 30 December 2016 (UTC)

I'm talking about this. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=InTZfnNyLIQ&t=12s

Benjamin (talk) 04:05, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

Found at 6:45. Bus stop (talk) 04:40, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

Thanks, Bus stop. OK, at about 7:03 the commentator states that the 5 pillars of Tumbler are:

1) Aesthetics

2) Fandom

3) Social justice

4) Memes

5) Porn

I'm not sure if this has any wider acceptance than just this one guy's opinion, though. Benjamin, in the future, I suggest you give us all the info you have, and list items out, like I just did, rather than assume that everyone knows what you're asking about. Also, don't ask us to watch a 10 minute video to try to figure out what you already know but won't share with us. Now that I've listed them, maybe you will get an answer. StuRat (talk) 05:03, 30 December 2016 (UTC)

Sorry about that, and thanks for your input. I know that it's just one guy's opinion, but I was wondering if there were any formal studies of the cultural structure of social media communities, in general, not just regarding the five pillars. Benjamin (talk) 00:55, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

Hi Benjaminikuta—I'm not aware of any formal studies of the cultural structure of social media communities but I'm still not sure what the concept of "cultural structure" means. Even in other settings besides "social media communities" I don't know what cultural structures would be. Can you give a down-to-earth example of how cultural structures would manifest themselves? For instance, does a small-town community in the United States in the 1950s have a cultural structure? If so, what would that be? I only give this example because it seems simple and I would imagine such a setting would have already been subject to analysis. It may be that I am failing to grasp the essence of the question but my initial assumption is that such a culture would be structureless and any perceived order would be imposed externally by others outside of that community. Bus stop (talk) 15:02, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

I would be surprised if social media hasn't been studied at least to some degree. By cultural structure I mainly mean subcultures and ingroups, but I wouldn't so narrow my search. Benjamin (talk) 19:03, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

What would be an example of a subculture or ingroup? Bus stop (talk) 19:58, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

A Judge recusing themselves sua sponte due to religious obligations

Recently, an orthodox Jewish judge was appointed to New York's civil court circuit. The question arose about certain situations where Jewish law may prohibit her from hearing a case. For example, if both litigants are Jewish. Jewish law generally requires that a Jew who has a civil dispute with another Jew take the matter to Beis din, not the secular court system. There may be exceptions, but that's the general rule.

So, assuming this judge found herself facing this situation, and her religious beliefs precluded her from hearing the case. The case has yet to begin, so there would be no prejudice or cost to the parties if she were to handball the case to another judge. Would there be anything legally prohibiting her from recusing herself Sua sponte (of her own initiative) from hearing the case? Or would she be forced to retire from the bench if she refused to hear it, under "duty to sit" rules?

I'm sure there are other situations where this issue has arisen. For example, a Catholic judge asked to rule on a question of abortion law may well truly feel that his or her religious beliefs precluded them from approving an abortion, even though the law might require them to rule that way. (Not all Catholics hold such beliefs, but some may truly feel this way) Can the Judge recuse themselves before the case begins? Or would the "duty to sit" mean they would be forced to either hear the case, or retire from the bench?

NOTE that the Judge is recusing themselves of their own initiative, not at the request of a party, so the issue of "Judge shopping" (a party finding a Judge they feel will be sympathetic to their case, by asking a judge they perceive as ideologically unsympathetic to recuse themselves) does not arise.

I'm talking about the lower courts here, where a substitute judge is not a problem. Obviously, such a judge would be unsuitable for appointment to the supreme court, as replacement judges are not an option there, and the court sitting without its full membership is really not ideal.

Are there any rules, laws, or case law on this question?

(There seems to be a LOT of discussion about requests by a party for a Judge to recuse themselves. Much less discussion on a Judge in such a situation where the Judge faces a personal dilemma (in this case a religious one) about hearing the case altogether, not an issue of bias as to the outcome, but the parties have no problem with the judge hearing their case, they trust the judge to rule fairly. Our articles on Judicial disqualification and Substitution (law) do not seem to offer any clear insight on this question).

NOTE: THIS IS NOT A REQUEST FOR LEGAL ADVICE. This question ONLY involves how a JUDGE may or may not act, UNRELATED to requests or applications by parties to a proceeding - and a Judge, by definition, knows the law, and will NOT be getting answers from wikipedia to any legal dilemmas they may face! (I think questions as to the legal obligations and roles of judges or lawyers can seldom, if ever, be deemed "legal advice", as such individuals are legally trained, and will NOT be taking advice from a Wikipedian, unless the law somehow allows it).Eliyohub (talk) 09:20, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

I'm not qualified to answer this, but your implication that Orthodox Jews are not accepted for Supreme Court appointment seems like an extraordinary claim - why would you think that to be true? The relevant article Judicial disqualification currently doesn't tell us anything about a "duty to sit", but in any case recusal doesn't seem to be that obtrusive when it happens, and it does happen even on the Supreme Court. Wnt (talk) 12:41, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

It's not an issue of orthodox Jews "not being accepted" (there's no rule banning them!), it would be an issue as to the candidate's "ability to accept", given the Jewish law issues which may arise in requiring them to recuse themselves from certain matters. (I am not a Rabbi, can't say whether this would be an issue). And they would need to be fair and honest with the President and the Senate Judiciary Committee about the issue. And I would say that in the Supreme Court, recusal is significantly more obtrusive than in courts where a Justice can simply be substituted with another. Eliyohub (talk) 13:46, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

In fact, Jews not being allowed would violate the "religious test" clause in the Constitution. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 13:59, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

Absolutely true, BUT, if their religious obligations caused practical problems in the functioning of the court, such as forcing them to regularly recuse themselves from cases, there'd be a limit as to how far one would need to go to accommodate them, and I wouldn't blame the Senate Judiciary Committee for rejecting such a candidate. (And I happen to be a Jew myself, for what it matters, though this issue is by no means limited to Jews). Any more than employment law requires "reasonable" accommodation of an employee or potential employee's religious obligations, whilst recognising that the employer still needs to run his business. Australian judges have ruled that "reasonable" accommodation "falls somewhere between convenience and necessity". One must accommodate even if it is inconvenient. One need not accommodate if it is totally impractical. (I don't know if American courts agree). By the same token, a someone seeking a position as a Supreme court judge poses a significantly higher burden if they need to regularly recuse than in the lower courts, where they can be substituted relatively easily. That's my thought anyways. Eliyohub (talk) 14:32, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

I don't want to divert from my actual question, if anyone can answer it, and it does not relate to the supreme court: Can a Judge freely recuse themselves from particular cases based on the sort of issues I mentioned - be they Christian, Jewish, or whatever? Some people discussing this question on facebook seemed to suggest that some states have "duty to sit" rules which limit a judge's right to recuse. I think these rules were mostly based on dealing with recusal requests from a party, and didn't give much thought the the issue of self-recusal without either party requesting it. So how would reasons of the sort I have given fit with such rules? Can a Catholic Judge opt-out of hearing a case regarding abortion laws, if he (this particular catholic) held the belief that authorizing an abortion was against his religion, and the law might require him to do exactly that? Eliyohub (talk) 14:19, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

There is a fair amount of discussion here [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] mostly about Catholic judges. Note that a number of these sources talk both about disqualification and recusal but that appears to be because it's ultimately not always clear cut. E.g. the first one actually mentions how the terms are sometimes used distinctly but then goes on to say they will be using disqualification for both. In most cases if a judge doesn't voluntarily recuse when it's feared their religious beliefs may bias them in one direction, then there's a reasonable chance the lawyer for whoever is may lose out may ask for disqualification even if they may not get it (e.g. because of judge shopping concerns). But ultimately the answer of whether the judge should have been disqualified or should have voluntarily recursed is going to be the same so the sources generally addresses both of them.

BTW, as far as I can tell, there's no suggestion a judge shouldn't recurse if they feel they wouldn't be able to deliver an impartial verdict because of their religious beliefs. Actually it's generally agreed they should. The question is how the judge decides if their religious beliefs are going to mean their verdict isn't impartial. Although at least one source (the last one) does suggest that potentially the judge should step down in some cases.

I didn't see any examples where the issue wasn't an impartial verdict but simply a verdict, I assume because such a situation is so rare. (The stuff I did find about Jewish judges being asked to recuse are [9]). There is however the perhaps related issue where judges feel unable to perform same-sex marriages [10] [11] [12]. In that case, it definitely doesn't seem to be universally agreed that recusal (as opposed to either carrying out the marriages or stepping down) is an option.

Nil Einne (talk) 14:59, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

The Mississippi law dealing with objections to performing same-sex marriages was very broad, and thus may just raise constitutional issues. As long as the State ensures that an alternative clerk or Judge is promptly available (and that may well mean not posting such clerks or judges to remote locations where they're the sole official), why should such officials not have right to pass such matters on? If there was no other judge or clerk available, the "rule of necessity" might kick in, and the official may be forced to do the job, but otherwise, why should recusal not be an option?

The issue that I described in my question, where impartiality was not questioned at all, simply the judge being prohibited under Jewish law from even hearing the case (since Jewish law forbids Jews in civil disputes with other Jews from going to secular court) would be a new one, I assume? Eliyohub (talk) 15:25, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

You first need to prove that it's forbidden for her to judge the case. What is known is that it's forbidden for the parties to bring the case, but she is acting as an agent of the government. Is it also your opinion that a Jew may not be a policeman? 🔯 Sir Joseph ^🍸(talk) 15:45, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

The answer to your latter question I'd say is "no" - crime is crime. Rabbis have been pretty unanimous that when dealing with serious crimes, such as child molestation, where people are in danger, a Jew may report a fellow Jew to the police. The former question, I'm not a rabbi, so I can't answer conclusively, but assume the answer is yes, for the purposes of this question - a civil case. I'm asking how secular law would view a decision to recuse. Eliyohub (talk) 17:53, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

You're missing my point. According to basic rules of mesira, (let's exclude when it's allowed) a Jew can't snitch on another Jew. Does that mean a Jewish policeman can't arrest a Jew? No, of course not. So whether or not a Jew is allowed to take another Jew to court might be irrelevant to the Jewish judge, that judge is not a party to the case. She is not the first Orthodox Jewish judge, by the way. 🔯 Sir Joseph ^🍸(talk) 18:42, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

I have returned my comment to its original indentation [13]. I'm not sure why it was changed but please don't do that. My original indentation is nearly always correct and intentional. In this case I started replying before Eliyohub's followup even existed (I started at about 14:10) and my comment was primarily (I did notice the followup later while composing my reply) directed at the original question not the followup. Nil Einne (talk) 22:52, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

This is not dissimilar to our own ArbCom procedure. Judges recuse all the time - for example the judge listed to hear a case realises on reading the papers that he knows the defendant. Even if he's the sole judge for the area that's not a problem as a replacement can always be sent over from another circuit. It's not true that all the judges of SCOTUS have to hear cases together - as you can see from this link [14] more than one case may be being heard at any one time. 92.24.110.81 (talk) 13:40, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

As you might expect, there is a lot of guidance and precedent on judicial recusals. At the federal level, the primary sources of guidance are the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. There tend to be comparable statutes and codes at the state level. The American Bar Association has promulgated the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and some states have adopted versions of it, while in other jurisdictions it may have persuasive value.

Canon 2 of the Model Code states that a judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently. "Impartially" and its cognates are defined as "absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge." The former part of the definition is usually considered more important. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), which lists various situations under which recusal is required, focuses on personal bias or prejudice concerning particular parties or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. The mere fact that a judge has religious convictions are not usually taken to be disqualifying, unless they render him or her unable to follow controlling law. For example, some judges have recused themselves because they have strong views that abortion is wrong and they are unwilling to implement controlling Supreme Court precedent.

In the example given by the OP, a judge is unwilling to adjudicate a case because the litigants are Jewish, as is the judge, and the judge believes that the case instead should be handled by a beit din (a Jewish religious court, with various spellings). It is not clear to me that recusal is appropriate, as these facts do not necessarily imply bias or favoritism for one party over the other, particularly if both litigants are willing to be in civil court. I suppose an issue of partiality could arise if the judge felt a religious obligation to dismiss the case or to rule in favor of the litigant who sought to have the case handled by the beth din, although I think most lawyers and judges would consider this an unprofessional attitude on the judge's part. I am not aware of any cases where a judge has recused himself or herself when the litigants were both Jewish or the allegation was made in court that recusal was required, although there have been many cases involving Jewish litigants and a Jewish judge.

If a judge were to recuse himself or herself, I don't think the parties would be in any position to object, assuming there were other judges available. It is true that case law indicates that there is a "duty to sit," although that language was eliminated from 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1974. However, litigants are entitled to an unbiased judge, not to a judge of their choosing. Szeto v. United States, 2010 WL 1279072 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2010). Thus, the judge's recusal would not ordinarily give either party a right to object. And an occasional recusal by no means justifies a judge's retirement. John M Baker (talk) 18:18, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

London taxis and Oliver Cromwell

A follow-up question to an answer posted above, which has piqued my curiosity. The "Ordinance for the Regulation of Hackney-Coachmen in London" ([15]) was issued in June 1654. The Barebones Parliament was dissolved in December 1653, and the First Protectorate Parliament was convened on 3 September 1654. Which of Cromwell's executive bodies actually issued the ordinance? It doesn't seem as though either of the two parliaments in question were in existence in June 1654. Tevildo (talk) 15:03, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

See Instrument of Government (1653), which allowed Cromwell to govern by edicts which were ratified by the Council of State. Alansplodge (talk) 15:49, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

I see, thanks. In our Hackney carriage article, would "issued by Oliver Cromwell's Council of State" or just "issued by Oliver Cromwell" be a suitable replacement for the (factually incorrect) "approved by Parliament"? Tevildo (talk) 16:08, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

According to Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, many of the enactments from that period were "subsequently confirmed and given the force of statutes by an Act of the Protector's Second Parliament in 1657". If this ordinance is one of them, then it is not inaccurate to say that it was (later) approved by Parliament. --165.225.80.115 (talk) 10:45, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

It's probably inaccurate to say that it was approved by Parliament in 1654, so I think we should correct this, at least. Tracking down the legislative history in detail is proving tricky (and we probably don't need to include it in the article), but it would appear that the Court of Aldermen made by-laws to regulate hackney carriages in 1654 ([16]) following the Council of State's ordinance. The Hackney Carriage Driver's Company website ([17]) states that the ordinance was an Act of the First Protectorate Parliament, but this is contradicted by the Firth & Rait source you mention ([18]), and, according to our article, this parliament didn't in fact pass any acts. However, the Company's statement that "the Act was only to remain in force for three years" is consistent with later legislation by the Second Protectorate Parliament in 1657, although I've not been able to find a reference for this as yet. Perhaps "issued by Oliver Cromwell in 1654 and subsequently approved by Parliament" would be acceptable wording. Tevildo (talk) 13:50, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

Forbidden marriage

Let's say that Alice and Bob (I'm using placeholder names here) were married, in both the legal and religious way. Eventually, their relation decays, and Alice starts a new relation with Charles. With the law, it's easy: she gets divorced, and then gets married with Charles. But, as the Church is concerned, she is still married to Bob: she said "Till Death Do Us Part", and that phrase means it. Which means that, unless Bob dies, Alice and Charles will never get married in a Church.

But what would happen if priest David says "What the hell, I don't care about the Church's rules, Alice and Charles love each other so much, so I will get them married anyway!"? Which would be the consequences for David, and for Alice and Charles? Cambalachero (talk) 20:31, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

The answer depends very much on which church you are talking about. There are many denominations where remarriage is common after divorce, but others where David would be in trouble with a superior. We have some information in Christian views on divorce but perhaps someone can provide a better link or further information? Dbfirs 20:50, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

As far as the Roman Catholic church is concerned, the second marriage would be considered null and void. Our articles on Annulment (Catholic Church) and on Ligamen may provide some background. Fut.Perf. ☼ 20:58, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

Out of curiosity, if the hypothetical David was a Roman Catholic priest, and Alice and Charles were Roman Catholics too, what "punishment" would he (David the priest) likely face from the Church hierarchy for breaking this rule, and doing what the OP describes - marrying someone who's (according to the church) still married to someone else? And would Alice and Charles be either excommunicated or denied communion until they terminated what is (in the church's eyes!) an adulterous affair? Eliyohub (talk) 14:09, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

Under a previous version of canon law (the 1917 version) Alice and Charles would be admonished, told to terminate their illicit cohabitation, and excommunicated only if they failed to do so. Under the 1983 version of canon law, Alice and Charles would similarly be told that their activity was adulterous, but would not be excommuniated. They would, however, be told that as unrepentant sinners they could not participate in communion. But they could remain as members of the church. - Nunh-huh 21:09, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

Many thanks! And what would be the likely fate of the wayward priest? Eliyohub (talk) 01:03, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

I really have no clue. So it's strictly guess work from here on. But he'd be in trouble with his superiors. What form would his discipline take? Possibly demotion to a less desirable position. Possibly removal from the ministry. It would be an extreme case - maybe repeated episodes of disobedience - that could lead to laicization - but I think that extremely unlikely. - Nunh-huh 07:56, 29 December 2016 (UTC)